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This study originates from my practice experience working for the New 
Zealand Fire Service back in the late 1980's and early 1990's as an 
Occupational Health Nurse where I piloted a Critical lncident Stress Peer 
Support programme in the No.4 Region. My interest in the area began after 
attending a seminar on Critical lncident Stress Debriefing based on Mitchell's 
model of debriefing (1983). 1 had begun to recognise in my practice what I 
believed to be work-related stress but was a little uncertain about where this 
stress originated. After attending the seminar I began to understand that 
some of this stress was related to Critical lncident Stress (CIS) from 
firefighters exposure to critical incidents. 
This study explores four firefighters experience of Critical lncident Stress 
Debriefing (CISD) within a Region of the New Zealand Fire Service. It 
explores the application of CISD as one component of Critical lncident Stress 
Management (CISM), and the Nurse Researcher's philosophy of Clinical 
Nurse practice in relation to the application of CISD. The knowledge gained 
from the analysis of the data has the potential to influence professionals 
understanding of their experience and affect future practice and that of others 
working in the field of CISM. 
The aim of the study was to gain a greater indepth understanding of 
firefighters experience specifically in relation to their participation in a Critical 
lncident Stress Debriefing (CISD) following their exposure to a critical 
incident. Much of the literature that supported CISD appeared to offer a 
rather superficial understanding of the firefighters experience in relation to 
CISD. I chose to use narratives as the methodology, utilising four individual 
case studies as a method of social inquiry in order to explore the experience 
of CISD. The narratives were able to creatively capture the complexity and 
the dynamic practice of CISD. 
An overall pattern of the formalised process was uncovered through the 
participants' narratives. Eight dominant themes were highlighted from the 
narratives which included safe environment; ventilating the stress 
reaction; similar feelings; getting the whole picture; peer support; 
bonding and resolution. While these themes were common to all the 
participants, each participant had a particular themels which was unique to 
their experience. 
As a Nurse Researcher with dual practice interests in the area of nursing 
education and Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), I am in a position 
to inform practice and service development. It is my belief that the 
knowledge gained from this study has the potential to be transferred to others 
working in the field of CISM. The study results are timely, practical and 
informative at a time of major change in the New Zealand Fire Service. 
At the risk of being a large Master's thesis I Rave chosen to submit at this 
point in time with the intention of doing further research in the future. As a 
Nurse Educator, Nurse Consultant and Nurse Researcher, I continually seek 
to establish deep meaningful relationships with my clientslpatients and this is 
reflected in the text of this thesis. The sections on personal philosophy, 
philosophy of practice and the history of the New Zealand Fire Service, are 
very important for me to include as indepth discussion because this positions 
my role as a Nurse Consultant in the New Zealand Fire Service (which is 
unique in New Zealand and treasured by myself) so I can deliver a powerful 
nursing contribution to the Service. 
This thesis provides a historical record of a new era in crisis intervention in 
the New Zealand Fire Service which includes Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing (CISD). It demonstrates to other Occupational Health Nurses and 
others working in the field what my role is and enables an indepth critique of 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing. 
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l .  INTRODUCTION 
The origins of this research began from a need to identify in more depth 
firefighters experience of stress, so I was better able to work effectively in 
the area of Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) in my various roles 
in the New Zealand Fire Service as a Clinical Nurse Consultant with an 
educational background and a strong primary health care focus. I have 
chosen to present this thesis with a discussion on my role and my 
philosophy of practice which is a central focus to my model of practice. The 
intention of this document is to inform firefighters and others working in the 
field of CISM, a model of practice which works in partnership with members 
of the Peer Support Team and those firefighters who utilise the CISM 
services in times of significant stress. A discussion in the chapters on the 
history and culture of the New Zealand Fire Service are critical as they 
naturally represent my perception and view of the Service and should be 
read in this context. 
Information regarding the harmful effects of exposure to traumatic 
experiences has been chronicled for centuries (Saigh, 1992). As far back 
as 1666, the diary of Samuel Pepys, who witnessed the Great Fire of 
London, records intrusive thoughts and a disturbed sleep pattern still being 
experienced 6 months post-incident. During the many wars in this century 
there has been extensive documentation about the psychological effects of 
war-related trauma. Crisis intervention strategies have been used in military 
settings since the middle of the First World War for dealing with acute 
combat psychiatric casualties (Kormos, 1978). As a consequence of the 
Vietnam War there has been scientific studies of survivors of combat stress 
who suffer the condition now known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). 
Recognition of the personal pain and suffering of emergency service 
personnel and health professionals engaged in crisis, trauma and disaster, 
has only been seriously acknowledged in recent years. Historically there 
has been the assumption of the "John Wayne", the "tough cowboy" and the 
"stiff upper lip" image of emergency service personnel, who were often seen 
as being hardened to the pain and suffering of others and indifferent to their 
responsibility for the saving of lives, is well documented (Mitchell, 1983). 
Many lessons have been learnt from major disasters, particularly in relation 
to a number of airline crashes in the United States during the 1970's and 
1980's that have involved massive input from emergency service personnel 
in dealing with the loss and rescue of multiple casualties. An important 
lesson learnt is that emergency service personnel and others involved in 
crisis, trauma, emergency and disaster do not generally become hardened 
to the pain and suffering of others or indifferent to their role of saving lives. 
These rescuers, from whatever service they originate, are vulnerable and 
suffer from the normal physical, emotional and psychological effects in 
response to their witnessing the horrors of human tragedy. 
Crisis intervention is required in order to mitigate, where possible, the 
harmful effects of exposure to a traumatic incident and to support 
emergency service personnel in managing any adverse negative emotional 
reactions which could have the potential to cause PTSD. Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the most widely used of the official diagnostic 
terms employed to denote the psychological sequelae that exist in response 
to a traumatic event. It was first officially recognised in the psychiatric 
taxonomy of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual Disorders (DSM) in 1980, and has subsequently been 
retained in editions of the DSM, specifically DSM - l 1  1 (APA, 1987) and 
DSM - IV (APA, 1994). According to the 1980 taxonomy, PTSD involved 
the 
"development of characteristic symptoms following a 
psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside 
the realm of human experience" (APA, 7980, p.236). 
It was also indicated that the "stressor" producing this syndrome would 
evoke significant 
"symptoms of distress in most people, and is generally 
outside the range of such common experiences as 
simple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses 
or marital conflict" ( APA, 1980, p.237). 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is recognised by three characteristic 
clusters of symptoms. The three clusters include intrusive recollective 
thoughts; arousal and numbing; withdrawal andlor avoidance. The 
traumatic event or critical incident is one that is markedly distressing to 
almost anyone and often produces intense fear, terror or helplessness 
(APA, 1994). 
Professor Jeffrey Mitchell, previously a firefighterlparamedic and now a 
psychologist, pioneered the Critical lncident Stress Debriefing (CISD) 
concept. Critical Incident Stress as defined by Mitchell (1983) is 
"any situation faced by emergency service personnel that 
causes them to experience unusually strong emotional 
reactions which have the potential to interfere with their 
ability to function either at the scene or sometime later" 
(p.36). 
Critical lncident Stress Debriefing is a 
"psychological and educational group process designed 
specifically for emergency workers with two purposes in 
mind. First to mitigate the impact of a critical incident on 
the personnel, and second, to assist in the healing process 
of the members who are experiencing the normal symptoms 
and reactions to a stressful event" (Pierce, 1993, p. 19). 
In essence it normalises the physical, emotional and cognitive effects on 
personnel from an exposure to an abnormal event. 
"Mosf reactions fo trauma are normal and do not indicate 
pafhology or collapse" (Buckle & Hill, 1995, p.34). 
Debriefing following exposure to traumatic stress was also developed by 
Dyregrov (1989) referred to a "psychological debriefing" and more informally 
by Raphael (1986). The debriefing aims in all models were to reduce the 
effects of the traumatic incident by supporting and encouraging the 
processing of the event in a group setting, piecing together information 
surrounding the event, and normalising the personal effects in a supportive 
environment. It attempts to speed up the recovery of personnel exposed to 
a traumatic incident before more serious stress reactions have an 
opportunity to interfere with their professional, family, health and social life 
(Mitchell, 1983; 1988a; 1988b; Dyregrov, 1989). 
1 .l. AIMS AND PURPOSE 
As a primary health care nurse clinician, I have walked alongside and 
worked with firefighters for the last 10 years and it is my belief that reducing 
stress, particularly occupational stress, greatly maintains the productivity of 
firefighters. It is important to provide stress management strategies that are 
acceptable, appropriate and accessible to emergency workers who are at 
risk of specific health problems related to their exposure to critical incidents 
such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
The research seeks to elicit the exp,erience of debriefing through in-depth 
interviews. As the researcher, my goal is to explore some of the meanings 
attached to the debriefing process, particularly in relation to how the 
debriefing has assisted the firefighters to deal with a specific critical incident 
that they are asked to recall. 
In this research, I will attempt to uncover and understand firefighters 
experience of ClSD so that it may further add to the development and 
knowledge of studying the effects of critical incident stress and stress 
management strategies over a wider group of people in the population. 
In the research proposal my stated aims was to explore, within the New 
Zealand context, the experience of ClSD on firefighters following attendance 
at a critical incident (Cl). The purpose was to gain contextual meaning and 
understanding of the experiences of firefighters who have participated in a 
ClSD based on Mitchell's model of debriefing (1983). 
The goal at the end of the study is to make recommendations based on 
research findings that will clarify the value of ClSD in order to sustain, 
refine, reshape or suggest a rationale for its removal from use as a model 
within the New Zealand Fire Service. The research findings may provide 
further information which could have broader applicability to a wider group 
of other emergency and health care providers who provide a similar 
debriefing process or who are planning to implement stress management 
policies in the future. 
I developed indepth questions to explore the meaning of. ClSD for 
firefighters from their perspective, using in-depth discussion between the 
researcher and the firefighters. Freire (1972) defines this communication as 
"a two way inter-communication, a horizontal relationship 
between persons who are engaged in a joint critical search" 
(cited in Reason and Rowan, 1981, p.350). 
I was able to frame the research questions in such a way as to elicit the 
firefighters' stories in the interpretive paradigm. Knowledge and 
understanding of this stress experience is not possible without describing 
the human experience as it is lived by the firefighters themselves. 
Therefore the methodology for this research links the narrative of the event 
to understand the phenomenon of the specific life event, Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing. Narrative was the eventual approach of choice because 
of its potential to explain or to express, to analyse or to understand (Reason 
& Hawkins, 1988). It revealed the "realness" and depth of the experience 
for the participants. Like phenomenology, which was my initial choice of 
methodology, the narrative does not claim to offer effective theory in order 
to explain andlor control our world. It is a philosophical position, a lens on 
the world and a tool that offers us real insights into the everyday world of 
peoples' experiences (Van Manen, 1990). In the future I would like to 
explore other questions such as the timeliness of debriefing. 
I have been passionate in my exploration to understand firefighters' 
experiences related to Critical. Incident Stress and the debriefing process. 
Previously I have discussed ideas and issues within education and peer 
debriefing sessions with firefighters. I have utilised surveys and 
questionnaire evaluations and reflected indepth over many years. 
However, I had reached a point in my practice where I wanted to formally 
discuss in greater depth firefighters experience of the debriefing process. 
Narrative is a particularly useful methodology for nurses to uncover the 
experience of the storyteller, in order to share poorly understood details of 
this information with others who may have a similar experience. 
"Nursing practice involves diagnosing and treating human 
responses to actual and potential health problems and 
since humans respond as whole persons, knowledge of 
the lived experiences of health and healing are legitimate 
topics of nursing inquiry" (Swanson-Kauffman & Schonwald, 
1988, p.97). 
Following conversations with colleagues and after the pilot interview, 1 
developed the following open-ended questions to generate further 
discussion. The questions invite a response, especially in the form of a 
story. The questions were:- 
"Tell me about your experience related to participating 
in a recent Critical lncident Stress Debriefing". 
"What did you find most helpful in terms of assisting you to 
discuss the incidenf?" 
"Tell me how being involved in a ClSD has affected you." 
These three questions were asked consistently of the four participants and 
sewed to elicit specific storying. This thesis presents an analysis which I 
have done continually from the proposal and pilot interview through all 
stages of the research. In the interpretive approach, the aim is to focus on 
the interviews exploring the experience of ClSD while actually collecting and 
analysing the data (Glesne & Pleshkin, 1992). This created a spiral effect 
as each subsequent interview, while unique, added to my indepth 
understanding of the process of debriefing. This process will be described 
in detail in Chapter 7. 1 then chose to relate each participant's narrative as a 
case study in it's own right in order to 
"seek out whaf is common and what is particular abouf 
the case, but the end result presenfs something unique" 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p.238). 
I have chosen to relate my experience of the New Zealand Fire Service 
briefly in the introduction but will develop it indepth and will include my own 
life story for a number of reasons. The style of "working with", in partnership 
with my clientslpatients, that is nursing as an Occupational Health Nurse 
brings me into close contact with people. My own personal family and 
educational history shaped my beliefs, work philosophy, subsequent 
practice and vision in the New Zealand Fire Service dramatically. For this 
reason I have recounted personal details to reveal my role in developing a 
Critical Incident Stress Management programme in such a significant time in 
the history of the New Zealand Fire Service. 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
In 1989 1 attended a seminar facilitated by Dr.Robyn Robinson, a clinical 
psychologist from Melbourne, Australia, on Critical lncident Stress 
Debriefing. I had recently taken up a position as an Occupational Health 
Nurse with the New Zealand Fire Service and I was beginning to recognise 
in my practice some of the effects of traumatic stress. I suspected this may 
have been related to the firefighters occupational exposure to repeated 
rescue and disaster work. Examples of what I was seeing in my practice 
were alcohol and suspected drug abuse; high levels of smoking at a time 
when smoking was decreasing in the general population, high marriage 
breakdown and a high incidence of sick leave, both illness and accident 
related. Dr.Robinson had established a Critical lncident Stress Debriefing 
(CISD) team in Melbourne for emergency service personnel and had 
educated personnel on Critical lncident Stress (CIS) and ways of preventing 
this in emergency service personnel and others exposed to critical incidents 
that were likely to cause significant stress or distress in their lives. 
After attending this seminar, I spent time researching, reflecting and 
discussing with others who had a longer work history with the Fire Service 
than myself, about the appropriateness of introducing such a concept into 
the Fire Service. I will discuss my reflections as to the eventual outcome in 
a later chapter. 
1.3 MY PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
It is important that I discuss my background as it has enabled me to be 
confident in my work to formulate my own philosophy which underpins my 
present practice. My personal background has assisted me to have the 
ability to understand the relationship of firefighters' professional lives, their 
upbringing, training, life choices, fears, failures and achievements in a 
broader context when we meet. 
I was raised in an Irish-Catholic close knit family where I was the youngest 
of three children. My father was from a working-class background with 
minimal education though he achieved well academically until he left school 
at age 14. He married my mother who was from a middle-class background 
who left school at the age of 15 years to work as a Secretary in a bank until 
she married at 21. Her life has been spent bringing up her family, 
supporting my father who became a very successful businessman at an 
early age, and even though she has travelled widely her life has very much 
focussed around her home and family. My two brothers attended a private 
boys boarding school and their education and academic attainment was 
seen as being of more importance than my own. They both achieved well 
academically at secondary school. However, neither went on to attain any 
tertiary qualification as they both joined my father's business in their early 
twenties. 
My parents are both very loving and caring parents, but like many of their 
generation they did not view academic attainment as being as important for 
their daughter For most of my education I attended an all girls Catholic 
school. I do not have very fond memories of school particularly in relation to 
academic attainment. Throughout my schooling I was a very average 
student and always seemed to be placed in the middle stream classes with 
little encouragement from my teachers that I could achieve at a higher level. 
I decided in my second year of secondary school to take a combined 
general and commercial course. I achieved highly in the commercial 
subjects always being in the top stream. Even though I enjoyed the 
commercial subjects I did not plan to pursue a long term career in this area. 
I remained uncertain about what career option I would choose upon leaving 
school and had thoughts of being a Karitane nurse, who looked after 
children in their homes, not unlike being a nanny. I also considered being a 
kindergarten teacher. However, it was my girlfriend's mother, Sheila, who 
had a real interest in education who counselled me about my options and 
encouraged me to consider a career in nursing. My father was not all that 
encouraging as I think he thought the life would be too harsh and maybe he 
had ideas of his daughter marrying and having children and not having to 
think about a long term career outside of the home environment. 1 often 
thank Sheila for spending time and encouraging me in the area of nursing 
as I value her contribution in helping me to find a career that I have found 
truly satisfying and challenging and which has led me into areas of nursing 
which I never dreamed were possible. 
I commenced part-time university studies in 1984 and received 
encouragement from a very special friend and mentor, Pat, who I had 
worked for in his general practice. During my studies at university I was 
employed in the areas of practice nursing, public health nursing and 
occupational health nursing. I completed my undergraduate degree with 
above average grades which I had never thought possible for me. 
Upon completing my degree I moved into the area of nursing education 
where I have been able to share many of my skills and knowledge in a 
caring environment. The Whitirieia Community Polytechnic's Nursing 
School's philosophy is based on Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Appendix 1 ) and is 
reflected in students learning through partnership, governorship, autonomy 
and empowerment. This philosophy has profoundly affected the 
development of my professional philosophy in education as well as my 
clinical practice. 
The overriding principles of assessment in the curriculum are to encourage 
critical self-evaluation and for students and tutors in partnership to gain 
personal and professional insight into their practice (Whitireia Curriculum, 
1993, Appendix 2). Another principle of the Institution is that of equity which 
supports "second opportunity" education for those who have previously 
failed or under-achieved in the education system. I believe that because of 
my own personal experience as discussed, I can empathise with these 
students and have a strong commitment to support them in their quest for 
higher learning and achievement. 
Nursing is a profession that I have always felt proud to be working in and it 
has always been important for me to give 100% of myself in all areas of my 
practice, especially with my clients. From an early age I have always 
enjoyed caring for others and nursing has given me the opportunity to focus 
upon developing the art and craft of caring, which I believe is a skill unique 
to nursing. Most of my post-registration years have been spent working 
primarily in the community where the 1986 Ottawa Charter for health 
promotion and Alma Ata codes were forerunners to the organisational 
mission statements of the late 1980s. Since 1993 1 have worked in nursing 
education, where my philosophy of practice has evolved. 
1.4 PHILSOPHY OF PRACTICE. 
My philosophical beliefs centre around being in partnership with my clients, 
the community and the students in the teachingllearning process. I value 
and respect others' values, culture, gender, age, spiritual beliefs and 
experiences. 
I realised at an early stage of working in the area of primary health care that 
it was vital to work in partnership with my clients in order to practice 
effectively. I viewed myself as being a guest in their environment initially, 
and when a trusting relationship had been established I worked with them 
as partners in their journey to health and wellness, whatever health and 
wellness meant for that particular individual, family, community or group. I 
am in a unique position to enact those beliefs in my day to day work and to 
shape my sense of quality in practice. 
In my present practice in nursing education I see partnership as caring not 
controlling. I value both myself and the student being cared for on their 
journey of discovery (Watson, 1988). 1 acknowledge the students unique 
past experiences as being part of the caring relationship. I view both 
partners, that is students and myself, as being on a journey and an 
important link in the chain, where the students are prepared to become 
responsible and accountable for their own practice. Knowtes (1987) 
discusses the importance of providing an environment which enables the 
adult student to feel accepted, respected and supported, where the spirit of 
mutuality between both the educator and the student exists as joint 
enquirers. 
Personally, I need to share of myself in a teachingllearning environment, to 
establish trustworthy relationships with the students. This relates to 
Peplau's theory that gives support to the nurselclient relationship. Peplau 
identifies four phases in the nurselclient relationship as being orientation, 
identification, exploitation and resolution, which although separate, overlap 
and occur over the time of the relationship (Marrimer-Toomey, 1989). 1 see 
myself as coming together with the students as strangers where we build up 
a relationship of trust, teaching each other, utilising each other as resource 
persons and leading each other on a journey of discovery with the ultimate 
aim of assisting the students to gain the necessary knowledge in terms of 
theory and practice. Benner (1984) refers to this as the 'beginner 
practitioner'. 
I want the students to enjoy their journey, to give them a thirst, a passion 
and a commitment to nursing and to feel proud to say they are "a nurse" in a 
powerful voice, not "just a nurse" in a passive voice. I have a professional 
obligation to care for the students. I have evolved this sense of care so that 
I care for firefighters. 
I am in a unique and privileged position to assist them on their journey of 
finding their house, travelling through their garden by cultivating and toiling 
their roots and by being there for them in times of wandering through the 
wilderness. Kelley (1 995) discusses the house-garden wilderness metaphor 
where Parse's theory of Human Becoming (1992) 
"fosters journeying and sojourning with persons in a 
house-garden wilderness " (p.61). 
I used Parse's practice methodology to guide me in living the ideal of a 'true 
presence' with my clients and students, travelling with them on their journey 
and seeing how it is for them. True presence for me means real and 
genuine human to human relating and being open to what is happening to 
the person in the moment. Parse's Human Becoming theory (1992) 
"is grounded in the belief that humans co-author their 
becoming in mutual process with the universe, CO-creating 
distinguishable pafferns which specify the uniqueness of 
both humans and the universe" (p.5). 
Another key concept in my personal philosophy is that of viewing the clients 
and students holistically, understanding them as a non-reducible totality, 
being more than the sum of parts. Chin and Kramer (1 991 ) claim 
"the most consistent philosophic component of the idea 
of the person is the dimension of wholeness or holism" (p.42). 
It is important for me to view the students as totally unique, irreducible, 
unpredictable and forever changing. I believe communication skills, 
knowledge of self and others, and personal growth are all important areas to 
be developed with the nursing students so that the students will be able to 
provide humanistic care and are also able to view their clients as totally 
unique, unpredictable and forever changing. 
Wholeness enacted in my daily practice means that I have to "walk it like I 
talk it" and to enable this to happen I need to create an environment which 
is full of possibilities, a garden which has rich soil with potential for much 
growth and future development. In 1859 Nightingale (1969) ascribed a 
great deal of importance to knowledge of environmental factors. My goal is 
to create an environment that puts the students in the best condition for 
learning to occur. By presencing myself with the students, to truly care, I 
create authentic care, not a power-based care which creates dependence, 
but care which enables the students to travel through their own house- 
garden wilderness. 
It is important for me to establish an open authentic relationship genuinely 
allowing the students freedom and choice, providing a loving, nurturing 
environment which recognises the potential for human growth, even in times 
of wandering through the wilderness. It is necessary to be consciously in 
partnership, with space to learn from one another and acknowledge this 
learning. The chance of promoting self-actualisation, self-acceptance and 
self-fulfilment with the ultimate aim of the students becoming everything 
they are capable of becoming can be realised. As nurse educators we take 
the transformative potential from the Te Tiriti o Waitangi document 
embedded in the 'Whitireia Nursing Department's curriculum philosophy and 
illuminate the teachingnearning partnership, and the nurselclient relationship 
in nursing practice (Southwick, 1994). 
The curriculum also illuminates Parse's (1981) Man-Living-Health (now 
known as Human Becoming) theory where she elaborates on Roger's 
description of human beings by expounding about the person's nature being 
able to transcend the actual and move toward the possible. Students can 
come into the undergraduate and post-registration nursing program, who 
may have failed in other educational programs and by assisting the students 
in their journey, in providing a nurturing, supportive environment, the 
students learn and discover they are able to do what previously they 
considered impossible. I have the skills and empathy to assist as a person 
who experienced the feeling of underachievement in my secondary 
schooling and was then able to move into a university program within the 
Nursing Department at Victoria University of Wellington which provided a 
very affirming, nurturing and caring environment. I assist students in their 
own journey of discovery by sharing my own story and walk with the 
students, encouraging them to believe in their own possibilities and to 
believe in the process. 
Hughes (1995) discusses how Madeleine Leininger explored major factors 
that aided or hindered the practice of caring. Leininger teaches care-giving 
strategies to nursing students through role-modelling experiences from day 
one in their clinical experience. She considers it is important to teach and 
model to nursing students how to spend time talking, listening, touching and 
comforting, with less time focussing on the technological interaction. This 
is consistent with the emphasis on the need to focus on the client as a 
human being. I believe care is the essence of nursing and the desire to 
care is one of the main motivating factors in people who choose nursing as 
a career. Benner and Wrubel (1989) used the word "caring" to mean "being 
connected and having things matter" (p .1) .  It is a term that fuses thought, 
feeling and action and can be used to describe a wide range of nursing 
involvement. 
The capacity to care is not an automatic way of relating to people. As a 
nurse educator the challenge for me is to develop and professionalise the 
capacity to care for students. Caring must be affirmed and actualised. 
However, it is only through experience that students learn the practice of 
care. I must not just be content to work with students to only develop their 
thinking skills but it is only through the many times of applying the content in 
actual situations which include reflecting on mistakes that students can 
begin to practice skilfully the art and craft of care. 
I believe that to help foster nursing students capacity to care, the students 
need to have a sense of being cared for, to nurture their abilities to care for 
others. The students need to feel valued and respected and the precious 
gift of time is an essence of care. By being made to feel special and 
valued, that is cared for, this assists them to use caring behaviours with 
their clients in the clinical settings. 
As a Nurse Consultant working as a Clinical Director with the New Zealand 
Fire Service, I have been able to integrate the roles of clinician, educator, 
researcher and policy developer in the organisation. Like Kelley's (1995) 
house-garden-wilderness metaphor which is linked to Parse's Human 
Becoming theory (1992), 1 have travelled a journey through many houses in 
my various roles in nursing. It has been in travelling through gardens, being 
cultivated and having my roots shaped by others with indepth knowledge 
and experience (who have being there for me in my times of wandering 
through the wilderness) that I have succeeded. These role models have 
journeyed with me in times of doubt and confusion and have helped me 
shape my practice to what it is today. 
My philosophy of practice fits well with my present and previous workplaces. 
It is one of the main motivating factors why I have chosen to work in these 
areas. I recognise organisational influences such as frequent health policy 
changes and political influences that constrain the full expression of my 
philosophy of practice. In the present time of the increasing need for fiscal 
restraint, cost is a factor which definitely hinders my philosophy of practice. 
Nurses are forever reminded about the costs of care in terms of time, 
energy and money. However, it is important for me to teachllearn the ethic 
of care knowing that nurses do make a "difference" and that extra time, 
energy and even money is very likely going to enhance recovery or aid in a 
peaceful death. As a nurse I can be active in educating those who hold the 
power and the money, of the importance of care in terms of quality care and 
the ultimate cost savings. Watson (1990) discusses how the 
"health care system has traditionally operated within 
a patriarchal structure that treats normal life processes 
as illness and has no place for the basic health human 
caring concerns. It is an approach that has persisted 
despite caring, courageous and skilful contributions made 
by nurses" (p. 62). 
To positively change this structure, I need to work collectively with my 
colleagues to influence changes in health policies and to overcome our 
invisibility as we are a major contributor to effective health care. We have 
proven that hierarchal and patriarchal structures no longer create high 
achievers or competent nurses, but if we become CO-participants on an 
equal level as colleagues, we can offer a high quality of care. 
Roberts (1990) discusses the invisibility of caring nursing practice. These 
caring characteristics need to be uncovered so they can be taught, 
rewarded and recognised with the ultimate aim of successful patienffclient 
outcomes so that collaboration and co-operation between nurses and 
physicians can truly enhance patienffclient outcomes. When I worked 
collaboratively with the Regional Medical Officer in the Fire Service in 
Occupational Health, our ultimate aim was working together to achieve what 
was best for the occupational group. I engendered in my clients a feeling of 
power and control over their own health andlor illness. By educating and 
assisting my clients on their journey, be they student nurses or Fire Service 
personnel, I knew I was sowing the seeds and assisting them to cultivate 
their own garden, that is one of self-responsibility, self determination, a 
feeling of being in control and not being controlled or oppressed by the 
nurses and doctors who held the knowledge and power. As the Brazilian 
educationalist Paulo Freire (1972) contends, the great humanistic and 
historical task of the oppressed, is to liberate themselves and their 
oppressors as well. 
I remain ever mindful of my commitment to human caring and remain 
vigilant in raising caring consciousness in the nursing educational 
curriculum without devaluing technological advances. Many believe that 
technology is the panacea for treatment and cure but high technological 
environments can prevent me from truly caring. Hawthorne and Yurkovich 
(1994) discuss that the results of technology are no longer being balanced 
with a consciousness of the spiritual nature of man and his need to care and 
for caring. 
In the past and even in the present, nurses tend to hid behind professional 
masks which prevents true caring taking place. This can be related to 
culture, values, lack of trust and a lack of knowledge of own self. These 
need to be addressed with individual nurses and help must be made 
available to work through their own issues that impede their ability to care. 
My philosophy of practice encompasses various nursing theorists (Parse, 
1981; Benner, 1984; Watson, 1988; Christiansen, 1990) that have 
influenced and reflect my practice focus which relates closely to the 
curriculum philosophy of my workplace. I have used the Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
as my philosophical base to illuminate meaning in the teachingllearning and 
nurselclient partnership of my practice. There are other outside influences 
that impede full expression of my philosophy of practice such as oppression, 
costs and the hiding behind professional masks, but I believe these can be 
overcome by a critical analysis, performance, reviews and strategies with 
career planning in order to provide quality care. As nursing is moving in an 
era of rapid health care reform, it is even more imperative that nurses 
become more vocal by advocating for their clients, families and communities 
for quality health care. Nurses must remain committed to the centrality of 
caring to nursing practice. 
As I continue my lifelong journey in nursing, I am continually challenged and 
passionately interested in enhancing my practice of caring with the ultimate 
aim of engendering excellence in the art and craft of caring, be it in nursing 
education or nursing in the community. Caring to me is the true essence of 
nursing. 
I have discussed my philosophy of practice at length as I feel it is vital for 
me to explicate my day to day interactions of being in the world as a person 
and as a nurse. For me there is daily evidence that these insights and the 
ability to converse in the moment about who I am and how I work 
professionally, provides an important mature role model in the New Zealand 
Fire Service. I have introduced the journey metaphor and will develop it 
through this research as I plan to further disclose my practice by discovering 
and revealing the art and craft of my practice in relation to Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing. 
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In the following chapters I will present a journey metaphor to enable the 
reader to consider my personal and professional story, the history of the 
New Zealand Fire Service Occupational Health Service and a discussion on 
the Fire Service culture and occupational stress related to firefighting. An 
extensive review of the literature in relation to Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing of emergency service personnel will be discussed. My choice of 
methodology and the difficulty around this choice and the research design 
followed throughout the research will be discussed in two distinctive 
chapters. The four participants' narratives will be unveiled with an analysis 
of their stories and the research findings in three chapters. The first of 
these chapters will focus on one particular firefighters unique experience, 
the second chapter will focus on the three other participants unique 
experience and the third chapter will highlight the pattern and themes that 
were uncovered in the analysis of the narratives. Following these chapters 
a discussion on the implications for future practice will be discussed 
presenting a model based on the pattern and themes that were highlighted 
in the research. In conclusion I will make recommendations to Management 
of the New Zealand Fire Service based on the findings with a discussion on 
the limitations of this study and recommendations for further research. 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
In this introduction I have positioned the Thesis within a context of my 
nursing experience both in the educational setting and the New Zealand 
Fire Service. I have discussed at length my personal philosophy as I 
believe it is vital to understand my being in the world as a Nurse Consultant, 
particularly in relation to my practice in caring and supporting firefighters 
following their exposure to critical incidents. In the next chapter I intend to 
discuss my professional story- in relation to the introduction of the ClSD 
concept into the New Zealand Fire Service. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As previously stated I have a passionate interest in understanding firefighters 
experience in relation to their exposure to a critical incident. My intention is 
to use this research to actively reduce the traumatic effects following a critical 
incident through understanding the value of Critical lncident Stress 
Debriefing. Having worked in the area of Critical lncident Stress Debriefing 
(now broadly referred to as Critical lncident Stress Management) for 10 
years, I am resolute to increase my personal knowledge in this area and 
committed to the wide sharing of this knowledge within and beyond the New 
Zealand Fire Service. The way I have chosen to do this is through sharing 
my journey of my "house-garden-wildernessSS in relation to the establishment 
of a Critical lncident Stress Debriefing Peer Support programme. 
Subsequently this programme was redeveloped and renamed a Critical 
lncident Stress Management Peer Support programme. 1 share my journey 
so that others may benefit from my story. 
2.2 THE BEGINNINGS 
I was attracted to the position of Occupational Health Nurse for the New 
Zealand Fire Service as I wanted to focus my practice on one particular 
occupational group. Working for an emergency service organisation 
appeared to offer me the challenge that I was searching for. I had previously 
worked in the field of Occupational Health and enjoyed the diversity. I found 
it challenged my own values and belief systems. I believed that I could make 
a difference through empowering people who I was working with to take 
control of their own lives in terms of their own personal safety and health. It 
had a reflexive action on myself as their partner. I felt I could truly work in 
partnership with my clients journeying with them in the their lives, not only in 
relation to their physical health, but also the emotional, mental, spiritual and 
social aspects. 
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In 1988 1 was employed as a Regional Occupational Health Nurse together 
with a Regional Medical Officer of Health in one of the six Regions of the 
New Zealand Fire Service. Our employment arose out of an inquiry into the 
ICI fire, which occurred in Auckland in 1984 (Report on the Fire at ICI New 
Zealand Limited's Riverview Store, Mount Wellington, 1984). As a 
consequence of attending the ICI fire many firefighters suffered long-term 
physical, emotional and psychological effects. It is my belief that if a credible 
Occupational Health Service had been in operation many of these harmful 
effects could have been minimised or even prevented. Dr Bill Treadwell, the 
Principal Medical Officer for the New Zealand Fire Service for 13 years, said 
on his retirement with regards to the Occupational Health Service and 
subsequent development of ClSD 
" I  believe if we'd had these in place at the time of the ICI 
fire there wouldn't have been the perceived problems that 
subsequently arose" (Treadwell, 1993, p.3.). 
It was with this history, that I embarked on my new position as an 
Occupational Health Nurse. The wide ranging impact of the ICI fire, was to 
have a significant impact on my practice. My brief was to cover a 
geographical area that was reasonably well contained. However, my 
occupational group consisted of both permanent and volunteer firefighters 
and a large number of administrative staff. I felt like a pioneer treading new 
ground. As this was a new service, there was a certain amount of suspicion 
and fear regarding the role and aims of the Occupational Health Service from 
both the Management and from those firefighters who worked at the 
grassroots level. In order to provide an effective service, I realised at the 
outset that it was vital to establish a trusting relationship with the firefighters. 
I decided that the most practical way to establish this relationship was to 
begin with Standard 1: Assessment of the Standards for Occupational Health 
Nursing in New Zealand (1988). Within my first year of employment I carried 
out a health and audiometry assessment on all permanent firefighters within 
the Region. It was during this time that I began to recognise what I believed 
were the effects of work-related stress. I recognised a high incidence of 
alcohol and suspected drug abuse, a higher incidence of smoking than in the 
general population (when smoking was beginning to reduce in the general 
population) and a particularly high incidence of marriage breakdown. 
An increasing number of firefighters were being medically "boarded out" of 
the service and I believed that there were some firefighters who may have 
been suffering from PTSD as a consequence of attending a critical incident. 
They had received little or no crisis management interventions following their 
exposure to the critical incident. It may have felt more comfortable for those 
individuals to be medically boarded on the grounds of a physical injury, which 
was viewed as more acceptable and genuine, as opposed to being medically 
boarded for a stress related disorder. It must be remembered within the 
context of that era that the stress of the job was seen as an inherent part of 
the job of firefighting and 'if you couldn't take it you shouldn't be there'. You 
had to tough it out, and that meant toughing it out in silence. 
Unfortunately I was unable to do any health or audiometry assessments with 
the volunteers due to their large numbers and geographical spread but I oflen 
asked myself the question. If permanents suffered work-related stress then 
what impact did this stress have on the volunteer firefighters who often were 
involved in critical incidents where the victims were known to them in their 
small communities? Did they have the same opportunity to discuss the 
incident on their return to the station or were they required to return to work 
or home to sleep in order to be available for their permanent job? What 
effect did these critical incidents have on them, their families, friends and 
work colleagues? I was to discover the answer to these questions when I 
introduced the concept of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing to the volunteers 
sometime later. Many shared in great depth and detail their personal pain 
and suffering from incidents they had attended years before. In telling their 
stories there was often a certain amount of anger attached to the lack of 
recognition and help available to them. For some volunteers this was the first 
time they had had an opportunity to vent their anger and tell their 
personal stories related to horrific incidents. Often, after these presentations 
I pondered on how they had released the stresses of attending critical 
incidents over the years. How had it affected them personally in terms of 
their physical, mental, emotional, social and spiritual wellbeing? From their 
stories, I was beginning to have some understanding that for many the stress 
of attending critical incidents and the lack of opportunity to ventilate the 
painful thoughts and feelings associated with these incidents, had had a 
huge negative impact on their lives. I felt really sad and distressed that there 
had been very little acknowledgement of critical incident stress within the 
Service or any formalised support structures, where those who required 
assistance, were able to access appropriate services. With this knowledge of 
their personal stories I decided that it was vital that some form of crisis 
intervention be introduced into the New Zealand Fire Service. 
It is important to discuss the context of the male culture at the time when I 
first joined the Service. I was one of the first females to have free access to 
visit fire stations and only two female firefighters were employed in the 
Service at the time. There existed a strong macho image or what I refer to as 
the "John Waynes" or the "Cowboys" of the Service who still "sucked the 
hazardous smoke at fires and failed to use the breathing apparatus sets that 
were provided. It just wasn't manly!!! This image was particularly prevalent 
in the older aged firefighters. Fortunately over time, with the support and 
encouragement of the Occupational Health Service education programmes in 
relation to personal health and safety, firefighters began to become more 
self-responsible for their safety and health. It also became more acceptable 
to talk about personal thoughts, feelings and reactions in relation to attending 
critical incidents, particularly those that involved children and young adults. 
There was a gradual shift in attitude and an increased ability to talk about the 
stresses of the job which was beginning to be seen as acceptable and not a 
sign of weakness. I believe this shift in attitude may have been made easier 
as a result of the pre-education sessions that I carried out in the Region on 
Critical lncident Stress and the Critical lncident Stress Debriefing (CISD) 
concept, prior to forming a CISD Peer Support Team. A strong emphasis 
was placed on the fact that Critical lncident Stress (CIS) was a normal 
reaction to an abnormal situation in normal individuals following their 
exposure to a critical incident. I found I developed a style of presenting the 
material over time that was informative and also produced a change in 
attitudes and behaviour. This was possible because as firefighters shared 
their stories it enabled me to build up an accurate general picture of how 
stress had affected their lives. 
In 1989 1 attended a seminar on Critical Incident Stress Debriefing which was 
facilitated by Dr Robyn Robinson, a psychologist from Melbourne, Australia. 
In 1986 Dr Robinson had established a ClSD Peer Support Team for the 
Metropolitan Ambulance Service in Melbourne. The following year she 
established and trained the first Combined Emergency Services Debriefing 
Team in Australia. Robinson (1984) undertook the largest known empirical 
study into emergency services stress for the Ambulance Services of Victoria, 
Australia. The results of this study confirmed my thoughts in relation to how 
stressful firefighters found dealing with the death of children. Robinson, 
together with Mitchell (1993) evaluated 31 psychological debriefings 
conducted by the Combined Emergency Services ClSD team from December 
1987 to August 1989. 1 found Robinson a very credible and committed 
mental health professional who had a genuine concern for providing the most 
appropriate and effective stress management strategies to meet the specific 
needs of emergency service personnel. 
As a consequence of attending Robinson's seminar, the Assistant 
Commander of Personnel and I decided to look at providing a similar service 
within our Region. In order to provide a service that was acceptable to the 
consumer's I believed that firstly it was important to establish whether such a 
concept would be acceptable to firefighters and whether they would access it. 
I began questioning firefighters about work related stress and discussed the 
idea of establishing a stress management strategy such as a ClSD 
programme. I questioned both the novice firefighters with limited firafiqting 
experience and those who were known to be able to tough it out yqqer all 
circumstances. The response, particularly from the "John Waynes" was 
extremely positive, though the language was somewhat "strong" in terms of 
the need for Management to acknowledge the stress associated with 
attending critical incidents and the obligation to provide appropriate stress 
management assistance. 
After much research and considering what was available in terms of psycho- 
social support, the Assistant Commander of Personnel and I approached 
Management with a proposal to establish a ClSD Peer Support Team. After 
marketing the concept to Management we were given approval to establish a 
pilot program within our particular Region. We approached firefighting 
personnel who we believed were well respected and had a genuine interest 
in supporting their colleagues in managing work related stress and were able 
to work co-operatively and collegially as part of a Peer Support Team. 
Carkhuff & Truax cited in Mitchell & Everly (1995) demonstrated the value of 
lay support models. By being a firefighter and having an understanding of 
the stresses of the job, peers are in a unique position to assist their fellow 
firefighters in adapting to the stress response as 'they have been there, done 
that'. They have walked in the shoes of those to whom they were offering 
assistance. They are familiar with both the nature and the culture of the Fire 
Service. Taylor (1990a) views the peer group team members as trained 
volunteers from within the emergency service who assist their peers to 
discard the accumulation of negative feelings following attendance at a 
critical incident. Keywords are used by the team members to stimulate 
emotions, that if left unreleased could be both debilitating and stressful long- 
term. 
Those firefighters who accepted the invitation to join the ClSD Peer Support 
Team received extensive training on the ClSD process. This involved 
training in the seven phases of debriefing following what is commonly 
referred to as the Mitchell's model (1983). These seven phases include the 
introduction; fact; thought; reaction; symptom; teaching and re-entry 
phases. They also include training in listening and communication skills; 
stress management; how to recognise when a distressed firefighter fails to 
respond to the assistance being provided and requires more expert help; 
and training in the other types of Critical lncident Stress Management (CISM) 
such as one-on-one support, demobilisations and defusings. 
The aim of debriefing was discussed with the trainees. They were there to 
assist their colleagues deal with the inevitable stresses of their work and thus 
prevent more serious consequences of unresolved stresses resulting in 
serious physical, mental, emotional, social, financial and occupational 
distress and pain. It was continually stressed throughout the training that the 
Peer Support Team was not there to provide counselling or psychotherapy to 
the firefighters or infer that they had failed to cope, but to provide an 
opportunity for those who attended a critical incident to review the incident, 
not from an operational perspective, but from a psychological perspective. 
The team was there to assist the firefighters deal with the incident, give them 
an opportunity to discuss the incident in relation to their roles, their feelings, 
thoughts, reactions, frustrations, satisfactions and to assist them to deal with 
any negative effects and to look at the positive aspects of the incident. 
Finally, towards the end of the debriefing firefighters were educated on how 
to care for themselves holistically over the subsequent weeks until hopefully 
the negative effects would decrease. At all times it was stressed that the 
team members were not there in the role of 'mini counsellors' but should 
consider themselves as a peer supporter, 'a 12 stone listening ear'. 
The training was highly successful and continued with mental health 
professionals presenting seminars on their own research findings into Critical 
lncident Stress and stress management strategies. Practical exercises such 
as role plays were recorded on video in order to analyse and critique the 
performance of the perspective team members. This was carried out in a 
safe and caring environment where we were all learning together in 
partnership with the ultimate aim of providing a very credible and safe 
service. At the end of the training, team members were given the opportunity 
to withdraw if they felt that they were not suited or comfortable with the role. 
Fortunately those who were identified as being unsuitable withdrew of their 
own accord before it was deemed necessary to ask them to withdraw. These 
were personnel who had personal issues that they needed to address, or 
who had difficulty with being a good listener. 
Having attended many seminars, national and international conferences and 
received extensive training in CISD, I believed that it was necessary to adapt 
the concept to meet the specific cultural needs of the New Zealand Fire 
Service. As previously mentioned, as an appointee to a newly created 
position, I had initially been viewed with some suspicion. I realised that 
before I could be of any benefit to the Service I had to build up a relationship 
of trust in order to convince the firefighters that I was employed to keep them 
in their job by addressing their health and safety needs in partnership with 
them. My philosophy of partnership of practice was based on Christiansen's 
model (1990) in which I work collaboratively with firefighters. Rather than 
working in a controlling manner and dictating what their occupational health 
and safety needs were, I viewed my practice like Hinder (1997) as 
"accompanying" firefighters through their health care episodes by assisting, 
supporting and providing health education and knowledge. As discussed by 
Dunning & Silva (1980), 1 saw the need to establish a program that 
ameliorated the stressful effects following a firefighter attending a critical 
incident, where they would be accompanied through their rocky journey of 
Critical Incident Stress and their subsequent recovery. 
In developing any new service it is important to determine how it is to be 
staffed professionally, which is crucial to the outcome. Discussions were 
held with the Regional Medical Officer of Health and the Peer Support Team 
regarding the appropriateness of having a mental health professional such as 
a psychologist or psychiatrist as the Clinical Director of our team. All the 
literature indicated the need to employ a mental health professional in this 
role. I believed it was imperative that we provide a service that was culturally 
appropriate, acceptable, accessible and would be valued and utilised by the 
firefighters. Was a psychologist or psychiatrist the most appropriate person 
to act as the Clinical Director? Would helshe be viewed with even more 
suspicion than I had been initially? While we all agreed that there was a 
place for a mental health professional within our structure in terms of 
providing assistance with training, in a professional supportive role and as a 
referral for personnel who required more professional assistance, it was 
decided that the role of Clinical Director would be carried out by the 
Occupational Health Nurse with the support of the Regional Medical Officer. 
Initially I felt somewhat apprehensive about taking on this role, but as I had a 
commitment to providing a holistic approach to health and had many years of 
broad nursing experience with an interest in mental health, I did have the 
expertise and the enthusiasm for providing and overseeing mental health 
services, as distinct from mental illness services. Also, I had built up an 
excellent rapport with the firefighters and believed that I had gained their 
respect and trust and was more able to provide the most appropriate care as 
I had developed a broad and contextual understanding of the culture of the 
Fire Service and the different roles and stresses associated with firefighting. 
2.3 POLICY 
As a consequence of the success of the pilot program of the ClSD Peer 
Support Team, in 1994 the National Headquarters of the New Zealand Fire 
Service (Health & Safety Division) developed a National Policy on Critical 
Incident Stress Debriefing under the umbrella of Occupational Safety and 
Health. The five other Regions were to establish and provide ClSD Peer 
Support Teams which would service the particular needs of their Region. 
Overall the established teams followed Mitchell's model (1983). One Region 
subsequently employed a psychologist as their Clinical Director. However he 
was an ex-firefighter with a degree in psychology, who understood the culture 
and was well respected and trusted by the firefighters. 
2.4 MODEL OF PRACTICE 
I continued to lead the ClSD Peer Support Team until 1993 and the team 
continued to be led by the successive Occupational Health Nurses up until 
1996. It was the nurse's role to oversee the intervention activities of the team 
and ensure that the most appropriate services were being provided at the 
right time and that the Peer Support Team members were working within the 
boundaries of their training and expertise. The nurse's role was pivotal to the 
ongoing success of the team in that helshe "drove" the team by their 
commitment and enthusiasm, recognising the need to organise and assist in 
the on-going training and education of the Peer Support Team and 
acknowledging the importance of keeping statistics in relation to the Team's 
activities. The nurse was the link between Management and the team, and 
provided the clinical support and expertise to the Team members. 
It was a role that I found challenging, deeply satisfying and also exciting. My 
real commitment to the benefits of the programme was established following 
a particularly stressful incident that required a formal debriefing which I 
facilitated and was involved in the follow-up care of the participants. I would 
like to share my story which was a real journey for me in appreciating the 
impact of Critical Incident Stress on firefighters and why it is vital to provide 
the most appropriate follow-up support. 
This incident occurred early on in my experience with debriefing. At this 
stage I could envisage the benefits but was still a little sceptical when reading 
the literature as to its real benefits. I thought that mental health 
professionals, that is. psychologists and psychiatrists were the best first point 
of call when dealing with work-related stress and that the Peer Support Team 
that was being advocated as the back-bone of the concept were not really 
the most appropriate persons to be involved in stress management strategies 
for firefighters. However, my doubts about the credibility of peer support 
were to be turned around. 
The particular incident in question involved a group of firefighters from a 
small community who had been called out to a housefire in the early hours of 
a cold winter's night. No further details were forthcoming at the time. The 
firefighters responded to find a house dwelling fully engulfed in flames. It 
appeared that all persons in the house were not accounted for and a search 
of the house was required. However, the house was deemed too unsafe for 
the firefighters to enter. Sometime latgr the firefighters searched the gutted 
house and were unsure of whether they had found animal or human remains. 
While they were searching several occupants of the house began acting 
rather strangely and had to be restrained by other emergency service 
personnel. 
Following a police surgeon's identification it was found to be human remains 
in the gutted house. On further investigation it was found the person had 
been murdered. Because of the suspicious nature of the incident, the 
firefighters spent many hours at the scene and returned to the station cold, 
hungry and extremely fatigued. Due to the unusual and uncertain 
circumstances of the incident, the emotional impact on the firefighters was 
felt immediately at the scene and continued after the call was completed, not 
unlike Lightfoot's (1991) example. The firefighters were mystified about the 
circumstances of the incident. They had expected to attend a housefire and 
initially felt anger and frustration at not being able to rescue what they 
thought was a 'person trapped'. They felt fear and anger at the behaviour of 
the other occupants who were acting strangely and their attempts to hinder 
the operation. 
The Fire Chief recognised that this situation was a critical incident that 
required the support and assistance of the ClSD Team and a call for 
assistance was received. A ClSD was scheduled for the following day, 
approximately 48 hours following the incident, which is considered an ideal 
time post-incident. I facilitated the debriefing and was assisted by a Peer 
Support Team member. Naturally we had some initial fear and anxiety 
attached to what we believed to be a debriefing around an unusual incident. 
We set up the environment so that the participants felt safe and comfortable, 
established our credentials, introduced the ClSD programme and the aims of 
the debriefing. It was immediately evident to both myself as the facilitator 
and the Peer Support Team member that this incident had had a significant 
emotional impact on all members of the firefighting crew. Some firefighters 
had over-indulged in alcohol the night following the incident to dull their pain. 
Some had had difficulty sleeping and eating, and one particular firefighter 
was severely affected by the unusual behaviour of the occupants of the 
house and suffered from recurrent and distressing flashbacks to the incident. 
Some felt anger and guilt that they had not been able to save the deceased 
person. However, prior to the debriefing we had been briefed by the Fire 
Chief on the facts of the incidents and he had informed us that the deceased 
person had died sometime before the fire which had been deliberately lit. I 
was able to share this information with the participants. 
The seven stages of debriefing were followed and I found the process to be 
an amazing experience. To begin with we were feeling anxious and unsure 
about our abilities as debriefers but soon realised that with careful guidance 
through the seven stages of debriefing, the participants began sharing their 
feelings, thoughts and symptoms with ease. It felt as though they were 
controlling the debriefing and we were there to guide them through the 
process, to normalise their reactions and provide the support and 
reassurance in order that they recovered without any long term effects. 
Following this debriefing, I began to reflect on my initial question regarding 
whether a psychologist or psychiatrist would have been the most appropriate 
person to debrief these firefighters. Would they have accepted them in their 
fire station with as much trust and respect? Would the mental health 
professional really have understood their unique culture, their frustrations, 
fears and anger related to their firefighting tasks? I began to understand and 
acknowledge the literature with regards to the powerful role of the Peer 
Support Team members in terms of understanding the firefighters culture. 
They were able to validate their fellow firefighters' feelings, thoughts and 
reactions, and were the most appropriate persons to discuss and support 
firefighting decisions that were made during the critical incident. Also it was 
imperative that the facilitator, in this case myself, had a genuine 
understanding of the firefighters culture and unique personalities. 
It was a very emotional experience for all concerned, both those debriefed 
and the debriefing team. This was the first time a ClSD had been utilised in 
this particular area. The firefighters expressed their gratitude and satisfaction 
with the process and the team's quick response and availability. Due to the 
nature and severity of the incident all participants were followed up 
individually by telephone contact over the next few days, and those that 
required more ongoing assistance were supported individually. Because of 
the severity of the incident, a brief follow-up meeting was held one week later 
to ensure that any new issues or problems were discussed and that those 
who had participated in the debriefing, had responded to the support and 
assistance offered. All appeared to have responded extremely well to the 
support offered and all the firefighters felt that they had no major distressing 
symptoms that were causing them difficulties in their daily lives. The 
debriefing team left their contact telephone numbers so that the lines of 
communication were left open for any of the participants who might require 
further assistance. 
This particular debriefing presented several interesting points for me 
personally. Following the debriefing, I was more convinced of the 
effectiveness of the programme and became even more committed to 
marketing the programme in order to meet the holistic needs of firefighters. I 
had personally witnessed the powerful role of the Peer Debriefers in assisting 
the firefighters to reduce the harmful effects of attending a critical incident. I 
now felt more able to question the literature with regards to a mental health 
professional being the Clinical Director for our particular occupational group. 
Also for both myself and the Peer Support Team members, this experience of 
debriefing gave us more confidence in the validity and usefulness of utilising 
such a programme within the Region. I have often discussed this particular 
debriefing with one particular participant who was severely traumatised and 
he has spoken warmly and positively of the assistance he received from 
being personally involved in the debriefing. He has been one of the greatest 
advocates of the ClSD programme in the Region. 
A lesson that I learnt personally was the need for the debriefing team to be 
debriefed following a CISD. While the Peer Support Team member and I 
discussed the debriefing in terms of the process and the individual 
participants, we did not spend enough time discussing how we were feeling 
and whether we needed further support from other Team members. Several 
nights later I awoke in the early hours of the morning with flashbacks. A 
severely traumatised firefighter had visually and verbally acted out the 
strange behaviour of the occupants of the house during the debriefing. My 
flashbacks were related to his acting out and I was somewhat frightened, and 
also surprised at their occurrence. Fortunately I discussed this with a 
Occupational Health Nurse from another Region who was experienced in 
ClSD and who provided me with the necessary clinical supervision. The 
lesson to be learnt from this experience is that following all debriefings, it is 
important to spend some time discussing the debriefing and to provide the 
necessary support to the Debriefing Team following this discussion. 
In 1993 1 left the Fire Service to pursue full-time academic study. I continued 
to work in a voluntary capacity as a member of the Peer Support Team. As I 
had worked in the Service, and was well respected and trusted, and had a 
good understanding of the role of firefighters, their culture and their 
occupational stresses, I was oflen asked to facilitate debriefings. This may 
have been related to the fact that the Region no longer employed a full-time 
Occupational Health Nurse. 
2.5 FUTURE 
Due to the continuing restructuring of the New Zealand Fire Service, in 1998 
the Occupational Health Services in the Region were contracted out to 
private providers. In some Regions their brief does not include providing 
Critical Incident Stress; Management services. While many of them are 
experienced and credible Occupational Health practitioners, they do not have 
the necessary training and expertise that is required to meet the needs of a 
Clinical Director of the ClSM team. Due to their relatively recent employment 
and, in some cases their lack of experience and their location (which is often 
located outside the Fire Station), they have been unable to establish a 
credible and trusting relationship with the firefighters. As previously 
discussed, I strongly believe that the nurse has a pivotal role in "driving" the 
team. The Occupational Health Nurses who were employed following my 
resignation received the necessary training, expertise, commitment, 
enthusiasm, respect and trust necessary to continue the programme and 
report they observed the true value and benefits to the firefighters in their 
everyday practice. 
In July 1997 the National Office (previously known as National Headquarters) 
of the New Zealand Fire Service circulated a draft policy document on 
Occupational Safety and Health with recommendations for Best Practice 
Guidelines for Stress Management. There was much criticism of the 
document from around the Regions with regard to the role of the Mental 
Health Professional and while attempting to meet all the ideals of stress 
management, in the current economic climate, it was seen as being 
unrealistic, not achievable and in many instances unacceptable to firefighting 
personnel. 
In the mid to late 1990s, the ClSD Peer Support Team continued to respond 
to requests for assistance but they received little funding or support from 
Management. No formal training was carried out and there were grave 
concerns about the credibility of the team. As a volunteer Peer Support 
Team member, I expressed my concerns to Senior Management regarding 
the lack of support, clinicalsupervision and trainin;. Upon formulating a new 
Health and Safety Policy, there was a commitment to provide support for the 
continuation and restructuring of the Team in the Region. As a consequence 
of my approach to Management, the Regional CommandertManager 
contracted me as a Clinical Director on a part-time basis, to restructure the 
Team in the Region and to establish a new Team in part of the new Region 
that had previously received little or no ClSM services in its previous Region. 
As a consequence of the restructuring of the Team, it is now known as the 
ClSM Peer Support Team in order to keep up-to-date with current global 
trends. 
2.6 CONCLUSON 
In this chapter, I have discussed the concept of Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing by relating it to my own professional journey. I have discussed 
how the programme began, how it was established in my particular Region 
and its subsequent introduction into the other five Regions of the New 
Zealand Fire Service. I have purposefully shared a personal story of 
professional development (with some parts of the story fictionalised so as to 
protect confidentiality) in order to highlight how powerful and convincing a 
particular debriefing was for me personally. I have discussed how the team 
is operating in 1999 after its recent restructuring. In the following chapter, I 
will discuss the history of the New Zealand Fire Service Occupational Health 
Service, as it has had a significant impact on the introduction of the ClSD 
programme. Recognition of the context of the sewice has been a significant 
factor in being able to position myself as a Nurse Consultant working in the 
area of Critical lncident Stress Management and the impact the service has 
had on the New Zealand Fire Service firefighters health and safety over the 
years since its introduction in 1990. It has had a significant impact in 
reducing some of the stress attached to the ongoing restructuring of the New 
Zealand Fire Service which will be discussed in a later chapter. 
3. HISTORY OF THE 
NEW ZEALAND FIRE SERVlCE 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I plan to describe the health services that existed prior to the 
infamous ICI Fire in 1984, the health services that were utilised following the 
ICI Fire and the health effects which appeared following firefighters 
attendance at the fire. I have identified the relevant reports that influenced 
the introduction of an Occupational Health Service within the New Zealand 
Fire Service. As a result of the fire, a pilot program and subsequent 
establishment of the six Occupational Health Units occurred. I will conclude 
this chapter with an analysis of what is currently happening in relation to 
Occupational Health in the New Zealand Fire Service. 
Since 1990 significant changes have taken place within the Fire Service that 
represent a massive restructuring of the Service. In order to understand how 
the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing concept was shaped within the context 
of the Occupational Health Service, it is necessary to have some 
understanding of the history of the New Zealand Fire Service. It is important 
to identify the health services that existed prior to the introduction of the 
Occupational Health Service in 1988. Finally, I will discuss the socio-political 
impact on the Occupational Health Services from 1988 until the present day. 
It is my intention to provide historical evidence of the changes that have 
taken place in the New Zealand Fire Service by referring to important 
documents that detail these changes and also providing information that was 
provided by the Fire Service's first Principal Medical Officer of Health in a 
personal interview. I will also include my own personal reflections on these 
changes as I have not only worked within the Service during the early 
significant changes of the Occupational Health Service but left the Service 
as a full paid employee and was able to look back on the effect of some of 
these changes in a more reflective manner. Since beginning this research 
project, I have been employed on a part-time contract basis as the Clinical 
Director of a Critical Incident Stress Management Peer Support Team within 
a Region of the New Zealand Fire Service. 
3.2 HEALTH SERVICES - PRE ICI FIRE 
I found it difficult to establish what medical services that existed prior to 1976. 
Dr William J. Treadwell was appointed as the first Principal Medical Officer 
for the New Zealand Fire Service in 1976. 1 interviewed Dr Treadwell who 
provided me with the following information in relation to the Service that 
existed prior to his appointment. 
Dr Treadwell related how in 1975 as the Principal Medical Officer for the New 
Zealand Police, he was invited to a meeting with the Fire Service and the 
Firefighters Union in Wellington. He was asked to discuss his present role 
within the New Zealand Police and how the health services for the Fire 
Service could be improved. Following further discussions he was invited to 
take up a part-time position with the New Zealand Fire Service as their first 
Principal Medical Officer based in Wellington (W.J.Treadwell, personal 
interview 15 April, 1998). 
From 1976 to 1979 Dr Treadwell established a medical profile for all 
firefighters. This new initiative was viewed by some within the Service with 
suspicion as it was feared that the results of a medical examination could put 
firefighters' jobs at risk. In 1976 Regional Medical Officers were appointed in 
each of the six Regions throughout New Zealand. They performed a 
practical role which was largely confined to pre-employment medical 
examinations and the medical boarding procedure for retirement from the 
Service on medical grounds. The Principal Medical Officer's brief was to 
advise the Fire Service on matters of health, not safety, and no formal 
procedures were established in matters relating to incidents requiring medical 
assistance and intervention. 
"There were no plans in place for managing treatment, testing 
or monitoring health problems in firefighters exposed to 
occupational health r isk (Elias, Bandaranayake, Edwards 
& Glass, 1990, p.39). 
Prior to 1976 there were 277 local Fire Services which were controlled by 
individual urban Fire Authorities. On 1 April 1976 the Fire Service Act (1975) 
came into effect and the 277 local Fire Services were taken over by the 
newly established New Zealand Fire Service. All existing Fire Authorities 
were dissolved and their assets were transferred to the New Zealand Fire 
Service Commission which became the controlling body for the New Zealand 
Fire Service. The 277 existing Fire Brigades, 26 permanent and 251 
volunteers were grouped into 22 Areas. These Areas, in turn, were grouped 
into 6 Regions for administrative control. This structure, with some minor 
changes, existed until the 1995 restructure (Information Centre, 1998). 
Prior to the establishment of a Commission, each Fire Authority employed 
their own Medical Officer who was usually a local general Medical 
Practitioner with little or no occupational health experience, or knowledge of 
the health risks associated with firefighting. They were mainly employed to 
examine firefighters for pre-employment medical examinations. It was done 
on an ad hoc basis and the Medical Officers generally established their own 
criteria for passing a firefighter as fit. Often this was done in consultation with 
the local Fire Chiefs. At this stage no set health policies had been 
established in terms of addressing the health suitability of potential 
firefighters, and the health and safety needs of those already employed. 
According to today's' standards this assessment would be seen as a very 
crude way of addressing the health and safety needs of this particular 
occupational group. However it must be considered within the context of that 
time. Occupational Health, though not new to the health services, was still 
relatively invisible in many occupational disciplines within New Zealand. 
However, an event occurred that was to have far reaching consequences for 
the health and safety of firefighters. 
3.3 ICI FIRE 
On 21st December 1984 the Riverview, Mount Wellington store of ICI (N.Z.) 
was seriously damaged by fire. The warehouse stored significant quantities 
of hazardous chemicals for distribution throughout New Zealand and the 
Pacific. Eighty six firefighers extinguished the fire. A further 141 firefighters 
attended the incident on the same day. In total, approximately 340 
firefighting personnel were involved in either fighting the fire, dampening 
down the hot spots, remaining on stand-by in case of further fire or chemical 
spill, or involved in the subsequent clean-up of the site and fire equipment 
used in the incident (Elias et al, 1990). 
This fire was to have long term consequences for both firefighters exposed to 
the known hazardous chemicals and the New Zealand Fire Service generally 
in terms of the lack of a co-ordinated health response or an established 
Occupational Health Service with protocols prior to the ICI fire. 
Much controversy surrounded this large scale incident in relation to both 
firefighters and public safety concerns. The anxiety experienced by 
firefighters and the public may have been exacerbated by misinformation 
about the chemicals involved, the risk associated with exposure and the 
uncertainty regarding the toxic effects on those directly and indirectly 
exposed to the chemicals (Elias et al, 1990). 
First aid treatment was provided by the St.Johnls Ambulance at the site of 
the fire over the 3 days following the incident and approximately 30 
firefighters attended three local Accident and Emergency Departments. Their 
attendance at their local hospitals was on the advice of their supervisors and 
did not follow any formal process within the medical structure or within the 
Fire Service at the time. There was a great deal of misinformation, which 
may have been related to a lack of a co-ordinated emergency response and 
the inadequate and ineffective communication systems. This created 
unnecessary anxiety. I believe it was related to no one person being 
responsible for disseminating information regarding the chemicals involved 
and for advising on the appropriate tests and treatment. This is supported by 
(Elias et al, 1990) 
"Neither the hospitals nor the Fire Service made contact with 
the National Poisons Centre for information about the effects 
of the chemicals known to be involved, fhe sympfoms of the 
firefighters or general management and investigation of cases of 
suspected exposure to toxic substances" (p. 39). 
Thirty firefighters reported symptoms of skin rashes within a few days of the 
incident. These symptoms were consistent with those exposed to a toxic 
substance. While for many the skin rashes resolved, many firefighters 
continued to complain of recurring skin problems, memory loss, fatigue, 
irritability and other symptoms. Several months following the incident 200 
firefighters were diagnosed as suffering from chemical poisoning. This 
diagnosis was made by a Medical Practitioner utilising a diagnostic method 
not usually accepted by conventional Medical Practitioners. The Principal 
Medical Officer at the time preferred not to have direct contact with the 
firefighters as he felt it risked his objectivity with his other functions if he was 
directly involved. He and the Regional Medical Officers at the time, did not 
see their role as providing direct treatment. At the time of the ICI fire there 
were no formal procedures in place for managing, testing or monitoring for 
health problems. 
Due to the unsatisfactory treatment received by firefighters, particularly in 
relation to the skin rashes, the Fire Service involved the local Medical Officer 
of Health who was employed by the Department of Health. A dermatologist 
was arranged for treatment and advice on the management of the skin 
rashes. The Medical Officer of Health was not officially responsible for the 
firefighters health. However, he was willing to assist as he was already 
involved with the public health management of the incident and because the 
Fire Service had no formalised Occupation Health Service at the time. A 
dermatologist provided an initial consultation which included both tests and 
treatment. Follow-up treatment was arranged through the Regional Medical 
Officer with the Fire Service in Auckland. All other firefighters complaining of 
symptoms were advised to see the Regional Medical Officer who arranged 
the appropriate treatment, including blood and urine tests which all proved 
negative. 
Over the ensuing months the Regional Medical Officer was to play a vital and 
active role in consulting with approximately 75 firefighters with continuing skin 
problems, complaints of memory loss, clumsiness and psychological 
symptoms. It must be remembered that the Fire Service did not have an 
Occupational Health Service at this time. The Regional Medical Officers did 
not directly treat firefighters who were advised to consult with their own 
general practitioners. 
"The involvement of the Regional Medical Officer in Auckland 
in a strategy for the general management of the health of those 
firefighfers who attended fhe ICI fire was fherefore unusual and 
a specific response by the Fire Service fo the concerns of the 
firefighfers. The sfrategy for management (fesfing and 
treatment) was not one that was in place at the time of the fire 
but was worked out by the Medical Officer of Health and the 
Regional Medical Officer in response to increasing anxiety 
and criticism both within the Service and among members 
of the public days after the event." (Elias et al, 1990, p.59). 
Fortunately with time there have been lessons learnt from this particular 
incident and the New Zealand Fire Service have made significant changes 
that have had a positive effect on the health, safety and welfare of their 
firefighting personnel. 
It has become well recognised that symptoms suffered by firefighters who 
attended the ICI incident were not confined to physical symptoms. Not only 
were they exposed to toxic substances but also to significant psychological 
and social stresses over a lengthy period of time following the incident. 
There were multiple stressors which included a belief that they had been 
exposed to toxic and hazardous substances; uncertainty with regards to the 
harmful effects; misinformation by the press in relation to the long term 
effects of their exposure; lack of a co-ordinated and credible health 
response; continuing health problems with conflicting medical opinions and 
treatments; significant strain on their family relationships; and anger and 
suspicion directed towards the Fire Service management, to name a few. It 
is important to note that no formal stress management strategies in the form 
of psychological debriefings following major incidents were available to Fire 
Service personnel at the time. After working as an Occupational Health 
Nurse in the Fire Service from 1988 - 1993, being immersed in the culture 
and following many, many discussions with firefighters in relation to the ICI 
fire, I believe that those firefighters who sought alternative health methods 
did so due to a lack of a co-ordinated and credible health response. 
Six firefighters were medically retired froni the Fire Service following the ICI 
fire and the medical grounds for their retirement was attributed to their 
attendance at the fire. Public and firefighter concerns about the long-term 
effects of their exposure to the known toxic chemicals still exist to this day. 
Four years following the fire, a firefighter died of leukaemia and the cause of 
his death has been linked by the press to his attendance at the ICI fire (Elias 
et al, 1990) 
Due to firefighter concerns, the Minister of Health set up a Ministerial 
Advisory Committee on 21 March 1989, to investigate the health effects of 
firefighters who had attended the ICI fire which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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3.4 PRESENT DAY 
Following the success of the one year pilot project of an Occupational Health 
Service where an Occupational Health Nurse and Medical Officer were 
employed in the No.1 Region of the New Zealand Fire Service, an 
Occupational Health Service was established nationally in December 1988. 
Six Regional Occupational Health Nurses were appointed to support the six 
existing Regional Medical Officers. The nurses were administratively 
responsible to the Regional Commander and professionally responsible to 
the Regional Medical Officers for medical matters. As Registered Nurses 
with a current Practising Certificate, they were responsible for their own 
nursing ethics and standards of practice. 
As a nurse appointed to a Region, the biggest challenge I faced was to get 
the message across to both Management and operational staff regarding the 
value and role of Occupational Health. I believed that my role was not to be 
seen as the traditional one, that of a 'bandaid nurse'. My standards of 
practice focussed on maintaining and promoting health and safety, and the 
prevention of illness through encouraging safe and healthy workplace 
practices and environments. 
During the early years of the Occupational Health Service, the nurse's role in 
the area of health and safety was fraught with difficulties. Initially 
Management were fearful that the Occupational Health Service would be 
used to support industrial complaints and the staff within the Occupational 
Health Service felt constrained by Management in their daily practice. 
However, with the passage of time the nurses gradually proved their worth 
and were able to take on a more proactive role particularly in regard to health 
monitoring, hazard identification and their availability to attend and consult 
following major incidents. Initially some Regional Commanders looked 
unfavourably on the nurse's presence at a major incident. While expertise 
existed in the Service it was being ignored to the detriment of the health and 
safety of firefighting personnel. 
In the early days, the Occupational Health Service was viewed with much 
suspicion and issues around confidentiality of health information was of real 
concern to the firefighters. With the passage of time, ongoing reassurance 
and the building up of a trusting relationship, there has been a gradual 
acceptance of the Service amongst the firefighters. 
I believe my role as Occupational Health Nurse within the New Zealand Fire 
Service was able to be realised more effectively, not only with the passage of 
time, but with the publication of the Report to the Minister of Health on the 
Health of Firefighters in the Fire at the ICI Review Store, Mount Wellington, 
Auckland, 21 December 1984 (Elias et al, 1990). The Report acknowledged 
that the establishment of an Occupational Health Service had corrected 
some of the deficiencies evident at, and following the ICI fire. However, the 
report highlighted that the Service had a crucial role to play in three of the 
areas where the fire had revealed weaknesses in the safety system 
Co-ordination of health hazard information on the fireground. 
Co-ordination of medical responses to firefighters affected 
including testing as well as treatment. 
Provision of after care to fhose affected, including the provision 
of stress debriefing, health monitoring and follow-up of appropriate 
freatment (p. 107). 
The report highlighted for me problems that I was encountering in terms of 
being able to exercise my role both on the fireground and following incidents, 
from some Senior Management personnel. While I believed the 
Occupational Health staff had the required expertise and knowledge in co- 
ordinating an effective medical and nursing response, we were being 
hampered in providing the most appropriate response. It also identified that 
the Service did not provide debriefings or stress counselling after major 
incidents. 
A Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) Peer Support Programme had 
been established early 1990 as a pilot programme in the Region where I was 
employed, which provided stress debriefing following highly stressful 
incidents. As an Occupational Health Nurse new to the Fire Service, I had 
begun to recognise in my practice a significant amount of stress amongst 
firefighters. Upon talking with firefighters and attending major incidents, and 
having attended a 2 day workshop on CISD, facilitated by Dr Robyn 
Robinson, from Melbourne, Australia, I began to recognise that much of their 
stress could be related to Critical lncident Stress. As a consequence of 
talking with firefighters and Management, a CISD Peer Support Team was 
established under the umbrella of the Occupational Health Service. 
The ICI Report (1990) addressed the need to ensure the safety and health 
management of volunteer firefighters to match the standards applied to 
professional firefighters. At this time the Occupational Health Nurses brief 
covered professional firefighters health and safety in depth but was only able 
to respond to acute calls for professional assistance to volunteers. An 
increase in Occupational Health Nurses was required in order to  meet the 
needs of the large numbers of volunteers and their geographical spread. At 
this time I was beginning to recognise the need to provide psychological 
debriefings for volunteers as I believed they could be more vulnerable to 
Critical lncident Stress due to their community involvement where often they 
knew the victims of fire, accidents or medical emergencies. They were also 
less able to debrief themselves informally due to the need to return to work if 
the incident occurred during the day, or if the incident occurred at night they 
tended to return home for some much needed sleep. The professional 
firefighters were more likely to return to the station following a critical incident 
and discuss the incident amongst themselves on an informal basis over a 
cup of tea sitting around the "smoko" table. This had the potential to assist in 
mitigating the effects of'stress related to the incident. 
The ICI Report (1990) also recommended the appointment of a Director of 
Safety and Health who should report directly to the Chief Fire Commander 
with the function of reviewing procedures and practices in each Region and 
with the function of reviewing procedures and practices in each Region and 
to oversee the operation of the Occupational Health Service. This 
recommendation was actioned in 1991 when a Director of Safety and Health 
was appointed by the Chief Executive. 
The ICI Report (1990) highlighted that if health problems were not identified, 
monitored and treated, individual health could be put at risk. Occupational 
risks may not be properly appreciated and firefighters in dangerous situations 
may be put at risk by a colleague who was not functioning adequately either 
physically or psychologically. 
The Occupational Health Service in the Fire Service has also been affected 
by the multiple changes in the Management structure since the Fire Service 
Amendment Act (1990). The law change took away the day to day running of 
the Fire Service from the Fire Service Commissioner and placed it in the 
hands of a Chief Executive. The role of National Commander responsible for 
operational activities of the Fire Service was separated from that of the Chief 
Executive and required senior operational firefighting experience. The first 
Chief Executive was the former senior Fire Commissioner. However, in April 
1993, a new Chief Executive was appointed following a confidential review of 
the New Zealand Fire Service by the Minister of Internal Affairs. The new 
Chief Executive did not have a New Zealand Fire Service background. 
In September of the same year, the Chief Executive announced that a major 
review of the Fire Service was to take place. In March 1994 the review 
results were released and the Chief Executive announced major restructuring 
with significant job losses. Following this announcement firefighters fought 
the changes both on the streets, through a national referendum which 
opposed the cuts in professional firefighters and in the Courts. 
"Firefighters believed that cuts would reduce their ability to do 
theirjobs and put the public at greater r isk (Hawkins, 1998, p.5). 
In 1995 the Fire Service, despite the Professional Firefighters Union 
disapproval, introduced another level of firefighter called Community Safety 
Teams who later became known as CSTs. The Fire Service now had a three 
tiered level of firefighters. The three tiers included the professional 
firefighters; the volunteer firefighters (who traditionally had served their 
communities admirably but had often been poorly treated by professional 
firefighters who understandably viewed their employment as threatening to 
their own); and now the Community Service Teams. 
In April 1996 training of the first Community Service Teams began at Wigram 
Air Base. The recruits were trained by a large team of trainers which 
consisted of New Zealand Fire Service personnel and consultants. Many of 
the trainers were former Fire Service executive officers who had left during 
the restructuring. The 13 week training course saw the recruits trained in 
firefighting but undertook a wider range of training to include fire safety, 
community education and other emergency duties. The CSTs role was to be 
dramatically wider than that of existing firefighters. The change was to move 
from a reactive force that fought fires, to a proactive one that prevented them 
from occurring in the first instance. The CSTs were to work a completely 
different shift system to the existing professional firefighters which included 
longer hours with a significant increase in hours per week of productivity. 
The Professional Firefighters Union attacked the CSTs role and referred to 
their employment as "cut price workers" (Information Centre, 1998). 
The amount of anger and distress following the implementation of a 
significantly different contract resulted in the sabotage of two fire engines 
used in training and "Judas" letters being sent to some former Union 
members who were involved as trainers. The ongoing stress related to this 
change in personnel and their duties continues to impact on the health and 
safety of all levels of personnel today (Information Centre, 1998). 
In 1997 a New Fire Service restructuring proposal was announced. A new 
Commission was appointed and the restructuring plan stated that further 
management jobs would go. Roger Estall, the new Chairman of the Fire 
Service Commission stated: 
"The Fire Service currently selects and deploys ifs resources 
in our urban fire districts in much the same way and based 
on the same assumptions as existed mid-century" (1997, p. I) 
He continued to discuss the fundamental changes that had occurred in the 
nature of fire risk which had invalidated this historical assumption. The 
environment had changed, the ethnic make-up of the communities had 
changed and there was a need for the Fire Service to make changes to meet 
the ever changing needs of people and the environment 
In May 1998 the Fire Commission Chairman unveiled "The Way Forward, a 
restructuring package which would see all 1600 firefighters sacked and made 
to reapply for 300 fewer jobs, in competition with volunteers and others 
outside the Service. Included in the restructuring proposals was the dropping 
of one firefighter off a standard fire appliance, which in the past had been 
crewed by four firefighters. This restructure was referred to as the 
Modernisation of the New Zealand Fire Service. Estall (1998) described how 
resources for the future Fire Service would be re-balanced by a refocus on 
the type of work the Fire Service would carry out and a broader role for 
volunteers. He emphasised the need for greater skills and competencies that 
were required for future employees and volunteer staff to deliver a refocused 
Service. While the volunteers welcomed the Fire Service Commission's 
modernisation plans, there was some concern that the volunteers would 
become over-burdened once the Fire Service cut paid staff (Catherall, 1998, 
P.3). 
In June 1998 Jean Martin was appointed as Chief Executive of the New 
Zealand Fire Service. The Professional Firefighters Union took legal action 
against the restructuring and won a permanent injunction in the Employment 
Court. A new National Commander, Ken Harper, was appointed in January 
1999 and he expressed concerns about some of the Commission's 
restructuring plans. Jean Martin and the Professional Firefighters Union 
secretly reached an accord to end the industrial dispute, however this was 
rejected by the Commission. Roger Estall resigned just days prior to a 
Parliamentary Select Committee releasing a report damming his financial 
management of the Commission. He was replaced by the Director-General 
of Social Welfare, Margaret Bazeley. Within days of her appointment, Jean 
Martin resigned and was replaced by Alison Timms, who had worked 
previously with Margaret Bazeley in the Department of Social Welfare. 
Margaret Bazeley announced the Fire Service Commission Strategic 
Direction on 7 July 1999, stating that the reform process would continue. In 
her communication to personnel she made it clear that she hoped to work co- 
operatively and collaboratively with personnel to achieve the reform process, 
and viewed further Court proceedings with much disdain. 
In October 1999 the controversial plans to reduce firefighter numbers and 
reduce crew numbers from four to three on some selected fire appliances, 
was laid to rest following the Court of Appeal decision. The Court rejected a 
bid by the Fire Service Commission to overturn the previous Employment 
Court's decision which prevented the dismissal of all firefighters as part of a 
radical restructuring move driven by the previous Fire Service Commissioner, 
Roger Estall. While many of the firefighters would view this decision as a 
victory, the radical restructuring proposals had caused significant stress and 
tension amongst all ranks of the Fire Service and had created much 
uncertainty amongst the Service. Following the Court of Appeal's decision, 
the Fire Service Acting Chief Executive, Alison Timms, and the Professional 
Firefighters Union, had plans to work towards settling a new contract for 
firefighters. 
Through all these changes the Occupational Service has not been left 
untouched. During the lengthy ongoing restructure the nurses particularly 
have had to provide ongoing support in terms of counselling and stress 
management in order to attempt to maintain the health and safety of their 
clients. Their working conditions have also changed dramatically. In 1993 
a new Health Policy was implemented which included a method for the 
reporting of accidents, and volunteers suddenly appeared on the statistical 
reporting form. This was not discussed with the staff and in one particular 
Region it represented a 500% increase in personnel to be covered by the 
Service. 
Up until 1997, the Health and Safety policy has not changed in line with the 
new structure and Health and Safety Committee meetings had almost 
ceased in some Regions. The National Health & Safety Committee 
previously had an Occupational Health Nurse representative but had not 
done so since the new Fire Service restructure. The compliance with the 
Health and Safety in Employment Act (1992) has at times been dubious. 
Investigation of accidents became the exception rather than the rule. Near 
misses, which has the potential for a major injury or even death, were not 
usually reported. 
With the loss of the Director of Safety and Health during one of the many 
restructures, the Occupational Health Services was left out on a limb. Up to 
the current 1998 restructure, I would suggest that the Fire Service was not 
fully meeting its obligations in providing a healthy and safe work environment 
for its employees. In such turbulent times I would suggest that given the high 
level of anxiety and unrest, that it was even more imperative that the health 
and safety needs of personnel were paramount. 
In 1997 the Commission called for submissions on the Occupational Health 
Service, but a general fear existed amongst the staff and firefighters that like 
many of the services previously carried out by Fire Service employees, the 
Occupational Health Services would be tendered out to private providers. 
This fear was to be subsequently realised in some Regions. The 
Occupational Health Units prepared submissions which highlighted its 
strengths in terms of value to the Service, the trusting relationship that had 
been established over the years, its cost effectiveness and efficient use of 
time, its accessibility and availability to staff and the appropriateness of the 
services it provided. The Occupational Health Nurse co-ordinated the Peer 
Support Teams to ensure quality assurance and a consistent service and this 
role was seen by myself and other Occupational Health Nurses as a vital role 
in maintaining a credible and safe Critical Incident Stress Management 
programme. The subsequent loss of the Occupational Health Nurses in 
some Regions was to cause a significant effect on the co-ordination and 
quality of the existing ClSM Peer Support Teams and they struggled to 
maintain their credibility. 
Some of the weaknesses that could be highlighted were that Occupational 
Health were not seen as being fully integrated into the Health and Safety 
programmes but were seen as a separate entity. There was not a separate 
designated Occupational Health budget and equipment needed updating. 
The volunteer firefighters had limited access to the Service due to their large 
numbers and the geographical spread of their locations. The Occupational 
Health staff were generally not represented on Advisory Committees such as 
Uniform and Equipment, and as previously mentioned the Occupational 
Health Nurses were not represented on the National Health and Safety 
Committee. 
3.5 SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Despite strong opposition from the firefighters, the Professional Firefighters 
Union and the Occupational Health staff, tenders from private occupational 
health providers were called for early in 1998. Nightingale (1998) discussed 
the need for a more comprehensive and co-ordinated service. He 
acknowledged that the Occupational Health Nurse based service partly 
provided health monitoring and rehabilitation services but concerns existed 
due to inadequate time or resources not being available to meet the Safety 
and Health needs of volunteers and support staff. Further concerns included 
Safety and Health auditing and ACC cost control and reduction. A more 
comprehensive service was preferred by Management. However, when one 
looks at the historical development of the Occupational Health Service it is 
evident that a fully comprehensive and integrated service was never truly 
actualised. 
As an Occupational Health Nurse who was previously employed by the New 
Zealand Fire Service and having maintained my contacts with many of the 
nurses who had remained until their demise or disestablishment, I challenge 
this argument. The reasons why I challenge this argument has been 
previously identified in this chapter where I discussed both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the previous Occupational Health Service. While progress 
was slow in the initial conception of the Occupational Health Service, the 
Occupational Health Service was expanded over time due to experience, and 
the gradual acceptance by Management and firefighting personnel of the 
Service. This acceptance was also assisted by some of the 
recommendations made in the ICI Report. Two key legislative changes, the 
Health and Safety and Employment Act (1992) and the Accident, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act (1992), also assisted in increasing the 
role and effectiveness of the Occupational Health Service within the Fire 
Service. 
To become a more comprehensive service, the last restructure has followed 
the ethos of the ever changing work environment, where services that were 
previously provided within the organisation have now been contracted out to 
private providers who often have little or no knowledge of the culture of the 
organisation they are serving. While I appreciate that with time they will 
develop and understand the culture, this has been just another change that 
firefighters have had to face. The cost of providing private providers in many 
instances far exceeds the cost of the previous Services. While currently 
several Occupational Health Nurses who practised in the old system have 
remained within the Fire Service, they have taken up a new role as the 
Health and Safety Manager for their particular Fire Regions. Each Region 
has their own individual Health & Safety Policy, not a National Policy, and the 
Regions working independently of each other without any major direction 
from the National Office, previously known as National Headquarters. Many 
of the day-to-day nursing tasks have been passed over to part-time 
contracted nurses and firefighters on the whole view these Health and Safety 
Managers with some suspicion. They view these ex-Occupational Health 
Nurses as part of Management, where previously the nurses were never 
aligned with Management. While I believe that these part-time contracted 
nurses will in time be able to build up a trusting relationship with the 
firefighters, it is going to take a considerable amount of time, as the 
firefighters do not see them as belonging to the Service. The Occupational 
Health Nurses that practised in the old system were generally accepted by 
the firefighters as belonging to the Service. 
It is my belief that the Occupational Health Service provided within the New 
Zealand Fire Service did generally meet the needs of its people, had become 
accepted by personnel and was able to provide an affordable, appropriate 
and culturally safe service. However I do not believe it was able to reach its 
maximum potential due to a lack of resources and the expertise that existed 
within the Service was not being utilised to its full potential as previously 
discussed in this chapter. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have documented the history of the health services within the 
New Zealand Fire Service prior to and following the ICI Fire in 1984. 1 have 
commented on the recommendations that were made following the Report on 
the ICI fire and identified the many significant changes in the restructuring of 
the Fire Service from 1990 to the present. I revealed how this has impacted 
on the operation of an effective Occupational Health Service, with a 
subsequent increase in the need to provide an effective stress management 
programme such as Critical Incident Stress Management. In the following 
chapter I will discuss the Fire Service culture particularly in relation to 
occupational stress and stress management strategies. 
4. FIRE SERVICE CULTURE & 
OCCUPATIQNAL STRESS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section I will discuss the Fire Service culture particularly in relation to 
occupational stress and the stressors firefighters are exposed to in the 
Service. The effects of coping with the occupational stress of firefighting and 
firefighters personality traits will also be discussed. 
It is well documented in the literature, which will be discussed in this chapter, 
that firefighters and other emergency service personnel such as ambulance, 
police, nursing and medical personnel use particular coping strategies for 
their stressful jobs (Hartsough,l985; Raphael, 1986; Pennebaker & 
Susman, 1988 & Janik, 1998). They utilise these particular coping strategies 
as a form of a psychological shield to protect them, and often their families, 
from their day to day encounter with human tragedy. I have personally 
witnessed firefighters coping strategies, particularly following attendance at a 
critical incident where immediately following the incident they attempt to 
maintain a sense of control. It is usually sometime later that they begin to 
experience the stressful effects of having experienced a traumatic event and 
may require some support to cope with the distressing effects. Because of 
this need to maintain a sense of control in the immediacy of the incident, as a 
Clinician I will quietly and sensitively let them know, without being intrusive, 
that help is available if and when they may require it 
Different emergency workers may, because of their particular work tasks, use 
different coping mechanisms. However, I intend to focus in this chapter 
specifically on firefighters coping mechanisms. These coping mechanisms 
are seen as a form of personal stress management mobilised by firefighters 
to cope with the immediate crisis on hand, but may ultimately cause 
significant distress following the incident. Over time they can take over the 
personality of the individual firefighter and effect their interpersonal 
relationships in the work, family and social setting. In this chapter I will 
communicate my argument for the need to provide appropriate stress 
management strategies such as Critical Incident Stress Management for 
firefighters. 
4.2 THE PERSONALITY OF A FIREFIGHTER 
The common profile of the personality traits of the professional firefighter, 
although not common to all, are that they tend to be action-orientated, 
obsessive-compulsive individuals who like to be the centre of attention and to 
be in control of the situation. They are described as being family orientated 
particularly in regard to their "firefighting family", that is their fellow firefighers. 
They tend to seek instant gratification, are loyal and highly-dedicated to their 
tasks and many firefighters are risk-takers, willing to risk their own lives for 
the safety of others. 
"Being a firefighter is for many the central feature of 
their identity, as well as for their family members. 
Success on any job is largely a function of the "fit" 
between the personality of the individual and the 
demands of the job" (Harris, 7992, p.20). 
Kutner (1992) also discusses the personality profile of firefighters as being 
action-orientated, self-confident and self-assured in that they are able to cope 
with whatever confronts them in their daily occupational roles. Because of 
this profile they often have difficulty admitting that they are suffering 
emotional pain as a consequence of attending a critical incident. They tend 
to suffer in silence as opposed to seeking help as they are often 
embarrassed and perceive themselves as being weak. 
These personality traits deserve further discussion. If taken to extreme 
lengths they can have the potential to increase a firefighter's vulnerability to 
experience Critical Incident Stress. If the appropriate help is not provided it 
may cause them to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
A firefighter who has an obsessive-compulsive type personality may 
experience a sense of failure if an incident does not have a positive outcome. 
They tend to ruminate over how they could have done better and get into a 
cycle of self-blame. This can be further exacerbated by feelings of lowered 
self-worth and self-esteem. Often the firefighter may establish unachievable 
or unrealistic personal goals in relation to their work. When the firefighter 
expects everything to go well and all lives can be saved, they set themselves 
up to fail and may suffer disappointment if it is not actualised. Mitchell 
(1988~) discusses the dilemma that if a firefighter experiences too many 
failures from unfulfilled expectations this can dampen their enthusiasm and 
ultimately decrease their job satisfaction. 
The histrionic trait of enjoying being the centre of attention, while a useful trait 
in order to perform their tasks competently, can also have a negative impact. 
Their personalities are often seen as controlling, overbearing and annoying 
and leave little room for others to speak or be heard. This can affect their 
relationships with other firefighters, their families and social interactions. 
While action-orientated they are easily bored and if their thrill seeking needs 
are not being met, they often partake and enjoy dangerous sports such as 
mountain climbing, sky-diving etc. Mitchell (1988~) discussed how not only 
overstimulation is a frequent stressor by repeated exposure to emergency 
situations, but the opposite can cause as much stress due to inactivity 
leading to boredom in the emergency worker. 
As firefighters are seen as wanting to remain in control of the situation and as 
a consequence they are very often experienced at suppressing their 
emotions. The old movie image of "John Wayne" holding it altogether is 
important, though I believe this is decreasing. Seeing the need to seek 
emotional support following the experience of a critical incident or a traumatic 
event, is often viewed as a sign of weakness 
The Fire Service is seen as a culture, as a family. The very nature of their 
work in which they face life and death situations, are not normally faced on a 
regular basis like other occupational groups. This produces a strong 
camaraderie and family culture rarely experienced by other occupational 
groups. Because of the duration of their shifts, the need to sleep over and 
share meals and routine chores, firefighters get to know and care about one 
another. Stuhlmiller (1996) discusses the developed interdependent family 
system being due to the shift system and the intensity of the work shared and 
absorbed. As an Occupational Health Nurse who worked within the culture 
of the Fire Service, my observation is that it is necessary to establish a 
bonded trusting relationship, a connectedness between firefighters so they 
are able to successfully perform their work. This relationship, once 
established, allows the firefighter to have a sense of confidence in their 
firefighting crew, particularly when they are placed in life and death 
situations. This research may highlight this relationship. 
"Firefighters have a strong team affiliation with built-in 
socialisation practices that encourage and support 
fhat team identify" (Stuhlmiller, 1996, p.348). 
Bowker's (1988) study of firefighters in Wellington, New Zealand, discussed 
team work as a focal point of their social mechanisms. Each team member is 
allocated a specific task or position and they are all dependent on each other. 
This is particularly relevant when working together team in an emergency 
situation. They rely on each other in terms of their own personal safety. 
Some firefighers need instant gratification and become impatient and 
frustrated, but also are recognised as working harder and longer to achieve a 
positive result. As risk-takers they are known to remain on the job longer 
than is advisable thereby compromising their own health and safety. Berg, 
Clifford & Wheeler (1 997) discuss the dilemmas faced with regard to standing 
down firefighting personnel at major incidents such as the Thredbo 
Landslide, New South Wales, Australia, which occurred on 30 July 1997. 
"Some personnel wanted to be relieved with no shame. 
Some personnel wanted to be relieved but felt fhey would be 
"letting the side down". Some personnel were adamant that 
they would find it more stressful to be relieved before all the 
bodies were recovered" (p.5). 
The above example from Thredbo indicates that those who choose the 
profession of firefighting are highly dedicated and have a greater sense of 
obligation for the saving of lives than the average person. Firefighters 
appear to be motivated by a humanitarian urge and assume risky behaviour 
in order to achieve a positive outcome in the saving of life and property 
(Frago, 1999). While these qualities show a great sense of dedication and 
commitment to saving lives, it is not without its negative affects on firefighting 
personnel when support and assistance are not provided and when the 
demands of the job far exceed their personal coping strategies. On 
occasions even the toughest "John Wayne" experiences the harmful effects 
of being exposed to repeated critical incidents. This is another area of 
interest that I hope will be highlighted in this research. 
4.3 OCCUPATIONAL STRESS 
Like most theories, the theory of stress has developed and changed over 
time since Hans Selye, an Austrian endocrinologist, wrote on stress between 
the 1930s and 1950s (Selye, 2976a). In 1926 Selye identified what he 
believed was a consistent pattern of mind-body reactions which he called 
"non-specific response of the body to any demand" (Selye, 1974, p. 14). He 
later referred to this pattern as "the rate of wear and tear on the body" 
(Selye, 1976b) 
Many different and useful theories of stress have advanced with time and 
research. However, in this research it is not possible to discuss these 
indepth. I will focus on developing the background and management of 
Critical lncident Stress. It is important to discuss occupational stress in 
emergency service personnel, particularly firefighters, in some depth before 
discussing Critical lncident Stress in the next chapter. 
In reviewing the literature there is no single universally accepted conceptual 
model of occupational stress. There continues to be a growing interest in the 
literature in relation to Critical lncident Stress in emergency service 
personnel. Occupational stress has been described as the interaction (or 
transaction) between an employee and their work environment. The 
presence of stress can be inferred from the existence of problems in the 
employeelenvironment interaction (Ellis, 1995), or it can be measured in 
terms of health problems, cognitive processes and emotional reactions (Cox, 
1992). It can also be measured in the organisational outcomes such as 
absenteeism or presenteeism where employees may be viewed as being 
physically present at work but "mentally absent", and measured in terms of 
staff turnover and injuries (Ellis, 1995). 
Therefore occupational stress is dependent on the interaction of the 
individual and the environment or the circumstances they are in. It is not 
solely dependent on either the individual or the circumstances. 
Cox (1 992) stated 
"The experience of stress at work is therefore associated with 
exposure to particular conditions of work, both physical and 
psychosocial, and workers' realisations that they are having 
difficulty in coping with important aspects of their work situation. 
The experience of stress is usually accompanied by attempts 
fo deal with the underlying problem (coping) and by changes 
in cognition, behaviour and physiological function. Although 
adaptive in the short term, in the long term such changes may 
threaten health" (p. 18). 
Over the past 15 years, researchers have explored some of the occupational 
stressors of firefighters and other emergency service professionals. These 
studies (Kalimo, Lehtonen & Daleva, 1980; Hammer, Matthews, Lynons & 
Johnson, 1986; Mitchell & Bray, 1990) have suggested that firefighters and 
other emergency service personnel are exposed to extraordinary demands in 
relation to their emergency work and as a consequence, are at risk of "burn 
out" andlor suffer from a variety of physical and mental stress-related 
disorders. 
While many of these research studies have focused primarily on traumatic 
events or critical incidents following catastrophic disasters with multiple 
casualties, it must be remembered that there are a multitude of other 
significant sources of occupational stress that affect firefighters. 
Mitchell & Bray (1990) highlighted stressors that were task-orientated, 
specific and unique to firefighting such as driving an emergency vehicle at 
high speeds and using the ever changing and technologically sophisticated 
equipment at the scene of accidents or disasters. I facilitated a debriefing 
where the main stressor was malfunctioning and poorly maintained 
equipment. While it was a significant traumatic event, the firefighters were 
more stressed by the failure of the equipment to perform vital tasks in order 
to rescue the injured. Other potential stressors included fears of personal 
injury and the emotional strain of relaying the news of a tragedy to family and 
friends of the victims. 
Firefighters are exposed to other occupational stressors such as 
organisational stress. This can include disagreements over operating 
procedures and power struggles with immediate superiors andlor with peers 
(Steinmetz, Kaplan & Miller, 1982). Alexander and Wells (1991) study of 
reactions of police officers to body handling from the Sioux City plane crash, 
suggested that it was the organisational and the operational characteristics, 
rather than the exposure to the macabre sights, that was the primary cause 
of perceived stress. 
Organisational stress can take several forms. Hartsough (1985) cited conflict 
between organisations, low rewards, role ambiguity and the discomfort with 
new roles, as causing distress. Communication problems, role conflicts, role 
ambiguity, and associated role strain have also been identified by Steinmetz 
et al (1982) and Paton & Finn, 1999. Berah, Jones, & Valent (1984) noted 
the effect of interorganisational stress as one of the most stressful aspects of 
the Australian bushfires when dealing with other relief agencies. Bartone, 
Ursano, Wright and lngraham (1989) and Paton & Finn (1999) also cited 
interagency conflict as a major stress, as well as role conflict and a lack of 
clear role definition. Bushfire workers who did not have a high social support 
suffered significant stress from role conflict (Innes & Clark, 1985). Raphael, 
Singh, Bradbury & Lambert (1984) found that off-site workers suffered 
greater ambiguity of role than do on-site workers. 
Personality conflicts with peers andlor a lack of camaraderie can further lead 
to significant stress within a crew who work long hours in close proximity to 
each other with very often little personal space. A heavy reliance on team 
work and upon one another in "life and death situations" can lead firefighters 
to feel unsafe when working with particular peers who are not "team players" 
or who have caused significant stress. 
Sleep disturbance can be a problem for firefighters and with the impending 
change in shift structure to a 24 hour shift system for all paid firefighting 
personnel, this is a potential occupational stressor for New Zealand 
firefighters. Members of the New Zealand Fire Service who are known as 
Community Service Team (CST) members already work a 24 hour shift 
system. Many firefighters complain about the disruption to their sleep, sleep 
deprivation andlor the poor quality of sleep. Furthermore they are on the 
alert for an impending emergency call and as discussed previously they 
complain of boredom and inactivity (Mitchell & Bray, 1990). 
Certainly not unique to firefighters, but particularly pertinent due to the 
ongoing major restructuring of the New Zealand Fire Service, is the concern 
of job security. In June 1998 the Chief Executive, in essence, sacked all 
professional firefighters in New Zealand and requested them to reapply for 
new positions. The number of positions was to be greatly reduced and their 
role significantly changed as discussed in Chapter 3. The Professional 
Firefighters Union fought this decision in the Employment Court and were 
successful in having the decision overturned. This has caused a high level of 
stress in firefighters with reported complaints of low morale, an increase in 
sick leave, particularly stress leave, and lowered productivity. This has had a 
spill-over stress effect into their family and social environments. While the 
Court of Appeal rejected a bid by the Fire Service Commission to overturn 
the Employment Court decision in October 1999, many firefighters still 
continue to suffer stress in relation to their uncertain industrial relations. 
A further occupational stress is that many firefighters, due in part to their shift 
work schedules and partly due to their level of income, work in secondary 
jobs. This has the potential to cause further stress related to their secondary 
employment which may affect their primary employment. 
Karasek, Theorell, Schwartz, Schnall, Pieper & Michela (1988) highlighted 
the effects of psychological demands and job latitude and control. As 
discussed there are studies which have researched the effects of 
organisational and leadership such as communication, poor information 
management systems, and inadequately prepared leaders, are all 
contributors to stress (Hammer, Hammer, Lyons & Johnson, 1986; Paton, 
1997). There is an ever increasing body of knowledge on the importance of 
Critical Incident Stress in the emergency services personnel. 
Tools to measure occupational stress have been developed such as the 
Occupational Stress Inventory. However it fails to consider the variety and 
unique job-related stressors as discussed in this chapter in relation to 
firefighters (Murdock,l981). 
A review of the literature on emergency service personnel revealed a number 
of outcome measures for occupational stress (Kuorinka & Korhonen, 1981; 
Hammer, Matthews, Lynons & Johnson, 1986; Markowitz, Gutterman & Link, 
1987). No single instrument was used to address task demands, role 
responsibilities and job-related stressors. The Sources of Occupational 
Stress Instrument (SOOS) (Beaton & Murphy, 1993) was developed and has 
been modified over time. The SOOS identified 57 occupational stressors 
inherent or related to being employed as a professional firefighterlparamedic. 
While developed in the United States of America I consider that it is can be 
applied in the New Zealand context to measure occupational stress in 
firefighters. 
Beaton & Murphy's (1993) study of firefighter and paramedic emergency 
service personnel to measure job-related stress, revealed that conflict with 
management was the job stressor that most strongly correlated with the 
report of low job satisfaction and low work morale in both groups. Other 
commonly reported sources of occupational stress included disturbed sleep, 
and tedium related to boredom and dislike of day-to-day duties which 
correlated with job dissatisfaction and lowered morale in the firefighter group. 
However, these findings may not be a valid representation of this group as 
there was only a 50% response rate to the survey. 
Research by Taylor (1983, 1991) reported more than a decade ago that 
exposure to occupational stressors does not necessarily cause adversity in 
individuals but can have the positive effect of providing a challenge from 
which emergency service workers character and resilience are built. From 
my own observation working with firefighters, they are trained to respond to 
emergency situations. However ssme firefighters may never experience a 
"good fire". When they do, they experience a real high in terms of the 
challenge and a feeling of a job well done particularly if life and property has 
been saved. In firefighters terminology it is referred to as a "good save". A 
further study by Motowidlo, Packard and Manning (1986) discussed how 
other factors influence the perception of occupational stress. Job conditions, 
personal characteristics, especially job experience, type A personality 
characteristics, the fear of negative evaluation, all strongly influence how 
events in one's life will be experienced and interpreted. 
In order to preserve the careers of emergency service personnel and to 
prevent the crippling effects of stress-related disorders which are not only 
emotional but also physical stress-related disorders, it is important to gain a 
better understanding of occupational stress in firefighters. While firefighters 
enter their careers as physically fit and well able to perform their duties to a 
high standard, recent data indicates that job-related mortality in relation to 
stress-related disorders such as cardiovascular and coronary artery diseases 
are prevalent (Brooks, Parsons-Nicota & Richardson, 1998). The most 
recent reports (cited in Brooks et al 1998) of fireground death from the United 
States Fire Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
for the years 1995 and 1996, show that almost half of deaths occurring at 
incidents resulted from myocardial infarctions and half of the fireground 
deaths were a result of stress andlor exertion. 
4.4 COPING MECHANISMS 
Since the beginning of time people have been exposed to unusually stressful 
events. Natural or man-made disasters are shown in records such as the 
Book of Genesis which discusses the experiences of Noah and his family 
during the Great Flood. The history books recount endless stories of death 
and destruction from war. 
However, it is only in very recent times that the impact of disaster on 
individuals has been studied. For instance Mitchell and Bray (1990) 
described the stress theory. Earlier Walter Cannon (cited in Selye, 1956, 
p.196) formed the basic foundation of this theory when he described the 
"fight or flight" response, emergency reaction, in humans. He postulated that 
when a person was stressed beyond hislher capacity, an expected physical 
reaction such as freezing occurred, to enable the individual to prepare to 
fight, or challenge the stressor, or flee in order to escape the stressor. Hans 
Selye (1976a) added to Canon's work with his introduction of the General 
Adaptation Syndrome (GAS). During the first phase, an alarm reaction 
occurs and the person recognises a stressful stimulus. The mind and body 
respond with an increase in heart and respiration rate, and blood pressure. 
Muscles tense and the pupils dilate to take in more light. Biochemical 
responses occur in order to prepare to deal with the perceived stressor. 
Concentration improves and behaviour becomes extremely controlled. In the 
second phase the body attempts to resist the impact of the stressor by 
adjusting. Tensions increase due to the stressor until the body 
accommodates or exhaustion occurs. With enforced rest, the body recovers 
and achieves a steady state of relaxation until the next unusual stressor 
activates the syndrome once more. 
More recently Horowitz (1976) posited that when people are exposed to 
prolonged stress, particularly during an emergency or disaster, a mode of 
coping called "deniallnumbing" is initiated. By using this method the person 
is able to tolerate the constant threat of harm by either denying its existence 
or by assuming a numbed fatalistic stance. The findings of Lazarus (1975) 
adds credence to the role of cognition that the level of perceived threat during 
the stress experience determines the seriousness of a person's emotional 
response. Stanley (1990) produced further specific acute emotional 
reactions to extraordinary stress or trauma such as minimisation, disbelief 
and cold-like symptoms, to name a few. While cognitive defences are used 
by emergency service personnel to cope with the immediate and ongoing 
stress, overall little is known about its prevalence, effectiveness or ability to 
be learned by the less experienced emergency services personnel (Janik, 
1 992). 
Taylor & Frazer's (1982) incidental finding in their study of rescue workers, 
embalmers, mortuary staff and pathologists, found that those who were 
involved in body recovery and transportation, and victim identification, were 
able to cope more satisfactorily with their unaccustomed tasks if they 
regarded the grisly sights of broken bits and pieces of humans as broken 
dolls, frozen meat, tailors' dummies or waxworks' models. At a later stage it 
was necessary to readjust their cognitive defences of coping to equate with 
the reality of death (Taylor, 1990b). 
Emergency workers historically have been known to use specific coping 
mechanisms when faced with the tragedy and suffering of others. There 
appears to be a paucity of empirical literature on coping strategies used 
specifically by firefighters. Most studies have subsumed firefighters as a 
subsection of emergency service personnel or health care workers. Coping 
mechanisms such as avoidance and distancing oneself, that is withdrawal 
from the reality of the incident, denial and a strong desire to achieve a 
successful outcome, all assist the firefighter to focus on the immediacy of the 
incident. While these coping mechanisms are essential strategies for use in 
the immediate situation, they have the potential to cause significant distress if 
the firefighter fails to cognitively process the incident sometime later. 
Stress reactions can and do occur in firefighters during critical incidents 
which has the potential to interfere with effective operational performance. 
Ersland, Weisaeth & Sund's (1989) study investigated 134 rescue workers 
who participated in the rescue operation during the A.Kielland oil rig disaster 
in 1980 in which there was a large loss of life (58%). Approximately 20% of 
the participants reported one or more strong emotional reactions of 
significant strength and intensity of an overwhelming degree while working. 
Of interest, was that those who were less qualified for the task experienced 
more frequent and more severe stress reactions. 
In the past the Critical Incident Stress Management Peer Support Team in 
which I am actively involved, has received significantly more referrals for 
assistance from the less qualified and experienced volunteer firefighter as 
opposed to professional firefighter referrals. However, this does appear to be 
changing with an increased number of referrals from professional firefighters 
being received in relation to the stress attached to the ongoing protracted 
restructuring of the New Zealand Fire Service. However, Hytten and Hasle's 
(1989) study of professional and non-professional firefighters stress and 
coping following a hotel fire in which 11% of hotel guests died, found that 
despite the extreme stress associated with the incident, the frequencies of 
disturbing stress reaction during the incident were found to be low unlike 
McFarlane's study (1988b). These findings need to be placed in the unique 
context of the specific incident when comparing results from different incident 
studies. Every incident ha? its own special characteristics and problems. 
Emergency service personnel's competence and experience varies with 
different incident operations, the number of lost or saved lives and whether 
the rescue was positive in regards to the saving of lives and property. 
On occasions firefighters may suffer excessive stress following exposure to a 
critical incident. They may resort to self-destructive and risky coping tactics. 
Some firefighters may not want to acknowledge the stress and deflect the 
excessive stress by using such maladaptive coping strategies as the abuse 
of alcohol and misuse of drugs. They may exhibit extreme use of anger and 
violent behaviour and socially withdraw, both in their occupational setting 
andlor familylsocial environment. By using these maladaptive coping 
strategies there is the potential to cause significant physical, mental, 
emotional and social disruption to their lives and the lives of significant 
others. This can cause greater problems than the original stress of the 
incident (Mitchell & Everly, 1995). Firefighters should be encouraged to use 
positive coping strategies such as cognitive reinterpretation and reframing of 
the critical incident in order to find some meaning or "silver lining" in the 
incident. This could be to reinterpret the "failure" into a "success" or relook at 
the stressor and view it as learning an valuable lesson for the future and 
seeing it as being part of personal growth. Other positive strategies for 
coping could be the use of relaxation such as meditation, massage, 
biofeedback and deep breathing exercises. 
I will expand on how maladaptive coping mechanisms can be avoided or 
lessened, particularly in relation to firefighters when I discuss the Critical 
lncident Stress Debriefing component of Critical lncident Stress Management 
in a further chapter. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Having worked in the area of Critical lncident Stress Management for the last 
10 years, I have gained a greater understanding of the culture of the New 
Zealand Fire Service whereby firefighters are part of a large family who 
support each other through the good times and the bad. A special 
camaraderie exists which is related to the closeness of the work environment 
where they eat, sleep and work together for lengthy periods of time often 
under times of great stress. The need to care for each other through times 
of acute danger and stress all adds to the need to care for and understand 
the complexities of being a member of the Fire Service. I have personally 
witnessed some of the common personality traits, especially the need to 
remain in control, to stay on the job no matter what the cost is in terms of 
fatigue and safety, and the great sense of failure when property or life has 
been lost. Because of the culture that has been developed over time, it is my 
belief that one needs to understand the culture of the Fire Service with all its 
complexities in order to be able to work effectively with firefighters in the area 
of Critical lncident Stress Management. Members of the Peer Support Team 
who assist a trained facilitator in a debriefing are a vital link in the success of 
the debriefing. I believe they are the most important person in the debriefing 
in terms of being able to provide the most appropriate support and 
assistance. The Peer Support Team members understand the culture, the 
inherent occupational stressors, organisational stressors, the operational 
procedures and the different personalities, and are therefore able to provide 
the most effective support in order to assist firefighters through and following 
a Critical lncident Stress Debriefing. 
In this chapter I have discussed the culture of the Fire Service and in 
particular have discussed in some depth common personality traits that I and 
the literature recognise in firefighters. Ways in which these personality 
characteristics can help or hinder during their operational duties have been 
highlighted. I have also highlighted some of the known occupational 
stressors firefighters face and have also discussed some of the common 
coping strategies that firefighters utilise, particularly in the acute incident 
situation in order for them to remain effective operationally. Some of the less 
effective ways of coping following the incident such as maladaptive coping, 
have also been discussed and the impact this has on their lives and others. 
In the following chapter, discussion will focus on a selection of the literature 
that defines and explores the phenomenon of Critical lncident Stress 
particularly in relation to firefighters, and the stress management strategy of 
coping with the critical incident called Critical lncident Stress Debriefing. 
5. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The need for preventative psychological care was identified following the 
recognition that some emergency service personnel suffered psychological 
distress following their exposure to critical incidents where there was the 
potential for either direct or indirect personal physical or psychological harm 
(Mitchell, 1983; Dyregrov, 1989; Parkes, 1991). A technique called 
debriefing for use after emergency service personnel were exposed to a 
critical incident was developed by Mitchell (1983) and Dyregrov (1989) and 
more informally by Raphael (1 986). 
In this chapter, I will define what a critical incident is and explore more closely 
the literature on critical incident stress. The formalised technique used to 
lessen the effects of Critical lncident Stress which is Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing (CISD) will be discussed, together with the history of debriefing 
and the various models of debriefing. Due to limited space and my 
professional congruence with Mitchell's model (1983), the main focus in a 
review of the literature will be on this model of debriefing. 
Critical lncident Stress Management (CISM) will also be discussed briefly as 
ClSD is a component of CISM and it is a subset of an even broader field, 
crisis intervention. 
I will discuss the contemporary debates on the efficacy of ClSD and will 
conclude with a discussion on my position within the literature in relation to 
, 
my own practice within the field of CISM, specifically CISD. I will explore a 
range of literature on ClSD in order to identify the detailed steps in the 
process and its benefits to emergency service personnel when the model is 
applied appropriately and effectively. 
5.2 CRITICAL INCIDENTISTRESS 
The emotional response of emergency service personnel, that is ambulance, 
paramedics, firefighters and police, in relation to their exposure to critical 
incidents, has received considerable attention in the literature over the last 
two decades. In 1983 Jeffrey Mitchell, an American psychologist and 
paramedic defined a critical incident as:- 
"any situation faced by emergency service personnel 
that causes them to experience unusually strong 
emotional reactions which have the potential to 
interfere with their ability to function at the scene 
or sometime later (p.36). 
Very often critical incidents are sudden, unexpected and powetful events 
which are outside the range of usual human experiences. The potential 
fallout from exposure to a critical incident is Critical lncident Stress (CIS) 
which usually results from exposure to a traumatic or sudden situation or 
event which triggers a strong reaction in an individual. The sequence is well 
documented as being experienced even in well trained and experienced 
emergency service personnel. The incident has the potential to place an 
overwhelming demand on the individual's coping ability short-term, or even 
long-term. Because of the extreme nature of the critical incident, it may 
serve as the beginning point for the psychiatric disorder known as Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Critical lncident Stress is:- 
"the reaction a person or group has to a critical incident. 
It is characterised by a wide range of cognitive, physical, 
emotional and behavioural signs and symptoms" 
(Mitchell & Everly, 1995). 
Critical lncident Stress occurs when normal individuals experience a normal 
stress reaction which overwhelms their usual coping mechanisms following 
exposure to an abnormal event. They often feel overwhelmed by their sense 
of vulnerability andlor lack of control over the situation. Critical Incident 
Stress (CIS) begins as a normal response in a normal individual who has 
been exposed to an abnormal event. It is not a sign of weakness, poor 
training or leadership, in the individual suffering from CIS (Mitchell, 1992). 
Professionals historically have ignored the needs of emergency service 
personnel during crisis situations despite the occurrence of medical, 
emotional and mental disorders following these events (Raphael, 1975). In 
the past there has been the prevailing attitude that emergency service 
personnel are professionals who have "seen it all before" and "it is part of 
their job which they are trained to do". If they require professional help in 
coping with the negative effects of attending a critical incident, that is Critical 
lncident Stress, then it is considered that "the person is not suitable for the 
job". It is now well documented and understood that emergency service 
personnel are vulnerable human beings who have the potential to suffer from 
physical and psychological effects when exposed to the horroi of human 
suffering (Mitchell, 1983), and that their job and training does not train or 
adequately prepare them for the negative effects of their exposure to critical 
incidents. 
5.3 CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEBRIEFING 
Since the 1980s debriefing of personnel who have been exposed to the pain 
and suffering of individuals, groups and communities following natural 
disasters and accidents has been studied. (Mitchell, 1983; Bergmann & 
Queen, 1986; Raphael, 1986; Solomon & Benbenishty, 1986; Dunning, 
1988; Manton & Talbot, 1990; Armstrong, ~'Callaghan & Marmar, 1991). 
Providing debriefing services has been described as beneficial to emergency 
service personnel emotional wellbeing (Armstrong, O'Callaghan & Marmar, 
1991; Mitchell, 1983). 
Before discussing debriefing, it is vital to understand that debriefing is not 
psychotherapy or counselling (Mitchell & Everly, 1997). It does however 
apply some of the basic communication skills utilised in counselling such as 
non-verbal rapport, asking open-ended questions, paraphrasing and 
summarising. There are several models of debriefing that require discussion 
before focussing on Mitchell's model (1983) which is the main focus of this 
research. It must be recognised that other forms of debriefing were carried 
out, somewhat informally and crudely well before the 1970s and 1980s when 
debriefing became organised more formally for the emergency services in the 
United States. 
Although debriefing emergency service personnel is a relatively recent 
practice, encouraging limited ventilation or expression of the trauma 
experience has been used with soldiers in combat for at least 80 years 
(Mitchell, 1988a). Samuel Marshall, a military historian described a method 
similar to debriefing (Shalev, 1994). Marshall's diaries during the Second 
World War, and the Korean and Vietnam wars, discuss the benefits of 
debriefing. During this period small groups of soldiers were encouraged to 
discuss their experiences related to the traumas of war in some detail in a 
structured format soon after exposure. The debriefings were noted to have 
positive effects on the psychosocial functioning of the soldiers. 
The most rudimentary of debriefings was held on the beaches of Normandy 
during the D-Day operations on 6 June 1944. Though not named debriefing 
or structured in any formalised process, the psychiatrist who facilitated the 
process generally sat with groups of soldiers and allowed them to talk of their 
traumatic experiences during the invasion (Mitchell & Everly, 1995). The 
effect on those who participated in the debriefings and were encouraged to 
ventilate their feelings was that they were found to be more alert and ready 
for battle the following day. Due to this intervention, combat stress-related 
casualties in the Army produced a significant decrease from 20% in mid-l 944 
to 8% one year later (Harkins, 1997). The success of this intervention quickly 
spread and during the remainder of the war other psychiatrists carried out 
these informal debriefings. 
A Norwegian psychologist, Dr Atle Dyregrov developed a model (1989, 
1997) and referred to his method as psychological debriefing. It is based on 
that of Mitchell's model although there are some significant differences. 
Dyregrov begins the debrief with a question that focuses on how the 
participant came to hear about the incident. During the thought stage, 
Dyregrov's model focuses on the participants decision-making process of the 
to reduce their tendency to self-blame. To increase the understanding and 
processing of the experience, a stage of sensory impressions of the incident 
is included. Though similar to Mitchell's model (1983), Drygrov's (1989) 
model places greater emphasis on normalisation of reactions and responses 
and suggests that this may be safer for those participating in the debriefing. 
The Australian psychiatrist, Dr Beverley Raphael's (1986) model focuses on 
the emotional experiences of the participants and there is no formal 
assessment of cognitive processes. Interpersonal relationships are 
discussed in relation to identifying with the victims, concern for fellow workers 
and the impact of the incident on family and friends. Raphael's model is 
broader in focus than either Dyrgrov's or Mitchell's models. It does not follow 
the cognitive-emotional-cognitive pattern of both Mitchell's (1983) and 
Drygrov's (1989) models and is more involved with individual participants and 
their emotional experiences. She also deals with the participants' feelings for 
the victims of the critical incident which is not found in either of the two 
previously mentioned models. 
The whole movement of ClSM grew out of Professor Jeffrey Mitchell's nine 
and a half years as a firefighterlparamedic. In the 1970s Mitchell personally 
experienced the painful emotional effects following his exposure to a 
particularly unpleasant critical incident. He realised he was suffering the 
psychological effects of stress associated with his occupation and that others 
could also be similarly affected. His interest in mitigating, even preventing 
the stress attached to working in the emergency services field, began out of 
his own personal experience. He attained advanced degrees in psychology 
and human development and so began the birth of the ClSM field (Bell, 
1991). 
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The core of ClSM is Mitchell's model (1983) of Critical lncident Stress 
Debriefing (CISD). Critical lncident Stress Debriefing is 
"a psychological and educational group process designed 
specifically for emergency workers with two purposes in 
mind. First to mitigate the impact of a critical incident on 
the personnel, and second, to assist in the healing process 
of the members who are experiencing the normal symptoms 
and reactions to a stressful event" (Pierce, 1993, p. 19). 
In essence it normalises the physical, emotional and cognitive effects on 
personnel from an exposure to an abnormal event. 
"Most reactions to trauma are normal and do not indicate 
pathology or collapse" (Buckle & Hill, 1995, p.34). 
It represents a group meeting of those exposed to a common traumatic 
eventtcritical incident. It is led by a credible facilitator who is usually a mental 
health professional or other health professional, who is dedicated and has 
received the necessary training and who understands the culture and the 
unique personalities of emergency service personnel and the tasks they 
perform. The facilitator is supported by Peer Support Team members, often 
referred to as Peer Supporters, from within the particular occupational group. 
It was designed to mitigate the acute symptoms of distress associated with 
the exposure to a critical incident. It is supportive and encourages 
participants to discuss their experience, their personal feelings and reactions 
in a safe, caring and controlled environment. As the group members are all 
individuals who have been exposed to the same event, it enables them to 
share feelings and information on the incident. As a consequence of this 
group sharing the individuals feel less isolated and this reduces the likelihood 
of blaming or scapegoating and encourages participants to accept their 
reactions to the incident as normal (Hodgkinson 8 Stewart, 1991). By 
allowing the participants the opportunity for catharsis through discussing the 
critical incident, there is a reduction in arousal and improved immune 
functioning (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). 
My experience with debriefing is that it involves a "piecing together" of the 
event, getting the whole picture, not dissimilar to the piecing together of a 
jigsaw puzzle where participants have some part of the puzzlelpicture, but 
each has their own story, but not the full story. By the piecing together of the 
incident the participants are able to have a better understanding of the 
incident and to make some sense of the incident. Raphael (1986) refers to 
this piecing together as gaining mastery of the incident which ultimately 
allows the participants to eventually distance themselves from the incident 
and bring it to some conclusion. An important dimension of Mitchell's model 
(1983) of debriefing is that personal experiences are normalised and 
participants are assisted in looking to the future. Participants are encouraged 
to find something positive in the incident in which to make some sense of 
their experience. Participants are given health information and are assessed 
to identify those requiring more ongoing assistance. 
As discussed in a previous chapter, emergency service personnel have a 
strong sense of wanting to be in control. Dyregrov (1989) has shown that 
adverse reactions from exposure to critical incidents can be prevented by 
debriefing as it gives the participants back that perception of being in control 
of their lives which is particularly important to emergency service personnel. 
Pennebaker & Susman's (1988) discussion suggests that the intense 
personal experiences brought about by the incident is able to be controlled 
by encouraging the participants to integrate the experience at both a 
cognitive and an emotional level. 
The main aim of debriefing is to assist or accelerate recovery in normal 
individuals who are experiencing a normal reaction to an abnormal event 
before harmful stress reactions have the potential to damage their work 
performance, their careers, health, social and family life (Mitchell, 1983, 
1988b; Dyregrov, 1989; Robinson & Mitchell, 1993). 
Group psychological debriefing following critical incidents was originally 
designed to assist emergency service personnel deal with significant 
stressful situations they faced in their daily OC~Upati~n, such as line of duty 
death, serious injury, deaths of children and multiple casualties (Robinson & 
Mitchell, 1993; Wollman, 1993). Debriefings are based along the lines of the 
military principle of immediacy, proximity and expectancy (Solomon & 
Benbenishty, 1986). 
The functions of debriefing are essentially preventative although sometimes 
reactions and disorders may arise that require more specific psychological 
assistance or referral (Raphael, 1986). It must be acknowledged that ClSD 
is not psychotherapy or a substitute for any such process. 
5.4 CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT 
ClSD was never designed to stand alone in the field of crisis intervention. It 
has always been considered one of the components of the comprehensive 
and mutlicomponent crisis intervention programme, Critical Incident Stress 
Management (CISM) (Everly & Mitchell, 1997). 
ClSM defined: As stated it is considered a comprehensive, integrative, 
multicrisis intervention programme. It is considered comprehensive because 
it has multiple crisis intervention components which range from the pre-crisis 
phase through to the acute crisis phase and into the post-crisis phase. The 
seven core components of ClSM include pre-crisis preparation in the form of 
stress management education and crisis mitigation training; one-on-one 
crisis intervention throughout the full range of the crisis spectrum; family 
crisis intervention; disaster or large scale incident support which include 
demobilisation's; briefings and staff advisement; defusing, which is a small 
group process provided within hours of the crisis for purposes of assessment; 
triaging and acute symptom mitigation; ClSD as already discussed; and 
finally follow-up and referral for assessment and treatment for those who 
require more on-going assistance. ClSM provides a comprehensive system 
in which multiple interventions are available to provide the maximum benefit 
to individuals, groups and communities during times of crisis. ClSM services 
have been provided for emergency service personnel for the last two 
decades. However, it is now becoming a "standard of care" in many 
communities and organisations not associated with the field of emergency 
services (Everly & Mitchell, 1997). 
5.5 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
It is important that I define Mitchell's model (1983) since I base my practice 
on this model and this is the basis of the literature review. There have been 
multiple reviews of psychological debriefings but the conclusions with regard 
to the effectiveness have been varied. Some studies have failed to clearly 
define and identify the specific model of psychological debriefing that was 
used. These studies will be discussed under the non-supportive literature 
section later in this chapter. 
Mitchell's model (1983) has seven stages (Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & Everly, 
1995) and is facilitated by a trained mental health professional or someone 
who has extensive training and experience in CISD. The facilitatot is 
assisted by trained debriefing personnel, often referred to as Peer Support 
Team members or Peer Supporters. The debriefing is preferably held within 
two to seven days following the critical incident and can last from one to three 
hours. Attendance may be voluntary or mandatory. Generally participants 
are encouraged to participate voluntarily in the group process. 
Mitchell's model (1983) places emphasis on the participants of the group 
processing the experience within a cognitive, emotional and cognitive 
framework. The first stage called the introductory phase establishes the 
ground rules, the goals of the debriefing, the various roles of the facilitator 
and Peer Support personnel, and the facts related to the particular critical 
incident are discussed. The second stage is the fact phase in which the 
critical incident is described on a cognitive level from each participant's 
perspective from the time they arrived at the scene. The third stage, the 
thought phase, encourages the participants to describe their cognitive 
reactions and is a transition into their emotional reactions. In the fourth 
stage, the reaction phase, participants are asked to discuss what was the 
most traumatic aspect of the incident for them personally. The fifth stage, 
the symptom phase, participants are encouraged to discuss their symptoms 
of distress. This phase begins the transition back to the cognitive level. The 
goal of the teaching phase, the sixth stage, normalises their reactions and 
provides information on adaptive coping mechanisms. The seventh stage, 
the re-entry phase, addresses any outstanding issues, summarises the 
participants' experiences and assists the participants to find something 
positive from the experience. The process goal of ClSD is psychological 
closure following the crisis. Since the goal of ClSD is completion or closure, 
the ClSD is not usually repeated (Mitchell & Everly, 1995). 
Some critics of debriefing postulate that there is little empirical evidence 
which demonstrates the efficacy of debriefing and its subsequent prevention 
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Raphael, Meldrum & McFarlane, 1995; 
Gist, 1996; Gist, Lohr, Kenardy, Bergmann, Meldrum, Redburn, Paton, 
Bissen, Woodall & Rosen,1997). Research methods designed to measure 
simple cause-effect relationships of individuals who have participated in a 
debriefing, reveal little about the complex interactions between various 
factors which can affect an individual's response to the intervention. 
Variables such as the debriefing process utilised, the training and experience 
of the debriefing team, the timing of the debriefing, the type of critical incident 
the individual has been exposed to, repeated exposure to horrific critical 
incidents, cumulative stress, individual coping styles, support systems, and 
history of previous mental illness, can all influence the outcome of the 
intervention. 
Mitchell & Everly (1997) discuss that those who oppose the use of ClSD 
claim that there is no scientific evidence to support that ClSD is effective; 
that ClSD lacks a legitimate theory base; that ClSD has not been scrutinised 
and that those working in the area of debriefing require no specific training. 
Researchers who have reviewed the literature on debriefing have highlighted 
several methodological limitations in various studies. (Raphael, Meldrum & 
McFarlane, 1995; Gist, Lohr, Kenardy, Bergmann, Meldrum, Redburn, 
Paton, Bissen, Woodall & Rosen, 1997; Avery, King, Bretherton & Orner, 
1999). Because of the sensitive nature of the research related to critical 
incidents involving loss of life, multiple casualties and disruptions to 
communities, controlled studies are inherently difficult to carry out. Critical 
incidents are sudden, unexpected and can involve large numbers of people. 
Immediate support and assistance is required and research is very often 
inappropriate or difficult to carry out. 
Critical incidents vary in nature and in their impact on individuals, groups and 
communities, affect the methodology employed. The loss of a colleague in 
the line of duty or multiple deaths and casualties such as the Port Arthur 
incident in Tasmania, Australia, or a natural disaster such as a major 
earthquake, raises the question whether the effect on emergency service 
personnel would be the same as that of volunteers assisting in the disaster 
cleanup. 
A further important methodological issue relates to the use of control groups. 
Control groups cannot be easily formed as this involves withholding 
assistance. Randomly selecting experimental and control groups in the 
traditional research design poses ethical issues and can also be  difficult to 
perform due to the chaos and nature of many critical incidents. Withholding 
crisis intervention services when it is seen as an important aspect of support 
raises serious ethical issues. Seligrnan (1995) also argues that assessing 
the outcome of psychological interventions in controlled laboratory conditions 
as opposed to those in the natural environment, can adversely affect validity. 
Outcome measures in assessing the effectiveness of debriefing are 
problematic when carrying out studies. Individuals who have received the 
intervention following a critical incident do not often see research 
questionnaires as being a priority and may fail to respond or give the 
questionnaire the time and attention it requires. Furthermore, emergency 
personnel often close ranks after major traumatic incidents and resist 
research efforts (Robinson & Mitchell, 1993). Due to the sensitive needs of 
those who have been exposed to critical incidents, research efforts often 
have to take a lower profile as the needs of those traumatised must take 
priority. 
Studies need to evaluate behaviour outcomes such as return to work, and 
evaluating possible psychological outcome indicators such as the presence 
of intrusive thoughts, numbing and avoidance in relation to the incident. 
Because of the nature of their jobs, emergency service personnel, in 
particular, may fear the loss of their job if they reveal changes in their 
behaviour and psychological wellbeing. Management may view personnel 
who seek psychological assistance as no longer being suitable for the job in 
terms of their ongoing ability to cope with critical incidents in the future. Even 
if their job security is not able to be threatened by Management, their ability 
for job promotion may be compromised in the future. A further factor is that 
of time delay between the incident, the intervention and the assessment of 
the outcome tool. This is very relevant to emergency service personnel who, 
because of the very nature of their jobs, are regularly exposed to critical 
incidents, and the longer the delay in assessing the outcome the more likely 
they are to be exposed to further critical incidents which could sway the 
assessment of the original incident. 
Further methodological issues which are not always specified in the literature 
relate to the exact nature of the intervention, what model or method was 
used, by whom and whether they have the necessary experience and 
training in the intervention being assessed. As discussed earlier, there are 
several models besides Mitchell's model (1983) which can be utilised in the 
field of debriefing such as Raphael's (1986) model and Dyregrov's (1989) 
model. 
As can be appreciated, the above discussed methodological issues can all 
significantly affect the validity when assessing the efficacy of debriefing. 
However, it must be considered that research into debriefing is in its 
formative development and should be considered within this context. 
5.6 THE LITERATURE 
Due to the enormity of the literature in relationship to debriefing individuals, 
groups and communities, it is my intention to confine the review of the 
literature in relation to debriefing emergency service personnel which 
includes fire, police, paramedics, nurses and doctors. My main focus is on 
firefighters who are classified as emergency service personnel and are very 
often exposed to similar critical incidents or multiple critical incidents, and 
have similar characteristics, training, and coping abilities as other emergency 
service personnel. Also emergency and recovery personnel are classified as 
third-level victims of disaster (Taylor, 1990a). 
5.7 SUPPORTIVE LITERATURE 
Several Masters' Theses and Doctoral Dissertations highlight the positive 
benefits of CISD. The earliest study was carried out by Lanning in 1987 
(cited in (Mitche11,1997), on emergency service personnel who were 
debriefed following their exposure to the Delta 191 air crash. She identified 
six positive perceptions of debriefings for the debriefed. 
1. Participants found the debriefing prepared them for future stress 
symptoms. 
2. The debriefing enabled participants to accept symptoms and 
not feel crazy. 
3. Participants received support from other participants. 
4. Some problems were resolved. 
5. The participants felt safe in talking about their feelings and 
not having to hide them or be "macho". 
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6. The mandatory debriefings did not make the participants 
feel singled out (Lanning, 1987, cited in Mitchell, 1997, p. 89). 
The lack of a randomised control group is problematic in Lanning's study. 
Bohl (1988) studied Mitchell's model (1983) of debriefing in police 
andfirefighters. Using a naturalistic randomised control group, some 
personnel were debriefed by trained debriefers within 24 hours following an 
incident that involved a threat to or loss of life. Other personnel in a 
neighbouring department were not debriefed. All those involved in the study 
had been exposed to the same incident and their exposure to the incident 
was similar. Three months following the debriefing those who received 
debriefing from both the Police and Fire Services reported significant less 
depression, anxiety, anger and fewer stress related symptoms than those 
who were not debriefed. 
"The results showed that even a single session, one and a 
half hours in length can be effective in reducing the symptoms 
seen 3 months after a critical incident" (Bohl, 1988, p. 180). 
Roger's (1993) Doctoral Dissertation (cited in Seligman, 1995) evaluated 
Mitchell's model (1983) of debriefing on emergency service personnel. The 
findings suggests that ClSD was helpful in reducing the participants 
psychosocial stress by providing a moderate increase in a feeling of being in 
control of one's reactions to the critical incident. As discussed previously 
emergency service personnel have a strong drive to be in control, particularly 
during critical incidents and in their lives generally. Another positive effect 
was that the participants reported lowered symptoms post-debriefing and 
were better able to resolve their stress reactions than non-debriefed 
personnel. Though a control group was utilised, participants in the study 
experienced different traumatic events with variations on the intensity of the 
distress. 
Following the Los Angeles riots in 1992, researchers studied both the impact 
of stress reactions on emergency medical service personnel and the 
effectiveness of ClSD using a randomised control group. Wee, Mills and 
Koehler (1993) assessed 65 emergency service personnel who had either 
been attacked or threatened during the riots. Forty-two participants chose 
debriefing over 24 who declined. Utilising the Mitchell (1983) model and 
trained debriefers, it was found that participants who received debriefings 
had less symptomatology than the non-debriefed personnel, and were less 
stressed. 
A further study by Jenkins (1996) found that debriefed personnel had fewer 
symptoms of depression and anxiety one month following debriefing using 
the Mitchell (1983) model. Thirty emergency service providers, who were 
mostly male and who were exposed to a mass shooting in a cafeteria in 
Texas, were offered debriefing. Fifteen of the personnel volunteered for 
debriefing and 15 declined the debriefing intervention. 
Hytten and Hasle's (1989) study looked at the effectiveness of group 
debriefing for 39 firefighters who were involved in the rescue operation of a 
fatal Norwegian hotel fire. While participants found the debriefings helpful, 
their scores of intrusive thoughts and avoidance behaviour measured by the 
Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979) did not differ 
considerably from firefighters who were not involved in the debriefings, but 
who discussed the incident informally with colleagues, family and friends. It 
was difficult to measure the effectiveness of the intervention as self-report 
measures were not standardised in this study. 
In Shapiro and Kunkler's (1990) study following the football stadium disaster 
in England, 35 debriefings were held in 2 separate hospitals. Thirty-two 
debriefings were held in the hospital that received most of the dead and 2 
debriefings were held in a second hospital. Sixty-eight per cent of those who 
were debriefed found it to be helpful. 
In Smith and de Chesnay's (1994) qualitative evaluation study of 10 police 
officers involved in violent incidents, ranging from the murder of a young child 
to the death of a fellow-worker, ten cases were presented. All but one 
participant rated ClSD helpful on qualitative evaluation measures. It was 
difficult to measure the outcome due to self-report measures that were not 
standardised. 
A descriptive study of questionnaire responses of 682 emergency nurses' 
perceptions of critical incidents and debriefing in Illinois, Indiana and 
Louisiana was carried out by Burns and Harm (1993). Respondents viewed 
the death of a child and the death of a colleague as the most critical. Thirty 
two percent of the respondents had participated in debriefings and 88% had 
found them to be helpful in reducing Critical Incident Stress. However, the 
authors of this study did not clearly define the group debriefing model utilised, 
or the training or experience of the group leaders. 
Robinson and Mitchell (1993) conducted a systematic study of group 
debriefings on 172 emergency service, welfare and hospital personnel in 
Australia. The study evaluated 31 debriefings using the Mitchell (1983) 
model conducted over a 21 month period. The incidents which led to the 
debriefings were fairly routine except for three exceptions which were 
significant critical incidents involving loss of life. Participants were asked to 
complete an evaluation questionnaire two weeks post-debriefing on the value 
of debriefing. Ninety-six per cent of the emergency services workers and 
77% of the welfare and hospital personnel noted a reduction in stress 
symptoms which they attributed in part to the debriefing. However 41% of 
the group of chiefly female welfare workers and approximately 65 of the 
group of chiefly male emergency workers reported the traumatic incident as 
having a significant andlor great impact on them with a high frequency of 
cognitive and other symptoms. However, symptoms were not assessed 
systematically with standard measures. 
A further study by Robinson (1994) researched the broad range of ClSM 
services offered to ambulance personnel in Australia following the aftermath 
of tragedies. Of the 823 ambulance personnel involved in the study, 82% 
believed that the CISD's were helpful. As in Robinson's and Mitchell's (1993) 
previous study, due to the absence of a control group and the variance of 
critical incidents, it is difficult to draw valid conclusions. 
Hanneman's (1994) qualitative study for her Masters Thesis on ClSD 
evaluated the Mitchell (1983) model of debriefings. The group studied 
included volunteer firefighters in Nova Scotia. Hanneman identified eight 
dominant themes associated with ClSD services. They were 
l .  The positive impact of the ClSD on the department. 
2. The positive impact of the ClSD process on the individual. 
3. The value of venting. 
4. The value of being able to express emotions. 
5. The importance of getting the whole perspective. 
6. The CISD helped firefighters accept that they had done 
their best. 
7. The ClSD helped them feel that fhey were not alone in their 
feeling. 
8. The ClSD produced a sense of bonding or brotherhood. 
Hanneman concluded:- 
"This research was able to support some of the basic assumptions 
and rafionales which are the foundations of Mitchell's Model. 
Psychological debriefings were found to be effective in reducing 
the signs and symptoms of distress. The cathartic discussions 
helped to reduce stress, facilitate group cohesion and mutual 
support, reduce or eliminate any misunderstandings or mis- 
information, and peer support was identified as being very 
valuable" (Hanneman, 1994, p.48-49). 
In 1994 Scandanavia suffered its worst peacetime sea. disaster in its history 
with the sinking of the "Estonia", when over 900 people lost their lives. 
Nurmi's (1997) study contrasted three groups of emergency personnel who 
received ClSD with a group of emergency nurses who received support from 
their supervisors but were not debriefed. The rescue personnel that included 
firefighters, police investigators and disaster victim investigators, scored 
lower on the Impact of Event Scale (IES) (Horowitz et al., 1979) than the 
nursing group who did not receive the CISD. It is important to note that this 
was the largest application of Mitchell's model (1983) of ClSD in Finnish 
history. 
A study by Chemtob, Tomas, Law and Cremniter (1997) provided three hours 
of debriefing and two hours of disaster coping information to 43 disaster 
rescue personnel following Hurricane lniki in Hawaii. Disaster related 
psychological distress was measured using the Impact of Event Scale (IES) 
(Horowitz et al, 1979). Two groups of individuals were debriefed using the 
Mitchell's model (1983) six months and nine months respectively following 
the incident, which is significantly later than what Mitchell recommends. 
Despite the fact that the debriefing occurred six and nine months following 
the incident, the ClSD process was found to be effective in reducing 
symptoms of distress in both groups. This study is significant as it is one of 
the first studies to introduce a partially controlled design for psychosocial 
intervention after natural disasters. Though the group studied were not 
strictly from the emergency services group, because of the methodological 
strength of this study, I believe it required inclusion in this review. 
In an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of debriefings, Everly and Boyle 
(1997) carried out a meta-analysis. A meta analysis is useful because it 
"allows for the statistical integration of the results of independent 
investigations so as to summarise and statistically express the 
overall effectiveness of the intervention under investigation". 
(Everly & Boyle, 1997, p.2). 
The methodological strengths of studies by Bohl (1988), Chemtob et a1 
(1 997), Jenkins (1 996); Nurmi (1 997) and Wee et al, (1 993) and their use of 
the Mitchell model (1983), blended themselves to a meta-analysis of their 
data. All studies identified a common critical incident, clearly defined the 
group intervention utilised and assessed the outcome before the passage of 
time that may have further exposed the research participants to another 
critical incident. The five empirical investigations yielded a sample size of 
337 subjects. The outcome of the meta-analysis showed a significant effect 
size, Cohen's d=.86, which is indicative of a large positive effect size 
attributable to the debriefing intervention. Clearly the results are compelling 
and encouraging with regards to the power of CISD to mitigate symptoms of 
psychological distress. Despite the variance of subject groups, traumatic 
incidents and the diversity of outcome measures, the beneficial effects were 
revealed. 
5.8 NON-SUPPORTIVE LITERATURE 
A further body of data in the literature on ClSD presents findings that this 
type of group psychological intervention has no appreciable positive effects. 
One of the most commonly cited examples of a ClSD comparative study is 
McFarlane's study (1988a & 1988b) which revealed negative outcomes. This 
longitudinal study over a 25 month period examined the post-traumatic 
morbidity of 469 firefighters who responded to a bushfire disaster in Australia. 
The bushfire disaster (McFarlane & Raphael, 1984) destroyed almost three 
thousand square kilometres of bush, grazing land, orchards and national 
parks. Several thousand trained volunteer firefighters who either lived within 
and outside the fire affected area were exposed to extreme levels of danger 
for lengthy periods without respite. A number of homes were lost, stock and 
farms were destroyed, three volunteer firefighters were killed and many were 
injured. The General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1972) was used as an 
instrument for measuring Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the 
study. Using a four-stage longitudinal design, participants were assessed at 
six monthly intervals over a two year period. McFarlane found that those 
who were debriefed had less acute traumatic stress but had a greater 
likelihood of developing delayed PTSD. However, it is important to note that 
several of the participants were primary victims due to personal bereavement 
(7%) or personal property damage (23%). A further methodological flaw 
identified in this research is that the author did not clearly identify the type of 
debriefing utilised. 
A further commonly cited study is that of Kenardy, Webster, Lewin, Carr, 
Hazell & Carter (1996) which evaluated the effects of stress debriefing on 
195 emergency service personnel and disaster workers following an 
earthquake in Newcastle, Australia. The researchers compared 62 debriefed 
personnel with 133 who were not debriefed. Utilising the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) (Goldberg, 1972) to assess post-trauma stress 
reactions and the Impact of Event Scale (IES) (Horowitz et a1,1979) to assess 
general morbidity, participants were assessed on four separate occasions 
over a two year period following their exposure to the earthquake. There was 
no evidence of an improved rate of recovery among the 62 helpers who were 
debriefed. This finding was consistent in two years of follow-up 
assessments. However, 80% rated the debriefing as helpful. Once again 
there was no standardisation of debriefing. Kenardy et al (1996) were not 
able to determine objectively the quality of the debriefing provided and 
whether it matched Mitchell's model (1983). These studies were not 
controlled trials and the groups may not have been comparable. Some 
participants may have experienced different stressors, loss rather than 
trauma, had uncertain roles, or had more welfare or counselling duties for 
which the debriefing model was inappropriate. Some participants may have 
been distressed prior to the incident. 
A significant flaw in both the McFarlane (1988a) and Kenardy et al (1996) 
studies is that both were longitudinal studies following participants exposure 
to a critical incident. By its very nature ClSD was intended to provide short- 
term, acute crisis intervention to stabilise a critical situation and to assess 
those personnel who may require more professional assistance. The key 
objective of ClSD is to focus on short-term effects and therefore it is 
inappropriate to carry out longitudinal studies on short-term interventions. 
Also worth noting is that research participants may be exposed to further 
critical incidents, both professionally and personally, during the course of the 
study which further flaws the findings. 
Drygrov, Kristoffersen and Gjestad (1996) conducted a study of 43 rescue 
personnel who were debriefed following their exposure to a fatal bus crash in 
Norway. Findings concluded that rescue workers had lower total scores on 
the Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) at both one and thirteen 
months. However, those personnel who handled the dead and injured had 
significantly higher intrusion and avoidance scores which is indicative of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Different types of victims were presented in 
this research and the delay in assessing the effectiveness of debriefing limits 
the useful interpretation of the results of this study. A further limitation to this 
study was the response rate. It was not considered optimal as there was a 
decline in responders over time. The sparse information regarding the non- 
responders precluded the researchers in determining whether the non- 
responders were more traumatised than the responders. 
Following the Kempsey and Grafton bus crashes in Australia, which resulted 
in multiple losses of lives and casualties, Griffiths & Watts (1992) reported 
negative findings amongst half the subjects surveyed one year after the 
incidents. Two hundred and eighty-eight subjects, which consisted of fire, 
police, ambulance and medical personnel, and ministers and telephone 
operators were also included in the study and were followed up one year 
later. The 182 secondary victims that had been debriefed had significantly 
higher scores on the Impact Event Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) and poorer 
scores for general health. The group with the high distress may have been 
worse without the debriefing, but the study was unable to show this. Several 
significant flaws were evident. Different types of victims were used in this 
study. The debriefing model that was utilised was not stated, nor the training 
or experience of those who provided the debriefing. Also the delay in 
assessing the effectiveness of debriefing, especially amongst the emergency 
service personnel group who may have been exposed to further critical 
incidents, could have confused the assessment of the original incident. 
A further Australian study (Matthews ,1998) examined the efficacy of 
debriefing using Mitchell's model (1983) in ameliorating the impact of post- 
traumatic stress on psychiatric care workers after a critical incident at work 
such as assault by a psychiatric client. The study included sixty-three direct 
care workers from two areas in Sydney who worked in residences caring for 
people with both psychiatric and developmental disorders. The sixty-three 
participants were surveyed for symptoms of intrusive thoughts, avoidance 
and hyperarousal, one week following an assault by a patient or another type 
of work-related incident. The participants who responded to the survey 
included fourteen workers who requested and attended a debriefing during 
the week following the incident; eighteen workers who chose not to attend 
the same debriefing though they were offered the intervention; and thirty-one 
workers who worked in a different area of Sydney where debriefing was not 
available. The study found there was no significant reduction in the stress 
reaction between the 14 workers who received the debriefing and the 18 
workers who did not. While the debriefing was evaluated positively by the 
majority of the participants, there were some aspects of the debriefing, such 
as its timing and the work environment in which it was offered, which could 
affect the degree to which participants benefit from it. It is worth noting that 
Matthew's did not randomly select his sample group which limits valid 
interpretation of the intervention and subsequent study results. 
A comparative study of debriefing in police officers following their 
involvement in rescue work where a Boeing cargo plane cashed into two 
high-rise apartment blocks in Amsterdam, claiming the lives of forty-three 
people, was carried out by Carlier, Lamberts, Van Uchelen amd Gersons 
(1 998) Two hundred police officers were involved in the rescue, 45% were 
debriefed and 55% were not debriefed due to operational circumstances in 
relation to the lengthy duration of rescue work or their unavailability due to 
the need to rest after the exhausting rescue work. Non-debriefed police 
officers were used as the control group in the study. Two assessments were 
carried out on the participants at 8 months and 18 months post-disaster. 
One hundred and five officers were recruited, forty-six had been debriefed 
and fifty-nine had not received debriefing. Results indicated that a total of 
7% of the participants developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder following 
the disaster rescue work. At the first assessment no significant differences 
between the debriefed and the non-debriefed were found which is consistent 
with the results of Hytten and Hasle's (1989) study and Kenardy et al's 
(1996) study. However at the second assessment, eighteen months post- 
disaster, the debriefed police officers exhibited significantly more 
hyperarousal symptoms in relation to the rescue work than non-debriefed 
police officers, which resembled McFarlane's (1988a) study with firefighters 
and Griffiths and Watts (1992) study with rescue workers. While the study 
indicated that the participants were recruited to reflect the entire population of 
rescue workers, the participants did not differ significantly in pre-event or 
post-event distress; in activities performed at the rescue site; or in their 
motivation to undergo debriefing. However, there were some limitations to 
the study in that data in relation to exposure to the trauma, motivation for 
debriefing and early symptom levels were collected retrospectively at 8 
months following the trauma which has implications in relation to recall bias. 
While the two groups did not appear to differ significantly, it is possible that 
subtle or unmeasured differences such as their commitment to the task of 
rescue work, could have influenced the possibility in their participation in the 
debriefing in the first instance. 
There are other significant comparative studies (Lee, Slade 8 Lygo, 1996; 
Hobbs, Mayour, Harrison 8 Worlock, 1996; Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander 8 
Bannister, 1997) that showed similar negative results. However, all these 
studies focussed on primary victims of critical incidents, such as women who 
were debriefed at home following a miscarriage (Lee et al., 1996); victims of 
motor vehicle accidents who had been admitted to hospital (Hobbs, Mayour, 
Harrison & Worlock, 1996); and burns victims (Bisson et al, 1997) 
Other uncontrolled studies (Creamer, Burgeess, Buckingham & Pattison, 
1989; Weissaeth, 1989; Searle & Bisson, 1992) suggest negative results. 
Once again these studies focussed on primary victims of critical incidents, 
such as individuals involved in a street shooting (Creamer, et al, 1984), 
victims of a factory fire and explosion (Weisaeth, 1989) and soldiers involved 
in traumatic combat duties during the Gulf War (Searle & Bisson, 1992). 
While those studies that I have discussed resulted in negative outcomes, 
they still should be considered within the context of debriefing. However, as 
mentioned throughout the discussion of the various studies, there were 
significant methodological flaws which limits the validity of the studies. 
Raphael, Meldrum & McFarlane (1995) and Gist (1996) discuss the rapid 
expansion of debriefing programmes reflecting a powerful social movement 
that is said to address the needs of emergency service personnel and victims 
of disasters and violence. All authors claim that there is little solid evidence 
on which to judge the increasingly sweeping claims that debriefing is 
effective, and there is some evidence to suggest that it is not effective and 
may even exaggerate the traumatic process (Kennardy et al., 1996; 
Watts,1994). While debriefing meets some real and symbolic needs and 
many of the participants who have participated in the many studies 
mentioned report it as being useful, it is expensive and not effective for many 
people. It may negate the need for more individualised and longer term 
programmes focussing on recovery and rehabilitation for those who have 
been traumatised. Also suggested by Raphael et al (1995) and Gist (1995, 
1996) is the comment that debriefing may focus on the trauma to the 
exclusion of other important issues such as organisational and personal 
stressors. Raphael et al (1995) and Gist (1995, 1996) recommend that the 
existing programmes can no longer operate without randomised controlled 
trials of debriefing, using multiple outcome measures and assessments over 
time. They also recommend evaluating more individualised counselling. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss critical incidents, Critical 
lncident Stress and more extensively Mitchell's model (1983) of Critical 
lncident Stress Debriefing. I have referred to the literature utilising Mitchell's 
(1998a) ClSM Review of the Literature which he presented at the 
Australasian Critical lncident Stress Association Conference, Auckland, New 
Zealand, April, 1998, and other sources which I have discovered through my 
research or everyday practice. 
The ClSD crisis intervention is but one component of the comprehensive 
Critical lncident Stress Management crisis intervention programme. ClSD 
was never intended to be a stand alone intervention. However, I see it is a 
very important and effective group strategy in preventing serious and long 
term psychological distress. Everly & Boyle's (1997) study of ClSD is 
extremely significant. A significant positive effect was revealed attesting to 
the power of the intervention in mitigating the symptoms of psychological 
distress. This positive effect was highlighted despite the wide variety of 
subject groups, traumatic events, and the diversity of outcome measures. As 
is usual, a larger pool of subjects would have added more credence. 
However, the results of this study are encouraging and hard to refute even by 
the strongest critics of Mitchell's model (1983). 
As a Nurse Consultant with extensive training and experience in the use of 
Mitchell's model (1983), 1 have witnessed the positive effects and evaluated 
the debriefings which have on the whole revealed very positive results. For 
too long organisations and professionals in the field of emergency disaster 
have ignored the needs of rescue personnel exposed to crisis despite the 
occurrence of medical and mental illness following their exposure (Raphael, 
1975). 1 believe that is because of the sensitive nature of a firefighters 
occupation. There is a continuing need to provide debriefing, where 
appropriate, to forestall even mild debilitation affecting their work, family and 
social environments. 
While I have outlined the relevant research to date to assist the reader to 
gain some background understanding of CISD, I consider that many of these 
studies have lacked the ability to truly portray the benefits of debriefing. 
Many of these studies fail to gain a deeper meaning of the experience of 
debriefing from the individual perspective of the emergency service 
personnel. As a Clinician, I have a passion to gain a greater depth and 
breadth of understanding in relation to CISD from the individual's perspective 
in order to assist me to advise and offer the most appropriate CISD strategy 
in the New Zealand Fire Service. It is for this reason that I carried out a 
qualitative research project utilising individual narratives portrayed as case 
studies to gain a rich understanding of the experience of CISD. The 
research studies appear rather bland and do not reveal the individual's 
experience of debriefing. Many focussed on facts and figures to prove or 
disprove the value of debriefing. I asked myself when reflecting on the 
studies, whose benefit was being served by these studies, the researcher or 
the researched? How therapeutic was it for.the participants to be involved in 
these studies? I hope that by carrying out this research project, that the 
participants in this research will experience a therapeutic process and that 
the readers of this research gain a greater understanding of CISD. As a 
researcher and as a Clinician working in the area of CISM, I anticipate that I 
will gain a deeper understanding of the process with the potential to benefit 
the research in this area and of course my practice in which I know I can 
ultimately improve the debriefing process for future participants. 
As previously discussed, emergency service personnel have the potential to 
suffer from Critical Incident Stress following exposure to critical incidents. 
Reactions to highly stressful events can cause immediate andlor delayed 
physical, emotional, intellectual and behavioural dysfunction. With the 
emphasis in the 1990s on the need for preservation and conservation of the 
world's rich resources, so too should our human resources receive the same 
attention they deserve. However, many organisations fail to take the 
appropriate steps to value and protect their personnel from not only physical 
harm but also from mental and emotional harm. In the present era in New 
Zealand of downsizing and people being disposed of due to increased 
technology and continuing financial restraints, it is important for organisations 
not to loose sight of their most valuable commodity, their workforce. 
In this chapter I have explored in depth the development of Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing and discussed the extensive literature in regard to those 
who espouse the positive effects of debriefings and those who negate its 
effectiveness. I have concluded with my initial thoughts on debriefing prior to 
the research. In the following chapter I will outline the methodology I used to 
conduct this research. 
This chapter presents the ontological and methodological principles that 
guided the process of my research in relation to choosing the narrative case 
study approach. The study is located within postpositivist interpretive 
research, to further explore Critical Incident Stress Debriefing. I will discuss 
in depth my personal philosophy of practice as a nurse researcher and will 
focus on the process of discovering a methodology and the method that was 
utilised. I will focus my debate on the difficulties I experienced and 
resolutions I made around finding a methodology and method that was fitting 
for the project in order to meet the needs of the participants and the readers 
of this research. I will discuss how I discovered a methodology that would 
illuminate the rich descriptions that I anticipated would be revealed. I 
required a research approach that enabled the mutuality of my working role 
to be ongoing with the research. 
As a Nurse Clinician working in the area of Critical Incident Stress 
Management and research, I believed that I was in a unique and privileged 
position in which to explore with the firefighters the experience of debriefing, 
as the essence of my practice involves responding to firefighters in their 
particular context. While collectively I view them as a group, within a 
particular culture, I also view them as individuals each with unique 
experiences, though commonalities do exist, in relation to attending critical 
incidents and the subsequent stress attached to attending these incidents. I 
questioned some of the traditional forms o f  research exploring human 
experiences. Like several Australian nurses (Moss, 1991, Lumby, 1992, 
Taylor, 1994a), 1 wanted to explore using a different style of research in order 
to understand and explain the individual experiences of firefighters. I wanted 
to utilise a methodology that helped us all, the researcher, the research 
participants and significant others, to understand the personal experiences of 
debriefing. The narrative seemed the most fitting, as I believed it had the 
potential to uncover both the uniqueness of the experience and the 
commonalities. It offered the potential to work with the research participants 
in a creative, artful and caring manner, that was congruent to the research 
and had the potential to influence my future and others practice. 
My plan in utilising the narrative as a methodology was to examine the semi- 
structured interviews with firefighters who had participated in a debriefing, not 
as a series of set questions and answers, but as part of a large recurring 
narrative about the experience. I intended to interpret the interviews as an 
unfolding of a central narrative about a person who has experienced a 
debriefing, and how this person has come to be in the place that helshe is 
presently in. While reflecting on how the firefighters begin to share their 
story, I could see with greater clarity that the narrative methodology would 
best fit my research. 
It was my intention to direct the findings of this research as a means of 
assisting the New Zealand Fire Service and other organisations in looking at 
their provision of Critical Incident Stress Management. With this in mind I 
believed it was imperative that the research was presented in a language that 
was accessible to both the participants, the New Zealand Fire Service and 
other organisations who were likely to access the findings. As a result of my 
indepth reflections, I believed I discovered the most fitting methodology and 
will describe my journey through this process of discovery. 
6.1.1 THE LENGTHY JOURNEY 
I have been on a long journey to discover and utilise a methodology and 
method which would provide the most appropriate, congruent, sensitive and 
effective research process, when journeying together with the debriefed 
firefighters as research participants. In order to illuminate their personal 
experiences in relation to the process of debriefing, like any journey we had 
to discover a way together. Like many long journeys there have been some 
breakdowns along the way. I will share my personal experiences in order to 
assist the reader in understanding how I came to choose the narrative case 
study as my methodology. 
Parse's Human Becoming theory (1992) is: 
"grounded in the belief that humans coauthor their becoming 
in mutual process with the universe, cocreating distinguishable 
patterns which specify the uniqueness of both humans and the 
universe" (p. 5). 
I believed that I would be on a journey with the participants where the journey 
had the potential for the participants to also have a mixture of house-garden 
and wandering in the wilderness effect which was akin to Kelley's (1995) 
house-garden wilderness metaphor. I had a professional obligation to care 
for the participants and was in a unique and privileged position to assist them 
on their journey through the research, finding their house, travelling through 
their garden by cultivating and toiling their roots in order to reveal their stories 
in a safe and caring environment. I did this by being present with them in 
times of wandering through the wilderness of uncertainty, in the uncovering 
of the painful effects of the critical incident. 
I utilised Parse's practice methodology to guide me to live in true presence 
with the participants, travelling with them on their journey, and seeing how it 
is for them. True presence to me means real and genuine human to human 
relating, open to what is happening to the person in the moment. I believed 
that the qualitative research method best suited my study. 
A further key concept in my personal philosophy is that of viewing the 
participants holistically, understanding them as a non-reducible totality, being 
more than the sum of parts. Chin & Kramer (1991) claim that 
"the most consistent philosophic component of the idea 
of the person is the dimension of wholeness or holism" (p.42) 
-99- 
This ontological position is compatible with my research methodology which 
views reality as being created by people through interacting with their 
environment. Each person creates their own reality from their own 
experiences they have within a particular moment and within the space of 
their social and cultural worlds. Lincoln & Guba (1985) support this idea of 
constructed reality as the most significant reality because it engenders the 
idea that multiple realities exist. There may be commonalties among 
realities, there is no one single reality. While there are many realities there is 
no one explanation of reality. The only meaning given to the reality is that 
which is identified by the person experiencing it and that knowledge is 
created . Thus knowledge is created by individuals and different actions will 
reveal different knowledge with knowledge being context bound. The above 
ontological beliefs underpin the methodology chosen for this research. 
As my research was carried out on human subjects, my intention was to 
carry out ethically sound research where my focus of caring practice was 
able to be actualised. I wanted to move away from the traditional purist 
model with the dominant voice of the researcher and their interests being 
paramount over those of the researched. I wanted the participants to feel 
empowered so that they could be strong in voicing their world and to feel 
respected in their way of constructing and deconstructing their meanings 
within the context of their world and experiences. In the mainstream tradition 
of research there is a marked asymmetry of power between the interviewee- 
interviewer relationship (Mishler, 1986). Telling one's story and being fully 
heard can be empowering for research participants. Mishler (1986) proposes 
a mode of interviewing that empowers people and encourages them to speak 
in their own voice 
"When the balance of power is shifted, respondents are likely 
to tell "sfories". . ..interviewing practices that empower respondents 
also produce narrative accounts. Through their narratives 
people may be moved beyond the text to the possibilities for 
action. That is, to be empowered is not only to speak in one's 
own voice and to tell one's story, but to apply the understanding 
arrived at to action in accord with one's own interests" (p. 119). 
As my philosophy of practice centres on reducing the power differential, I 
view my clients, be they patients, firefighters, nursing students or research 
participants, as working collaboratively to achieve either an improved health 
outcome if possible, or a peaceful death; or in the development of the 
research study and in the analysis and interpretation of same. My philosophy 
also centres on the act of healing my clients and from my readings on the 
narrative methodology it did have the ability of healing by the participants 
telling their stories (Morse, 1988; Krysel, 1991 ; Sandelowski, 1991). 
Storytelling has become a more acceptable method of research. It is 
culturally acceptable, adds both a richness and depth in the revealing and the 
understanding of the phenomenon being researched, and generates data 
which reveals genuine insights into the participants' experiences (Silverman, 
1993). Storytelling also affords the researcher the opportunity to gain 
information that is contextually relevant and can thus assist providers of 
health care to develop services that are flexible and able to meet the realities 
of peoples' lives (Banks-Wallace, 1998). 1 believed that the use of the 
narrative would best suit my philosophy of practice and my chosen research. 
6.2. PHILOSOPHY & QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
My particular philosophical and epistemological position in this study is based 
on Streubert & Carpenter's (1 995) statement that qualitative research is not 
about prediction and control but is related to description and understanding. 
I was attracted to.qualitative research in that it is conducted within the real 
world of individuals' lives utilising methods that generate data in a more 
flexible and sensitive manner within the individual's own social world. I 
wanted to study a selected issue in greater depth and detail and believed that 
the qualitative method would enable me to meet my specific needs. I was 
interested in obtaining a more complete representation of firefighters 
experience of debriefing and thus a more contextualized understanding of 
their needs. 
Qualitative research is seen by some purists to be a new fad in the world of 
research and is deemed to be frivolous, without any real substance, value or 
able to be utilised in the real world of people and their problems. However, 
qualitative research is more concerned with the lived experience, unlike 
quantitative research which involves the positivist approach of finding the 
"truth or facts and is purely objective. 
Qualitative research is conducted with individuals who are influenced by the 
complexity of a social world which is often multi-layered (Mason, 1996). It 
offers a way to gain rich insights through the discovery of fresh meanings. I 
wanted to be able to truly understand the experience of debriefing from the 
firefighters experience in the complexity and context of their world, in order to 
discover fresh meaning which have the potential to influence my own and 
others practice in the area of CISD. 
Qualitative research is grounded in a philosophical position which is broadly 
interpretivist, in that it utilises an holistic framework and it provides a mode to 
explore the depth, richness and complexity inherent in particular phenomena 
(Bums & Grove, 1993). My goal in utilising qualitative research was to 
transform my own and others understanding of debriefing. As Sandelowski 
(1997) states the goal of qualitative enquiry is not just the amassing of data 
but it offers the opportunity to transform understanding of the phenomena 
being studied. 
6.3 DISCOVERING THE NARRATIVE 
My journey in discovering the narrative was not without its wandering in the 
wilderness and along the highways where I felt at times incredibly confused 
and lost. The map that I planned to follow did not feel congruent with my own 
philosophical beliefs. My own fear around following a different methodology 
tended to obstruct me in my ability to create a "fit" between myself as the 
researcher, the participants and those who were likely to access this study. 
6.3.1. BREAKDOWN TO BREAKTHROUGH 
Some years ago I was attracted to Parse's (in Kelley, 1995) house-garden- 
wilderness metaphor in discussing the journeying with clients through the 
health continuum. As a nurse researcher, relatively new to the world of 
qualitative research, I could relate to Parse's metaphor of being in the house- 
garden-wilderness during my journeying. However, I have used Parse's idea 
and taken the liberty of developing my own image in relation to the car 
metaphor that I will utilise as I tell my story. 
As a novice in the world of nursing research, particularly qualitative research, 
my journey has not been without its "breakdowns". At times there have been 
major breakdowns where I have even considered dispensing with this "old 
car" as my research seemed beyond repair, particularly in relation to the 
dilemma of finding the most appropriate methodology that would "fit" the 
research. I even considered looking for a "new car" and starting afresh with a 
new research project. However, through the many breakdowns along my 
journey, with the assistance of my supervisor, nursing academics and 
nursing research peers, I began to see with more vision and clarity, that 
research is not a recipe and I did not have to follow a particular methodology 
step by step like a set of ingredients in a recipe book. I did have some 
freedom to design a methodology that suited my study and in order to 
describe and illuminate the experience of debriefing, I needed to enter into 
the research world fully. My dilemma centred on validating the firefighters 
experience of debriefing and checking out my model of debriefing in practice. 
I needed to discover a "fit" between the questions I was asking in relation to 
the debriefing the firefighters had experienced. As a Nurse Clinician involved 
in the debriefing, the best way to elicit this information from the participants 
was to CO-create a text that would do justice to their experience. I had to 
move away from questioning them to elicit this information in order to use the 
research process to both explore with them and to mutually discover what 
was occurring in the debriefing. 
Initially, in considering this research, I was interested in gaining an 
understanding of the phenomenon of debriefing as it occurs "naturally" by 
listening to firefighters describe their experience of debriefing as it occurred. 
I knew I would ask them questions and that we would have conversations, 
but beyond this I did not know what the narratives might look like until I 
conducted a pilot interview. The purpose of the research was to understand 
the experience of firefighters following their participation in a ClSD in which I 
had participated as a facilitator. I knew that knowledge of this experience is 
not possible without the firefighters describing their human experience as it is 
lived. 
My initial intention was to use the interpretive approach grounded in 
Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology as a suitable methodology to 
study the experience of debriefing (van Manen, 1990). Phenomenology aims 
at gaining a deeper understanding of the nature or meaning of our everyday 
experiences. It does not claim to offer effective theory in order to explain 
andlor control our world, but rather offers us real insights into the everyday 
world of peoples' experiences (van Manen, 1990). 
I viewed phenomenology as a method of research that appeared to offer an 
approach of accessing the "real life" experiences of firefighters in a way that 
retained the "aliveness" and context of their experiences. Rather than being 
focussed on the world of theory it is focussed on the world of experience 
(Reed, 1994). 
As time passed I progressed with developing the research proposal and 
design. However, it became clear that phenomenology did not feel 
congruent with my own philosophy and did not "fit" well with me in terms of 
empowering the research participants and those who had the potential to 
access the final research document. Congruency was important to my 
research. I felt uncomfortable with a methodology which the participants and 
the readers of this research would perhaps find somewhat foreign and 
difficult to understand its roots. Roberts & Taylor (1998) discuss the 
importance of choosing a methodology and method that has a degree of "fit" 
between the type of knowledge that can be obtained and the means available 
to achieve it. 
After much soul searching I discovered narrative as a methodology. On 
reflection the periods of wandering on the motorway where I had a sense of 
being lost in the side roads during my journey of discovering the most 
congruent methodology was important. Because of the spiralling processing 
and reflection, I clarified and came to believe that the narrative would very 
likely reveal the liveliness of the experience of debriefing, the participants 
involvement and even illuminate the passion or depth of that experience for 
them. I realised I wanted to utilise a research process that had the potential 
to uncover the experience of the storyteller and that enabled this information 
to be shared with others in order to understand common human experiences. 
Narrative is not dissimilar to reflective topical autobiography which focuses 
on a "snap shot" or a "part" of the participant's life story which is of some 
common interest and encourages comparison with others who have had a 
similar kind of experience (Berg, 1995). The aim of the participants' 
conversations was not to uncover a true account of the storyteller as required 
by some positivists' researchers subscribing to the philosophy of positivistic 
research. It was important to me that potential readers of this research were 
able to find some common meaning within the stories that were uncovered in 
order for the participants to gain new insights and a greater depth of 
understanding about their own and others lived experiences and the 
meanings they attach to these (Johnstone, 1999). In essence, the goal of the 
narrative was to facilitate the transformation of stories that sustained my own 
and others professional practice in the area of Critical lncident Stress 
Management, specifically Critical lncident Stress Debriefing. 
I have used Sandelowski's (1991) discussion on the increasing use of 
narrative and story telling in qualitative research as a foundation to develop 
my position. Narrative and storytelling is a primary way individuals make 
sense of their experiences. By the telling of the story of the experience, it 
takes on new meaning for the person. Morse (1988) records that interviews 
encourage participants to tell the whole story, rather than just bits and pieces. 
She also discusses that participation is unquestionably a therapeutic 
process. I was later to discover that all the participants found the interview 
process to be a therapeutic experience as they were able to tell the story 
from their own perspective. At no stage during the interviews did any of the 
research participants find it difficult recalling their story. of the particular 
critical incident and the follow-up CISD. Once a trusting relationship had 
been established at the beginning of the interviews, they tended to tell their 
story with much passion and in a great detail. 
I have discovered in my practice that very often firefighters come into a 
debriefing feeling anxious and fearful about the process believing that they 
are going to go through a process of psychoanalysis. I have repeatedly 
witnessed the firefighters transformation from entering the debriefing in a 
tense and anxious state, to that of great relief and release following their own 
and others active participation in the debriefing process. In the introduction 
phase, the first stage of the seven stages of the debriefing, the ground rules 
for the participants, the facilitator and peer supporters are discussed in detail. 
The facilitator discusses that the participants are not undergoing a form of 
psychoanalysis, but are there to tell their story from their own position. I refer 
to this as each person having a piece of the jigsaw puzzle, and with each and 
everyone's support all the pieces will be put together into the full puzzle or 
picture. It is also established that the Peer Support Team members and 
facilitator are there to support and assist them through the processing of the 
trauma attached to attending the incident, and that the debriefing is not a 
critique of the operational side of the incident, but is a stress debriefing. If 
the introductory phase has been carried out in a caring and supportive 
manner, it is amazing to see the participants suddenly begin to relax and feel 
less threatened by the process. I believe this sets the scene for the 
participants to begin to open up as they are being valued and feel 
empowered to share their own story in a more calm and relaxed manner. 
Personally, I view nursing as focussing on experience, being engaged with 
people who are living in their personal worlds whereby together we negotiate 
a safe passage through the many uncertain journeys of health. My 
participation in their journeys is fraught with both vulnerability and strength as 
we negotiate this journey as partners in the process. These experiences can 
be conveyed as narratives of exploration (Gadow, 1995). The lived 
experience in narrative can afford an opportunity in which truth becomes 
visible. This will be discussed in a later chapter, where one of the major 
themes for one of the participants was that debriefing afforded him the 
opportunity to tell the truth. in telling his story he was able to engage with the 
researcher and offer others his experience of debriefing. Narrative is an 
excellent way of explicating knowing because by the sharing of the 
experience we can engage others in our explorations and join them in theirs 
(Gadow, 1995). 
6.4 NARRATIVES AS STORYTELLING 
In-depth interviews uncover personal stories (Hutchinson, Wilson & Wilson, 
1994). My attraction to the narrative as a methodology rests on seeing the 
experience to be uncovered as having multiple meanings and open to 
differing interpretations, so that no one experience is reduced or objectified. 
Narrative is a way of highlighting aspects of the person's experience that 
cannot be fully realised within the positivistic model of research (Wiltshire, 
1995). There are many ways of expressing and illuminating the lived 
experience and the narrative appeared to "fir my research, especially in 
relation to the research participants and consumers of this research. It uses 
ordinary everyday language that has the potential to reveal and uncover the 
richness of the experience, without using new terminology that has little 
meaning or relevance to the experience or peoples real world. Instead of 
uncovering the richness of the experience, new terminology has the potential 
to disempower and disengage both the participants and the readers of the 
research as they begin to view the subjects' experiences as being objectified 
by foreign terminology and jargon. 
The earliest and most widely cited model of personal narrative is the 
Labovian model, which is still current today (Mishler, 1991). Narrative as a 
methodology has a long history of being invisible, inaudible and has been 
relatively ignored as an object of research. However, there has been a 
renewed academic interest in personal narrative (Langellier, 1989). It does 
not appear to fit neatly within the boundaries of any one particular scholarly 
field (Riessman, 1993). 
Narratives located in research interviews require narrators and listeners. 
Participants in research studies together weave their stories with the 
interviewer and in many ways it is jointly woven. By utilising narrative in the 
research, a co-operative inquiry process and a culture is established that 
honours expression as well as explanation, and assists participants in 
making sense of the experience. I believe that narrative was a powerful 
method of communicating the findings of the inquiry to other people in a way 
that was congruent with their level of understanding of the methodology 
utilised. The narrative has the ability to seize the richness and the truth of an 
experience as it is told and retold over time. Not only does it assist those 
involved in the primary experience but meaning is shared with others. Not 
only is it a truly meaningful collaborative experience between the researcher 
and the research participants, but also meaning is able to be shared with 
others who may relate to the telling of the experience (Lumby, 1994). 
In research we are taught that the goal of conducting research is to get the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth (Sandelowski, cited in Kikuchi, 
Simmons & Romyn, 1996). However, is our goal of research to get the whole 
truth or the whole story and whose interests are we serving in getting the 
former? Riessman (1990) relates stories as being the "strategicn way by 
which individuals develop, sustain and present an interpretation of 
themselves and reality. Individuals use stories to describe and explain 
events and to justify themselves in their thoughts, actions and feelings. Good 
stories are a way of making our world more transparent and predictable. The 
descriptions elucidated in narratives have the potential to prescribe ways to 
act in the future. 
It is important to acknowledge and appreciate that in the construction of 
stories the ultimate goal of storying is not so much to discover the real truth, 
rather to create it and to make sense, meaning and order. To acknowledge 
the truth in stories and the storied nature of truth requires that researchers 
maintain the completeness of the data gathered in the typical qualitative 
research interview (Sandelowski, cited in Kikuchi, Simmons & Romyn, 1996). 
Stories have been used in the social sciences to view how we preserve a 
sense of connectedness in our identity over time. They reconstruct the 
experience in an ordered fashion to be understood in the past, experienced 
in the present and anticipated as the future. Humans are active constructors 
of their lives. People in their everyday life do not use abstract concepts to 
make sense of what happens to them, instead they tell each other stories. 
Stories reveal how people experience in a particular way the situations that 
effect their lives. Stories refer to lived experiences (Abma, 1998). Thus 
narratives have both a reconstructive and coherence function which Mishler 
(1991) refers to as the "narrativization of identity formation". Stories do not 
present a detached perspective but are told from a specific point of view. 
Stories are not completely static. They contain many meanings and are open 
to multiple interpretations and in the interpretation stories can change (Abma, 
1998). 
The act of constructing a narrative in response to an experience affords the 1 
l storyteller the opportunity to examine their life that has been transformed by I 
the experience. The details of individual stories may vary because the 
stories draw on the particular individual's position in their social world. 
However the putting the story back together in all its totality, which is a 
function of the narrative, is seen as central to interpreting the experience 
(Mathieson & Barrie, 1998). 
6.4.1 NARRATIVE AS INQUIRY 
As I journeyed in the early stages of planning the study I had decided that the 
methodology that I chose would need to meet several critical criteria that I 
had highlighted as being paramount to the success and safety of the study. 
It was necessary to find a methodology that enabled the participants to 
describe, explain and justify their thoughts, feelings and reactions in relation 
to the critical incident and subsequent CISD. A methodology that had the 
potential to be healing in terms of making further meaning of the experience 
and also enabled the mutuality of my working role to be ongoing with the 
research. Once I had discovered the narrative I questioned myself as to why 
I had not been attracted to this methodology sooner. Had I been entrenched 
in the idea that I had to follow a particular recipe, which in hindsight would 
have been somewhat confining for both the participants and myself. 
I had a great sense of relief once I was empowered with the freedom to 
develop my own methodology based on the narrative form of inquiry, using 
the case study method of data collection. I recognised that I could truly 
represent the generated data as narratives of the participants' experiences in 
a way that both the participants and the consumers of this research would 
appreciate and value. Using narrative enabled me to explore the experience 
of debriefing for firefighters and how they interact during and following the 
debriefing. It would have the potential to be both a credible and valuable 
piece of research that would have meaning to the wider community. 
Whatever methodology I chose would serve as a road map for the journey in 
order to reach the expected research outcome. 
Mishler (1986) states that efforts to empower participants and the study of 
their responses are intimately connected. A significant way through which 
f participants make sense of and give meaning to their personal experiences is j, 
I 
to construct them into a narrative form (Mishler, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988). 
Human beings make sense of their experience by creating it in a narrative \ 
form (Gee, 1985). This appears to be particularly pertinent during difficult life 
transitions and traumas (Riessman, 1993). Therefore, I wanted to design a 
methodology in which there was a more equal partnership where the 
participants were empowered and felt more able to find and speak in their 
own voice. I believe that participants are more likely to tell their stories where 
there is a more open relationship and where the balance of power has 
shifted. 
A further reason for choosing the narrative as a methodology was that 
storytelling is a time-honoured tradition in nursing. The narrative approach 
utilised in nursing research is seen as justifiable and practical because of the 
strength of the oral tradition in nursing. Nurses listen to their clients' stories 
and those of their families and friends. Clinical storytelling is a powerful tool 
in assisting the listener and the storyteller to develop shared knowledge and 
a greater understanding of the culture of nursing practice (Moss, 1991). 
Nursing is recalling the narrative to the world of nursing and storytelling is 
emerging as an important understanding within nursing practice (Baker & 
Diekelmann, 1994). Once I had discovered and decided to use this 
methodology I began to feel a sense of relief and congruency with the 
research. 
My intention was that the research process would be of benefit to myself, 
both academically and professionally, for my continuing practice, but 
ultimately would be of benefit to the participants, their fellow firefighters and 
to the wider emergency services community. As will be discussed in a later 
chapter, it became evident during my interviews and follow-up discussions 
with the participants that the research process was of benefit to all the 
participants who found the process a very healing experience. 
6.5 BENEFITS, CREDIBILITY AND 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
A further benefit from utilising narratives is that it has the potential to not only 
empower the participants by the telling of their stories, but the participants 
are also able to understand the possibilities for future action for themselves 
and for others. This became evident with my first case study, where the 
participant discussed how he had gained greater understanding of his 
situation and in future would be more aware of the need to carry out a 
defusing, an informal method of debriefing, with his crew following attending 
critical incidents. By telling his story, by reading the transcripts and by 
probing from the researcher, he was able to understand in greater depth the 
need for some form of ClSM when the circumstances demanded it. Another 
participant, whose marriage had recently ended in unpleasant circumstances 
prior to the debriefing, was empowered by the process of debriefing in that he 
shared with the group more than what he was usually comfortable with. As a 
consequence of his increased confidence in the area of the telling of his 
story, he was considering seeking professional counselling to resolve some 
of his anger and pain attached to the breakup of his marriage. 
It was my intention that this research, rather than be used to develop any 
major theory, has the potential to influence the New Zealand Fire Service and 
other emergency service organisations, of the need to provide Critical 
lncident Stress Debriefing where appropriate, or other forms of Critical 
Incident Stress Management, if debriefing was found to be of little or no 
benefit to the participants. My goal was to gain knowledge of the experience 
of debriefing practice. I explained to each participant prior to the interview 
process what my main intention was for carrying out the research. The 
participants had the role of acting as advocates within their community and 
culture, and the research was intended to serve their interests, the New 
Zealand Fire Service and other emergency service organisations' interests. 
The aim of the research was to collect information on the experience of 
debriefing in order to reveal its benefits in reducing the effects of Critical 
lncident Stress and the subsequent potential development of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. 
It was always my intention that the voices of the four participants be "heard" 
in the final document. Primary quotations illuminating the pattern and themes 
that were uncovered are used to allow their voices to be "heardn in the text. I 
discussed with the participants at the beginning of the study that a copy of 
the analysis chapters would be made available to them for their comment on 
the truthfulness of the text, in that it accurately represented their personal 
experiences. 
6.6 CASE STUDY AS METHOD 
In this chapter I have identified and discussed the methodology that I have 
chosen that best "fits" the research. The philosophical and methodological 
premises of this research have created the methods that I have pursued to 
study the phenomenon of Critical lncident Stress Debriefing. As a researcher 
I needed to consider what method would best suit the research. I had a 
genuine interest in understanding the experience of debriefing and wanted to 
focus intensively on the experience of debriefing and all its complexities. 
With this in mind the logical road to follow was the case study method. The 
case study method was chosen because of the exploratory nature of the 
research (Yin, 1994). Case study is a method that is likely to seize the 
complexity of a single case or cases. 
Case study investigates an individual, a group, institution or social unit 
indepth (Polit & Hungler, 1993). It is especially applicable when the 
researcher is concerned with client-centred clinical problems (Meier & Pugh, 
1986). Case studies are considered an excellent method of carrying out 
research in nursing contexts (Sharp, 1998). It is widely postulated that case 
studies are beneficial in researching human experiences because they are 
practical and hold the reader's attention. However, case studies are not a 
suitable basis for generalisation. They are often the chosen method of 
research as they may be epistemologically compatible with the reader's 
experiences and consequently to that person, a natural foundation for 
generalisation (Stake, 1978). 
While it can be argued that the value of case studies is determined by the 
extent to which their findings can be generalised, the generalisability of such 
research is often underestimated. This relates to the confusion over two 
quite discrete logical bases upon which generalisations can be made; 
empirical and theoretical generalisations. Empirical generalisations relate to 
the claim that what is discovered is typical of the population from which the 
sample has been selected. Whereas theoretical generalisations are made on 
the basis of having highlighted or discovered some general principle 
concerning the phenomenon under investigation (Sharp, 1998). While only a 
few cases will be studied, they will be studied in depth. Certain issues, 
activities or problems will appear time and time again. Therefore, certain 
generalisations will be drawn (Stake 1994, 1995). There is another way for 
readers to learn from cases, Stake (1978, 1995) refers to this as "naturalistic 
generalisations". Naturalistic generalisations are the particular meanings the 
reader may associate to the text from the totality of who they are. It involves 
getting a feel for how things are, sensing what happens and generally 
extending one's experience whereby they are empowered and are given the 
sensitivity to act (Wilson, 1979). 
The real pursuit of case study is not generalisation but particularisation. 
Case studies are particularistic in that they depict events or experiences in 
one particular situation as it exists in reality for the individual (Wilson, 1979). 
By taking particular cases the researcher comes to know the cases well, not 
just how it differs from each case, but what it is and what it does. The 
researcher looks for the uniqueness, understanding the particular case itself, 
seeing the difference between cases, but also looking for cornmonalities 
when interpreting the data (Stake, 1995). 
The ultimate goal of nursing research, like other practlce based professions, \ 
l 
is to provide information that will lead to improvement in the prov~sion of 
services to clients ((Meier & Pugh, 1986; Ray, 1991; Sharp, 1998). As a 
Nurse Consultant working in the area of Critical lncident Stress Management 
I am concerned with firefighters response to Critical Incident Stress and the 
resultant crisis intervention of debriefing. I have a commitment to understand 
the whole person and the complex issues that affect their response to a , 
critical incident and the subsequent experience of debriefing. The case study 
approach I believe is well suited to focussing on the individual's experience. / 
! The case study approach focuses upon understanding the particular in l , ,  
addition to the general (Stake, 1994). i \
As it was my intention to use language that could be understood and 
presented to the wider community using narratives to describe the 
experience of debriefing, the case study method was the most appropriate \ 
l 
method to pursue. It seemed reasonable to assume that the chosen 1 
methodology, narrative, and the chosen method, case study, are congruent 
with the type of research being undertaken for this study. Taylor (1994a) 
discusses the need for a degree of fit between the type of knowledge 
uncovered and the approach that is available to accomplish it. I wanted to 
portray the cases comprehensively using extensive but non-technical 
descriptions and narratives. I envisaged that the relationship between the 
researcher, the participants, and myself would be unique. I hoped that what 
was uncovered from the data would be of value to the New Zealand Fire 
Service, particularly in relation to providing the most appropriate ClSM 
programme and may have some relevance to particular readers of this 
research, principally those working within the emergency services field. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have outlined my personal philosophy of practice and how it 
related to my choice of methodology and method for collecting the data. I 
have discussed in some depth the breakdowns related to my initial choice of 
methodology and the discovery of, and subsequent choice of narrative as a 
methodology. I have discussed how narrative is a means by which 
individuals construct personal experiences to find further meaning. They 
touch others' lives by their familiarity which is akin to a mirror effect. 
Narratives are powerful tools for change as we learn from stories and are 
influenced by stories. Knowledge gained from narratives has the potential to 
be transferred to others working in the emergency services field. The case 
study method of social inquiry has also been discussed as a preferred 
method of research because it may be epistemologically in harmony with 
potential reader's experience and thus a natural basis for generalisation. 
There are potential benefits to both the participants and the readers of this 
research. The case study method has been utilised in the world of research 
and has been found to be a direct and satisfying method of adding to 
experience and improving understanding. The following chapter will discuss 
the research design utilised to conduct the research. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research design is akin to a map outlining the journey to be utilised by 
the researcher in order to provide an overall framework for the collection and 
analysis of data. In this chapter I will describe the study design focussing on 
the overall strategy that was utilised to access the research participants, the 
development of the research and the relationship that was established 
between myself and the research participants, the debriefed firefighters. I will 
also describe the decisions I made to shape the interview process; data 
collection and transcribing; ethical considerations and the process 1 used to 
gain rapport, verify and develop deeper interpretation of the data. I will 
conclude the chapter with a discussion on the trustworthiness of the data. 
7.2 NEGOTIATING ACCESS 
This research was carried out within the New Zealand Fire Service and the 
research participants were firefighters from within the Service. I had 
previously been employed as an Occupational Health Nurse in a Region 
within the Fire Service. At the time of the proposed research, I was a 
volunteer on the ClSD Peer Support Team, and I was aware that there were 
a number of governing bodies within the Service from whom I was required to 
gain consent in order to carry out this study. Through my familiarity with the 
Service I realised that in order to gain the support of the firefighters, it was 
vital to have the permission and support not only of Management, but also of 
both the New Zealand Professional Firefighters Union and the United Fire 
Brigades Association. Without their support, especially the New Zealand 
Professional Firefighters Union, I knew that it would not be possible to carry 
out this study effectively. The journey of gaining consent from the five groups 
within the Service is a narrative in itself and is important in positioning the 
participants' narratives and the eventual reflections and practical value of the 
research to develop policy. 
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The research proposal and a covering letter requesting permission to gain 
access to the firefighters was sent to the Management of the relevant Region 
of the New Zealand Fire Service and the ClSM Peer Support Team, where it 
was planned to carry out the study. The proposal was sent to the National 
Office of the New Zealand Fire Service; the New Zealand Professional 
Firefighters' Union; and the United Fire Brigades' Association of New 
Zealand. All parties approved and supported my request to access potential 
participants for the study without question. I felt affirmed in their approval 
and considered their unquestioning approval of my research proposal 
significant and an indication of their support. 
The National Office required me to sign an agreement on four criteria relating 
to the research project. These included that no individual was able to be 
identified in any published reports; that the published report would only 
address the stated objectives; that the Region be advised of any change in 
the project that would significantly impact on the methodology, research or 
findings; and that the Fire Service reserved the right to withdraw approval (if 
warranted) as a result of any changes in the previous criteria. I have 
complied with these requests and conducted the research as requested. The 
New Zealand Professional Firefighters Union distributed a circular to its 
members in the relevant Region, outlining their approval and support by 
encouraging their members to participate in the study. This was another 
indication of their support for the study. 
7.3 RECRUITMENT 
As discussed, my study was approved and supported by the New Zealand 
Professional Firefighters Union, which assisted me in recruiting potential 
participants. Following receipt of ethical approval from the Central Health 
Wellington Ethics Committee and Victoria University of Wellington Human 
Ethics Committee to carry out the study, I then had to wait patiently for 
sometime for critical incidents to occur in rapid succession that required 
debriefings. Then several significant and powerful critical incidents occurred 
which required debriefing. 
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Following the debriefings which I had facilitated, I discussed with the 
debriefed participants my research study, its support from the five Service 
groups, and the purpose of the study. I discussed the full implications of 
what was involved if they consented to be participants. From previous 
experience of working with firefighters I was aware that confidentiality issues 
were of paramount importance to this particular occupational group, therefore 
this issue was discussed in detail. Questions about the project were 
answered. It was necessary to keep the discussions brief due to the usual 
fatigue experienced by the debriefed participants. To avoid any undue 
pressure to participate, the participants were provided with an information 
sheet (Appendix l l l) to take home and read at their own leisure. With their 
approval, participants were informed that they would receive a follow-up 
telephone call from me within the next 24 - 48 hours, enquiring into their 
willingness to participate in the study. Several firefighters declined the 
information sheet and stated that while they supported the study they were 
unable to meet the time commitments required of the study. I thanked them 
for their honesty and also for their support. 
Approximately 24 - 48 hours following the debriefings, the debriefed 
firefighters were telephoned to discuss their participation in the study. The 
first participant, who was to become my first case study (and became known 
as Fit) was originally recruited to assist me in a pilot interview. However, 
when reflecting on the data and following discussions with my supervisor, I 
believed that his experience was powerful and so his narratives became 
central to the study. I explored with him his willingness to be involved in the 
study. I discussed with him that the data gathered in the pilot interview was 
invaluable and that I would like to utilise it as one of my case studies. He 
was really happy to be involved in the study and stated vehemently that 
because of his experience with the debriefing process he wanted his story 
recorded and acknowledged. 
Prior to seeking out potential participants for the research, I received a call 
from a debriefed firefighter who stated he was willing to participate in the 
study. I telephoned the participants who had taken an information sheet and 
the first two participants who agreed to be involved in the study were 
recruited. The group now consisted of four male firefighters who had all 
participated in a debriefing prior to the interview process which began 
approximately 7 - 10 days post debriefing. 
As the researcher I felt somewhat uncomfortable asking the firefighters to 
participate in the study. This was related to several issues, such as the time- 
commitment involved; the need to review the critical incident with the 
potential participants and the likelihood of resurfacing painful thoughts and 
feelings associated with the incident, and the uncertain and unhappy 
industrial climate within the New Zealand Fire Service. When I was 
considering undertaking the study 12 to 18 months previously, the Fire 
Service was going through significant change. However, it had been 
considerably more stable than it was at this particular time. There was a lot 
of pain, anger and distrust being experienced amongst firefighting personnel. 
I considered it was an enormous request of their time and energy to 
participate in the study at this particular time. For some individuals, they 
were barely able to cope with the day to day task of coming to work and 
attempting to stay motivated with the tasks ahead of them. However, I was 
really surprised and encouraged at their generosity when I somewhat 
hesitantly asked whether they would be willing to participate in the study. I 
felt really affirmed, particularly in my relationship with them, when they all 
replied that they were happy to be involved and support me in the study. 
To ensure that they understood what was required of them, I discussed what 
was necessary in terms of personal time commitment and also that by 
participating in the interviews it had the potential to resurface some of the 
pain and suffering attached to attending the critical incident. I believed it was 
imperative to be open and honest in my dealings with the firefighters in 
relation to their participation in the study. By being honest in what the study 
entailed, it assisted me to build up a trusting relationship with the participants. 
At no stage did I attempt to coerce them to participate in the study. In fact, I 
may have been overprotective of the firefighters in that I was more likely to 
discourage participation. 
I agonised over whether the small number of participants would provide 
sufficient information to meet the aims of the study and whether I should 
approach more debriefed firefighters to gain a broader perspective and add 
further credibility to the study. The "logic" and "power" of the various kinds of 
purposeful sampling used in qualitative research rests principally on the 
quality of the information gathered from the sample group as opposed to their 
numbers (Patton, 1990, p. 169). Sandelowski (1 995) suggests that the way to 
determine the adequacy of sample size in qualitative research is essentially a 
matter of judgement and experience. That is the experience in discerning the 
quality of the data gathered against how it will be used, the particular 
research method employed and the sampling strategy utilised. 
Sandelowski's (1995) discussion on sample size has been very pertinent and 
has assisted me in my decision to remain with the four participants. 
"An adequate sample size in qualitative research is one that 
permifs - by virtue of not being too large - the deep, case- 
oriented analysis that is a hallmark of all qualitative inquiry, 
and that results in - by vitfue of not being too small - a new 
and richly textured understanding of experience" ( p. 183). 
7.4 PARTICIPANTS 
For inclusion in the study, the participants must have participated in a recent 
debriefing within the last 7 - 10 days prior to the first interview. There were 
no other restrictions apart from the participants being able to discuss their 
experiences in some depth and being open with the researcher. 
The four participants who agreed to participate in the study were male, 
Pakeha, aged between 30 - 55 years, with between 10 - 30 years plus of 
firefighting experience. They were all paid employees within the Region, that 
is they were permanent firefighters as opposed to volunteer firefighters. 
Their employment positions consisted of one Senior Station Officer, two 
senior firefighters and one firefighter. They all worked in four separate fire 
stations within the Region. 
7.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RESEARCHER 
AND PARTICIPANTS 
Ethical and moral principles guide my practice as both a Nurse Clinician and 
as a Nurse Researcher. They include a belief in social responsibility and a 
belief in democracy. Reason (1988) believes that researchers have a 
responsibility to think about the social, political, cultural, moral and financial 
implications of their research and also to consider the significance of their 
theory and subsequent action as a consequence of their research. With this 
in mind, I considered whether my study would be detrimental to the 
firefighters. Was it likely to cause harm, and if so was I morally responsible 
for redesigning my study or even abandoning it? Were potential participants 
likely to incur financial costs? Could my study have the potential to harm 
other cultures within the Service and did my study support the democratic 
ideal of the research participants being partners in the research process? I 
believed that if I failed to consider these issues, they could seriously affect 
my relationship with the research participants. I had considered these 
implications when preparing the research proposal and believed that I had 
addressed these issues responsibly. 
The proposed research focussed on exploring the meaning of ClSD for 
firefighters from their position using in-depth interviews between myself, the 
researcher, and the firefighters, the participants. Friere defines this dialogue 
as 
"a two way inter-communication, a horizontal relationship 
between persons who are engaged in a joint critical search" 
(cited in Reason & Rowan, 7981, p.350). 
Following the assumptions of Habarmas 'S (1 971 ) critical theory, I was aware 
of the need to empower the research participants in the study by creating a 
trusting, mutually beneficial and collaborative relationship between myself 
and the participants. I have consistently used the term research participants 
as opposed to research subjects, to signify the collaborative relationship that 
was established. Heron (1981) and Reason (1988) believe that the 
collaborative research relationship could be the vehicle for empowering 
research participants. 
One of the strengths of the qualitative research approach is the unique 
opportunity to get to know individuals. I felt that I was advantaged in having 
known all of the research participants prior to the study and had been in a 
privileged position of providing nursing services during my employment as an 
Occupational Health Nurse several years earlier. I had gained, over time, 
their trust and respect which was to be a great advantage to me during the 
research process. 
Before commencing the interviews, I discussed with each participant that we 
were partners in a journey of discovery. They were CO-researchers in the 
process of mutual discovery and that by their participation they were adding 
to the existing body of knowledge in relation to Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing. Throughout the research process I repeatedly acknowledged 
their contribution to the study. I believed that by continually valuing their 
contribution and generosity it further enhanced the trusting, respectful 
relationship between the two partners. Throughout our journey together l 
continually asked them if they had any questions or concerns about their 
involvement in the study. I was concerned for their personal and professional 
safety, and that at no time during the study should it be compromised or 
threatened. 
7.6 INTERVIEW PROCESSIDATA COLLECTION 
At the beginning of my journey I decided that in order to gather the rich 
descriptions and personal interpretations of firefighters following their 
participation in a CISD, the most appropriate method of gathering this 
information was to use case studies. From my readings I understood that 
each case would not be the same, that each was unique in itself but also 
there were likely to be some similarities expressed by the participants. It was 
my intention to uncover and portray the multiple views of each case (Stake, 
1995). 1 decided to utilise interviews as a method of gathering the rich 
descriptions and personal interpretations of the debriefed firefighters that I 
hoped would be revealed. 
As I was new to the process of qualitative research and had certain anxieties 
around the interview process, I decided that it was important to design a 
map, an advanced plan in which to ponder my journey of interviewing. I had 
heard stories about the difficulties around asking the "right questions", the 
difficulties gathering relevant information from participants, and problems with 
recording and transcribing the information. The manner in which interviewers 
evoke respondents recall, information, expression and feelings has a direct 
impact on the quality of the data obtained (Drew, 1993). 1 decided that in 
order to minimise the likelihood of asking the wrong questions, and having 
problems steering the participants in the right direction, not to mention the 
potential problems with technology, that I would conduct a pilot interview. My 
ultimate aim was to get a "goodn interview. Whereby the participant and 
researcher felt safe and comfortable with the process. I wanted to learn a 
few lessons along the way so that when I conducted the "real" inte~iews, I
was less likely to have difficulties. 
I had recently facilitated a debriefing in which one particular participant had 
been extremely distressed prior to the debriefing. I had spent some 
considerable time with he and his partner prior to the debriefing, assisting 
and supporting him through his fears and anxieties related to the incident. 
His life and the lives of several of his crew had been threatened and he had 
considerable distress about his "near miss death" (which he referred to) and 
the potential loss of several of his crew. With this in mind I decided to 
contact him and ask him whether he would be willing to participate in a pilot 
interview. He answered positively and we set up a suitable time and venue. 
In qualitative research, the researcher serves as an "instrument" through 
which data is collected (Boyd, 1993). With this in mind I saw myself as the 
driver where I was required to guide my CO-driver, the research participant, in 
his responses, by probing in a caring and sensitive manner in order to gather 
further information required to gain depth and clarity. While it was important 
to have some structure to the interview process, I appreciated that it also 
required flexibility. 
I had earlier decided to utilise the narrative as the research methodology of 
choice, and the purpose of the interview was not to explain, predict or 
generate theory. The purpose was to understand the shared meanings by 
drawing from the participant a vivid and "alive" picture that represented the 
experience, containing rich detail and within the context that shaped the 
experience. As "the driver" it was important for me to turn on the ignition to 
begin the interview, but once underway on our journey, I then believed that 
both myself and the CO-driver, the research participant, would be participating 
in the interview process together. Once there was an element of comfort 
between both parties, I would be the CO-driver, and when he began to tell his 
story with ease, then I would then take a backseat and allow him to tell his 
story with little interruption. 
Prior to the pilot interview, I began to carefully frame an opening question 
which I hoped would gather the data necessary to reveal the rich detail of 
their experience, and which would not be too intrusive or intimidating in the 
early part of our journey. I decided to begin with a broad question which 
would be open to interpretation for the participant and once I felt the 
participant was at ease, I would then refine the question to probe for further 
meaning. 
As I appreciated the intimacy of the situation and the likelihood that it could 
uncover a strong emotional reaction for Fit, I had spent time prior to the 
interview establishing a trusting relationship and building a rapport with him 
and his partner. Researchers focussing on very personal and private 
subjects do need to plan substantial time for building rapport (Kondora, 
1993). Prior to beginning the interview, I discussed with Fit that the interview 
had the potential to resurface strong painful thoughts, feelings and reactions 
associated with the critical incident and subsequent debriefing. I assured Fit 
that we could stop at any time and terminate the interview if he wished. I 
also stated that if he had any long-term negative effects from participating in 
the interview that I had contracted the services of a psychologist to assist him 
to recover from these effects. 
With all this in mind I began the pilot interview. The interview was conducted 
in the lounge of Fit's home. It was necessary to rearrange the furniture a 
little, send the dog outside and shut the windows in order to minimise the 
traffic noise. We sat face to face in comfortable lounge chairs, a comfortable 
distance apart so as not to invade personal space. Two audiotapes were set 
up on two low tables, one on either side of myself and Fit. The seating was 
arranged to create a safe and caring environment, and also to enable me to 
see and respond to Fit's verbal responses and body language. I explained 
that it was necessary to have two audiotapes recording. They were placed in 
a position that was not too intrusive and were visible to me to ensure that 
they were recording the interview. 
I began the interview by thanking Fit for agreeing to participate and stating 
that this was a pilot interview and the reasons why I was conducting a pilot 
interview. I established the parameters of the interview such as if at any time 
he felt uncomfortable or wanted to end the interview, he only had to indicate 
this. I discussed the likelihood that some of the questions had the potential 
to uncover some painful thoughts, feelings and memories. Confidentiality 
was discussed and assured, and I informed Fit that the interview would take 
approximately one hour. After checking out with Fit that 
he was comfortable and had no further questions or concerns around the 
interview I began the first leg of our journey, interview number one. 
I had spent some time pondering over how to encourage Fit to describe his 
unique perspective of the experience of debriefing. I decided to structure the 
interview asking "inside-out" questions in order for Fit to describe his 
experience rather than his interpretation of the experience (Miller & Glassner, 
1997). By steering the participant down this road, as the researcher I could 
gain a more holistic understanding of the experience that formed an 
important part of the participant's day to day existence. Silverman (1993) 
notes that interview participants construct social worlds, not just narratives. 
"The primary issue is to generate data which give an 
authentic insight into people's experiences" (p. 91). 
I was aware from my readings that certain kinds of open-ended questions are 
more likely to encourage the participant to tell their story. Asking questions 
that open up the phenomenon being studied, allows the participant to 
construct answers, in collaboration or consultation with the researcher, in 
ways they find meaningful (Mishler, 1986; Riessman, 1993; Streubert & 
Carpenter, 1995). 
The open-ended questions that I subsequently framed which I hoped would 
generate discussion for further development included:- 
"Tell me about your experience related to parficipating 
in a recent Critical Incident Stress Debriefing?" 
"What did you find most helpful in terms of assisting 
you to discuss the incident?" 
"Tell me how being involved in a ClSD has affected you?" 
These questions provided a beginning to the establishment of a relationship 
between myself as the researcher and the participants as CO-researchers. 
Data for qualitative research can be gathered easily and effectively through 
having people tell their stories that are relevant to the research (Roberts & 
Taylor, 1998). It is not uncommon for people to feel that they have little to 
offer research and they may feel intimidated by the thought of participating in 
the process. However, this is often made easier by inviting a person to tell 
their story of the experience or phenomena being studied. For this reason, 
my opening question centred on Fit telling his story of the experience of 
debriefing which asked for an extended account of his past experience of 
debriefing. 
During the actual exchange I listened with much intent and took a few notes 
vvhich I used to develop further probing questions. I began to feel relaxed 
within a short time of beginning the interview. The opening question had felt 
"right" as it elicited a story directly related to the experience of debriefing 
where Fit became intent on revealing his story, returning in vivid detail to the 
critical incident that had caused him so much pain and suffering. It was 
evident at an early stage of the interview that Fit was feeling relaxed and safe 
with the process as he appeared to reveal his narrative in great detail. I 
realised that I was required to say very little at this point. However, as Patton 
(1990) suggests, I used verbal and non-verbal probes in order to clarify or 
complete the participant's description of the experience. 
Fit told his story and engaged me, as the researcher, in his story by making 
some sense of the incident and experience. Storytelling is a primary way 
people make sense of their experience. While the experience exists, it takes 
on meaning for the person in the telling of their story. Storytelling has the 
potential to heal both the storyteller and the listener. Interviews encourage 
participants to tell their whole story, rather than the bits and pieces (Morse, 
1988). In the telling of their story there is a potential to cause significant 
distress, as was the case with Fit. He did become tearful and distressed 
when recalling the painful thoughts, feelings and reactions to the experience. 
However, at no time did he express the desire to terminate the interview even 
though I gave him the opportunity to do so on several occasions. As a 
qualitative researcher I wanted to empower Fit in the telling of his story so I 
encouraged participant power by advocating process consenting (Munhall, 
1988). 1 repeatedly assessed Fit's consent throughout the interview, 
particularly during periods of emotional distress. 
At times I personally felt some discomfort when Fit became tearful and 
wondered whether he was safe. I kept checking with him whether he felt 
safe and was prepared to carry on with the interview process. While I felt 
some discomfort with his distress, Fit later revealed it was very cathartic and 
provided him with a sense of relief that appeared to come, in part, from 
having engaged me in active listening. When the storyteller is aware of the 
presence of a good listener, it defuses the power of the experience and thus 
provides some further emotional relief which was what Fit later reported. 
Catharsis was evident in each of the four participants during the telling of 
their story related to the experience of debriefing. At the conclusion of the 
three interviews, they all discussed that they had found it a very positive 
experience, not at all arduous but very freeing and healing. 
Immediately following the first pilot interview, I made some notes on how the 
process had gone for me and how I thought it was for Fit. He assured me 
before I left, that he felt safe even though he had at times become distressed 
telling his story, but he appeared happy and almost relieved following the 
telling of his story. My notes centred around Fit and his personal safety. Had 
I threatened this? I made a decision that I would ring him several times over 
the next week to discuss how he was feeling following the interview process. 
My feeling was that while he was exhausted from the catharsis, that there 
was a sense of relief for him. I felt elation at the richness of Fit's story and 
considered that my questions "fittedn the research. I felt that the Critical 
Incident Stress Management strategy of debriefing had assisted Fit in 
processing the critical incident and its aftermath, both personally and 
professionally. With that processing came a healing for Fit. I felt encouraged 
that the interview process had gone very smoothly with no obvious technical 
or interview flaws that might have hindered the successful gathering of data 
and subsequent analysis. On reflection I believed that I had been more 
anxious than Fit. I had a mindset that I had to do it "right" even though it was 
a pilot interview. During my follow-up telephone calls with Fit after each of 
the three interviews, I discussed with him how he felt about the interview. 
Could I have made the questions less intrusive for him and were these 
questions able to elicit the maximum amount of information regarding his 
experience? On each occasion Fit felt really happy with the interview 
process and questions and did not suggest any significant changes. 
I subsequently decided, because of the rich data that was obtained in the 
pilot interview, that with Fit's permission I would use him as one of my case 
studies. Fit agreed to become a case study participant using the same 
pseudonym and he also agreed to participate in two further interviews. A 
second interview was held approximately 4 weeks later. The audiotapes 
from the first interview were transcribed and a copy sent to Fit to view, verify 
and suggest changes at the second interview. Fit had no problems with the 
transcribed text and made the comment that he had repeated himself often 
throughout the interview which he was surprised at. The second interview 
addressed issues arising from the first interview where I asked probing 
questions in order to seek clarification on certain issues related to his 
experience. The third and final interview was carried out approximately 2 
weeks following the second interview, where as previously, Fit had been sent 
the transcribed text for his viewing, verification and modification if necessary. 
At no time did Fit request any of the text be removed or modified. His 
responses centred mainly around how he had found the interview a 
therapeutic process. The third interview was seen as a time for closure, to 
raise any concerns, queries or questions that Fit had, which was not 
dissimilar to a debriefing. 
While the interview process concluded at the third and final interview with 
each of the four participants, I telephoned the participants on several 
occasions to check that they were not suffering any negative effects from 
being involved in the interviews. Each participant reported that they were 
fine and once again appreciated the opportunity of being involved in the 
research as they felt it had assisted them in further processing the critical 
incident and the debriefing experience. I felt really humbled by their 
generosity and their ability to open up the experience by telling their stories. 
A similar format was followed with the 3 other case studies. Three interviews 
took place. The first interview which was held approximately 7-10 days 
following a debriefing, lasted approximately one hour. The second interview 
took place 3 - 4 weeks following the first interview, and the third and final 
interview was held approximately 2 weeks following the second. The times 
did vary somewhat for one particular participant. This was due to his family 
commitments and the holiday period. Between each interview the 
participants were sent a copy of the transcribed text at least 7 days before 
the next interview to allow them adequate time to read and consider the text. 
Few notes were taken during the interviews as I found it both distracting and 
somewhat intrusive and detrimental to the flow of conversation between 
myself and the participants. Following each interview l drove to a quiet and 
safe place to reflect on the interview process and content. I made notes 
which I reflected on before the next interview. These notes also assisted me 
in the ongoing development of the data analysis. 
7.7 TRANSCRIBING 
The pilot interview tapes were transcribed by myself. There were no 
problems with the audiotapes which were audible and easily able to be 
transcribed. While it was a lengthy process, I felt really engrossed in Fit's 
story which assisted me in becoming familiar with the data when analysing 
his narratives. I had planned to employ a professional typist to transcribe the 
, 
subsequent interviews but technology failed me on the first interview of the 
following three cases. Because of the poor sound quality I was forced to 
transcribe these tapes myself. It was an incredibly difficult process taking 
hours and hours of rewinding, listening and then rewinding again to check 
that what I had transcribed was correct. Due to the poor sound quality I felt 
that a lot of the emotion and feeling was unable to be heard so I had to trust 
on my memory when analysing these interviews. A professional typist who 
was required to sign a consent form regarding confidentiality issues 
(Appendix VI) transcribed the second and third interviews. 
All the participants were allocated a pseudonym prior to their first interview so 
each transcript was headed by the allocated pseudonym. All tapes were kept 
in a locked cabinet that was accessible only to myself. Only the typist and 
myself had access to the raw data. Each participant was offered the raw 
data and audiotapes to be returned to them at the end of the study. However 
each participant stated that they were happy for me to destroy both the 
audiotapes and the transcriptions at the conclusion of the study. 
7.8 PRESENTATION OF THE DATA 
As discussed previously all four participants were given a copy of each 
interview transcript to read so they could verify their story and remove any 
data that they felt uncomfortable with. It was important that the participants 
felt safe in their participation in the study throughout the whole process of 
their involvement. 
The process involved a partnership with me in the journey from their initial 
consent to participate in the study to the final document for presentation as a 
full thesis. All the relevant chapters, where data from their respective 
interviews had been utilised and interpreted, was sent to each participant for 
verification that they were satisfied with the data that was being presented. 
While this was a lengthy and time-consuming process I was mindful that it 
was important that they were comfortable with the final document and had no 
discomfort that their participation could be detrimental to them personally or 
professionally. 
7.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Central Health Wellington Ethics Committee and the Victoria University 
of Wellington Human Ethics Committee granted ethical approval. As 
previously mentioned, approval to access participants within the New 
Zealand Fire Service was gained from four management groups within the 
Service and the relevant ClSD Peer Support Team. 
Written consent was obtained from each participant (Appendix V). While the 
information sheet discussed issues around consent, I spent time explaining 
the aims and purpose of the study, the commitment that was required for 
participation in the study, that identifiability would remain confidential and 
how the information gathered from the study would be disseminated. As 
previously mentioned the person employed to transcribe the audiotapes 
signed a confidentiality agreement. 
I was ever mindful that the recounting of their experiences of the critical 
incident and subsequent ClSD could distress the participants. I had 
arranged for a psychologist, with experience in the area of Critical Incident 
Stress Management, to be available to accept referrals from participants who 
may have required support following the interviews. 
Other details in regard to ethical issues will be discussed under participants' 
considerations in the next section. 
7.10 PARTICIPANTS' CONSIDERATIONS 
As a researcher I was aware of the importance of ethical considerations that 
needed to be observed for the wellbeing and safety of all the participants. At 
no time did I attempt to coerce participants into the study. As previously 
stated I tended to veer on the side of caution. The safety of the firefighters 
who had already been traumatised by their exposure to a critical incident, 
was paramount to my ethic of practice both as a nurse and as a researcher. 
I was also aware of the uncertain and tense industrial environment that the 
participants were working in and did not want to add to their stress 
At the beginning of the first interview a comprehensive explanation of the 
aims, objectives, data collection process, methods of collecting the data and 
the intended outcome of the study was presented verbally. This reiterated 
what had already been stated in the information sheet that they had received 
following a debriefing. Following the explanation, the participants were asked 
to sign a consent form and were informed that they had the right to withdraw 
at any time (Appendix V). 
In order to ensure that the participants felt safe during the interview process I 
empowered the participants to choose the place of interview and every 
attempt was made to ensure their personal safety and security at all times. 
Due to the time commitment involved by the participants, a time and place 
was arranged that was convenient to them. I continually valued their 
contribution to the research project and also frequently checked my 
interpretation of their data to avoid any misinterpretation from my own 
personal world view. 
At the beginning of the first interview each participant was given a 
pseudonym to lessen identifiability. Confidentiality was maintained by using 
the pseudonym on all audiotapes and transcripts. All data, that is 
audiotapes, transcripts and computer discs were kept in a locked cabinet that 
was accessible only to myself. I assured the participants that I would retain 
confidential information from interviews and would not identify or discuss their 
identify or information with any other persons. I also assured them that every 
endeavour would be made to ensure that no participant could be identified by 
name or event from quotes or information included in the final report. The 
use of a pseudonym and the checking and approving of their data assisted in 
minimising this occurrence. 
I informed the participants that when I had completed the final analysis of 
their narrative, I would send them a copy to ensure that they were satisfied 
with the contents. Each participant was informed that they would receive a 
copy of the final document. 
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Participants were followed up by telephone after each interview to ensure 
they had suffered no harmful effects from participating in the interview. I saw 
it as a mini-debriefing. I was conscious that the interview had the potential to 
raise strong emotional reactions by the resurfacing of the critical incident and 
debriefing. As previously discussed I had contracted the services of a 
psychologist to be available if the need arose for referral of a distressed 
participant. At no time was this necessary. 
7.1 1 PROCESS USED FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
Analysis involves reviewing the multiple sources of data methodically with the 
intention of organising and classifying them into representational groups and 
patterns (Roberts & Taylor, 1998). Data included audiotapes, the transcribed 
interviews, written notes that were recorded following telephone 
conversations with the participants and notes that I made during and 
following the interviews. The taped interviews were compared with the 
transcripts and special features such as long pauses, loud or lowered speech 
and emotional distress were identified and marked. This process was 
somewhat difficult with some audiotapes, due to the poor quality of the 
recording. At times I had to rely on my memory or the recorded notes I had 
made during and following the interview. 
There is no particular moment during the research when data analysis begins 
(Stake, 1995). Analysis is seen as giving meaning to the first impressions as 
well as the final or completed document. Analysis is viewed as essentially 
taking something apart, - piece by piece, the unravelling of the structure of the 
data that is essential to interpretation (Riessman, 1993). Reason (1988) 
refers to data analysis as the 'making sense' process. Data analysis was 
done contemporaneously with data collection so that the study could be 
shaped as it progressed. The aim was to focus on exploring the experience 
of ClSD while collecting and analysing the data (Glesne & Pleshkin, 1992). 
With this in mind I studied and systematically examined all the data with 
multiple readings and listenings of the audiotapes, ever mindful of the aims 
and objectives of the study. It was a time consuming process, not unlike 
warming the engine of the car on a frosty morning. I could not hurry the 
process. I had to wait and let the data "warm" and "surface" so as to be able 
to connect with the data in order to continue on my journey of analysis and 
interpretation. 
1 began dwelling with the tapes whereby I repeatedly listened for different 
cues that may not have been obvious in the transcriptions. I repeatedly read 
the transcriptions and often read them alongside the listening of the tapes. I 
also reflected on my field notes which I had recorded both during and 
following the interview. I had kept a journal on my personal reflections and 
thoughts throughout the whole process of the research project and these 
became a significant part of the data. The multiple pieces of text provided 
me with a fascinating reflection of Fit and the subsequent participants' 
stories. Each individual's story was unique, revealing differing meanings and 
yet there were also common meanings. Polkinghorne (1 988) discusses this 
as plurastic epistemologies in which there is no one truth, rather there are 
multiple truths which correspond to our reality and are shaped by our 
contexts. This produces multiple ways of knowing. 
The challenge for me in analysing the data was to seek out and understand 
the way in which the data is postulated as a unified whole while still being 
able to reveal the multiple truths, realities and meanings, without loosing the 
whole or the essence, while illuminating the parts. The process I followed in 
order to achieve this was repeated re-readings and relistenings of the 
transciptions, tapes and other data thereby recognising that 
"........the realm of meaning is best captured fhroughout the 
qualitative nuances of its expression in ordinary language 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 10). 
While I entered into each participants story in its entirety and its parts, I also 
intended to analysethe collective stories of those who had shared a common 
experiencd. 
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7.12 DWELLING WITH THE DATA 
To locate the true essence of Fit's and the other participants' stories I began 
to analyse the data for key moments in the storytelling. I looked at how the 
narrative was organised, the differing ways each participant developed his 
story and the way in which they related their story. Each of their stories were 
situated in the interaction with myself, but was also influenced by cultural, 
social and institutional discourses which had the potential to affect the 
interpretation of their stories. 
I was conscious that it was important that the participants' voices, not my 
voice, was situated in the final document. Because of my passionate interest 
in working in the field of Critical Incident Stress Management, there was the 
potential for my "voice" to override the participants' voices. I was ever 
conscious of this phenomenon. I discussed with each participant that when I 
had developed a draft of an interpretation of their story, that I would send 
them a copy for their verification and comment. I requested that they be 
open and honest with their critique in order to enable my interpretation of 
their story as a genuine and legitimate representation of their experience. 
Lumby (1 994) discusses 
".....the equal relationship of the CO-researchers meant that 
as the narrative took form, the primary researcher checked 
the authenticity of meaning wifh the CO-researcher" (p.24). 
My next decision centred around how I would represent the stories in my 
thesis. It was imperative that I present their stories in a readable and 
interesting manner for potential readers. Authenticity and the potential for the 
material to be easily accessed and readable was a major issue for me. 
My own philosophy of nursing influenced the process of analysing the data. I 
was ever mindful that the ontological position of each participant's singular 
view be established. By using the spoken words in the story, I needed to 
carefully conduct an analysis and interpretation as it was important that their 
story remained as a whole text. Any attempt to put it into patterns or themes 
had the potential to distort or misinterpret the stories of the participants. 
The data recalled the past experience of debriefing, but the way the 
storyteller recalled the experience gave meaning to both the language used 
and the emotion expressed during the storying. While my intention was to 
present the powerful stories in as meaningful a way as possible, I believe that 
it is impossible to truly present them with all their nuances, hidden meanings, 
feelings and emotions which they deserve. 
With this in mind I began my journey of painstakingly analysing the multiple 
pieces of data. The transcripts were analysed manually by a process of line 
by line analysis in order to pick up the nuances in the text. I came to know 
the text intimately. Particular phrases, words and sections of the narrative 
began to emerge over time that made connections with other participants, but 
also that were unique to each participant. 
Colour coding of the transcripts was used to identify emerging patterns, 
which represented different patterns and themes, which aided in the process 
of manual coding. These patterns were listed on individual pieces of paper 
and were subsequently reduced when similar patterns merged into 
respective groupings. When it was no longer possible to reduce the patterns 
without loosing some of their "specialness" in relation to the experience, 
these patterns then became the named themes. While initially I identified 3 
main patterns, these were reduced to one main overriding pattern and eight 
major themes. 
As a double check I used a giant mind map for each participant to enable me 
to visually contemplate the data and the emerging themes. As I am a visual 
learner it assisted me in making connections between the similarities and the 
uniqueness of the participants' experiences. I developed a gestalt approach 
of using the written word, both the transcribed text and my 
own reflections; the oral voice with all its nuances; and the visual mind map, 
as valuable tools in which to analyse the data in all its totality. Unique 
themes appeared to travel down side-roads whereas some of the other 
themes consisted of similarities which tended to merge together on the main 
road. 
While common themes were identified, I became engrossed in the individual 
themes that began to emerge with repeated readings. Over time and when I 
least expected, the participants individual stories would surface in my 
consciousness. The moments when this occurred were totally unexpected. 
What caused these times of what I refer to as "being hit in the face" with the 
uniqueness of their stories? I did not fully understand. As time passed I 
began to see that each individual's story, while having common patterns, had 
their own unique theme. However, all the themes yielded a greater 
understanding and interpretation of the experience and the importance of 
Critical lncident Stress Debriefing in my clinical practice of Critical lncident 
Stress Management. Not only were themes identified but with the telling of 
their stories it became evident that each participant found it a therapeutic and 
healing process in the telling of their story in relation to the experience of 
debriefing. Morse (1 988) states 
"Participation in a qualitative research project is undoubfedly 
a therapeutic process" (p. 215). 
With this in mind I decided that while I would discuss the common themes 
that I had discovered in the literature and in the participants' stories, I had 
this passion to reveal the unique theme of each participant as l discovered 
that each and every participant had a theme that was "their's" alone. It 
belonged to them and was unique to them as an individual within their own 
personal context. 
7.13 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY 
There is no one method of guaranteeing absolute truth in qualitative research 
studies because truth can change due to context-dependent variables related 
to people, environment, time and conditions in which it is placed and 
emerges (Roberts & Taylor, 1998). However, there are various ways of 
demonstrating trustworthiness which qualitative researchers can utilise in 
their study. Qualitative research is trushnrorthy when it accurately represents 
the experience of the participants under study (Streubert & Carpenter, 1995). 
In order to ensure trustworthiness of the analysis of the data that I had spent 
many hours engaging in, I returned to each participant and enquired if the 
exhaustive descriptions and interpretative pattern and themes reflected their 
experiences. Lincoln & Guba (1985) call this activity "member checks" 
(p.314). I assured the participants that the content could be added to or 
deleted if they so desired. 
Authenticity and trustworthiness can also be established by asking the 
participants if there were any negative aspects of the phenomenon under 
investigation. This affords the opportunity to compare and contrast the data 
and is another way of checking for trustworthiness. I questioned each 
participant towards the conclusion of the interview as to whether there were 
any negative aspects of participating in a debriefing for them personally. The 
only negative aspect of the debriefing was that one participant, Flick, stated 
that he would have liked the debriefing to be held earlier. This will be 
discussed in chapter 9. 
Confirmability of the findings was achieved by an audit trail, not dissimilar to 
a fiscal audit (Lincoln' & Guba, 1985) which records planning, ethical and 
procedural issues followedthroughout the study. The audit trail illustrated 
the evidence and thought processes that led to the final conclusions of the 
study. 
Exploratory and descriptive studies do not generate findings that have 
meaning to others in similar situations and are not directly transferable to the 
wider community. They are unique to the person and the situation. 
However, the findings have the potential to provide an illumination of the 
experience within the context of the study for others in a similar setting and 
thus may offer significant insights into the experience under investigation. 
7.14 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have discussed the strategy that was utilised to access the 
research participants and a summary of the interview process. I have 
described in detail the semi-structured interview process utilised to collect 
data. Issues around transcribing, method employed to analyse the data, 
ethical considerations, and issues of trustworthiness were also discussed. 
The concern I had around the identifiability of potential participants and the 
possibility for participants to suffer negative effects from their participation 
and the methods that were utilised to minimise these effects, were 
highlighted. 
In the following chapter I will present the narrative and relevant interview data 
from my first case study with Fit, which initially was gained from the pilot 
interview. This chapter will focus on the unique themes that were uncovered 
in the telling of Fit's story. 
8. FIT'S STORY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The review of the literature on Critical lncident Stress Debriefing highlighted 
many of the patterns that I discovered in the stories of the four firefighters I 
interviewed. There was a dearth in the literature of what I refer to as the 
reality and the uniqueness of the experience of debriefing. Personal stories 
were difficult to find in the literature which all seemed rather bland and lacked 
feeling and depth. Whereas I believe the four participants in this study told 
their stories with much feeling, emotion and humour, revealing a true picture 
of their inner self in relation to the experience. 
This chapter seeks to uncover the reality of debriefing for one firefighter, Fit. 
I will begin with a brief personal introduction to Fit and discuss how he 
became involved in the research and our interview discussions. I will then 
discuss how I uncovered the patterns and themes of his story while 
journeying with Fit through his experience. 
I uncovered the meaning of Fit's experience by deeply reflecting on his 
narrative and this has enabled me to further develop my model of practice 
from his insights of the experience of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing. 
8.2 FIT - OUR JOURNEY TOGETHER BEGINS 
My journey with Fit began several months before he agreed to participate in a 
pilot interview for the research. I received an urgent call from one of his 
superiors requesting that I visit Fit at his home as he was severely distressed 
following an incident some 24 hours prior to the call. Fit and his crew had 
attended a major fire in which he and his crews' lives were threatened. 
I drove some distance to his home and as always I began to think, plan and 
mentally rehearse how I would assist Fit. Upon arrival at his home, his 
partner, Fit and myself sat in the lounge and Fit began to discuss at length 
the firecall and the subsequent events that led to his significant distress and 
sadness. He graphically portrayed the events in several stages. I had a 
sense of being with him during the fire, particularly when he described how 
he and his and crew had difficulty extricating themselves from the fire. 
During the time of his recalling the incident and subsequent events following 
the fire, he became acutely distressed, both emotionally and physically. He 
discussed how some 16 to 24 hours following the call he had woken and 
couldn't get out of bed. 
"I started to think about it and I could see a situation that.. . . . . 
I was uncontrollable.. ... I cried uncontrollably.. .. . .. and it wasn't 
for five minutes, probably an hour. I thought I had come right. 
I would get up and as soon as I stood up I would collapse". 
Fit subsequently recovered and went to work earlier than is usual as he felt 
he needed to be around his colleagues. He recalled how he was able to 
perform his duties. By keeping himself occupied with his duties he was able 
to carry on as long as he had something else on his mind. However, he 
recalled 
"at the forefront of my mind.. .. I hadn't forgotten what had 
happened". 
His Senior Officer noticed that he was distressed and rang Fit the following 
day to say that he would like to visit him. Fit discussed how he felt that this 
was the beginning of his ability to start talking about the incident and its 
effects on him, when the Senior Officer visited him to offer support. The 
Senior Officer suggested that he might benefit from discussing his situation in 
greater depth with a member of the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Peer 
Support Team. 
Initially I spoke with Fit and his partner together. Fit had shared some of his 
fears and anxieties with his partner around the incident and she was really 
concerned about his personal safety. She realised the seriousness of his 
distress as it was most unusual for him to share his work stress with her. 
Sometime later his partner left Fit and I to discuss in greater detail the 
incident and the negative impact that it had had on him. He was very tearful, 
had several periods where he broke down and was unable to continue. With 
time, understanding and encouragement he continued to tell his story with 
greater clarity. He described his thoughts and feelings of sadness, guilt, a 
loss of control, disempowerment, fear and his own vulnerability in relation to 
the potential loss of his life. 
After allowing Fit the space to tell his story and share his innermost thoughts 
and feelings, I then asked him what he wanted to happen following the one- 
on-one session we had shared together. Personally I believed that it was 
important that he and his crew participate in a formal CISD. I was aware of 
his feelings of disempowerment and wanted to empower him in his decision 
making in regard to his ongoing journey of recovery from the critical incident. 
I discussed the options available and he opted for a formal CISD which I 
believed was imperative to assist him and his crew in mitigating the negative 
affects of attending the critical incident. It was obvious that Fit needed to 
share his story of the incident with his crew. 
A debriefing was carried out some 24 hours following our meeting with all his 
crew members who had attended the incident. I facilitated the debriefing and 
was assisted by a Peer Support Team member who was well known to most 
of the participants, was well respected and had many years of firefighting 
experience. While Fit reported that he felt much improved following our one- 
on-one meeting, he believed he needed a further ClSM strategy to assist him 
in his full recovery. The one-on-one ClSM strategy had assisted him in 
recovering from the acute stress reaction but it was necessary for him to be 
able to share his story of his experience at the critical incident in order 
for his crew to have a better understanding of what happened from his 
perspective. 
8.3 RESEARCHER'S INTERPRETATION 
Before presenting and analysing Fit's narrative, I believe that it is important 
that I reflect on this particular incident and subsequent CISD in order to 
validate Fit's experience and narrative. I would classify this particular 
incident as a major critical incident, an event which would be considered 
generally outside the range of ordinary everyday human experiences 
(Mitchell & Everly, 1995). It had the potential to cause serious injury and 
even death to the firefighters involved. Fit and his crew had difficulty exiting 
the fire due to the intensity of the fire in terms of intense heat and poor 
visibility. Air from their breathing apparatus sets was empty some minutes 
before they were able to find their way out and as a consequence they were 
hypoxic and somewhat confused following their exit from the fire. Due to 
issues of confidentiality it is not possible to discuss any further details except 
to say that all crew were placed in a serious situation where there was the 
potential for loss of life. Fortunately all crew eventually exited the fire and 
while seriously fatigued and distressed, no major injuries were sustained. 
In my analysis of Fit's narrative, two major issues stand out. One was the 
fear of being trapped and being unable to visualise an exit point and with a 
decreasing oxygen supply there was the potential for his own loss of life, and 
secondly the potential loss of his crew for whom he was responsible. In my 
experience the majority of firefighters would say that these two scenarios 
would be their worst nightmare. As Fit was the Officer-in-Charge of the crew 
he felt an immense sense of guilt and believed he had lost credibility with his 
crew. Under the circumstances his emotional reaction was understandable. 
He needed to discuss it on a one-on-one basis, but he also needed to share 
his story and the reasons why the crews safety had been threatened, in a 
more formalised process with his crew. A formal CISD, I believe was the 
most appropriate strategy for Fit to tell his story and hear the story of his crew 
members in a safe and caring environment. 
While it was some months following the one-on-one and subsequent CISD, I 
had been very moved by the intensity of Fit's and his crew's sharing in 
relation to their experience of the incident and its subsequent impact on their 
lives. As previously discussed in Chapter 7 1 approached Fit and requested 
his participation in a pilot interview. He willingly accepted my request after I 
discussed with him the potential to resurface the painful thoughts, feelings 
and memories attached to the incident. I was ever mindful of protecting his 
safety as I had personally witnessed his pain and distress following the 
incident. However, I believed that he had a made an excellent recovery and 
hoped that by participating in the research, this might further assist him in the 
healing process. 
I arranged the first interview at a time and place that was suitable to Fit. 
While travelling the lengthy distance to carry out the first interview I had 
mixed emotions. I was excited at the prospect of at last conducting an 
interview into the experience of CISD on a firefighter within the New Zealand 
Fire Service where I had worked for the last 8 years, but I was also really 
anxious about the process of conducting the interview. Would my questions 
be the right questions in order to assist Fit in the telling of his story? Would I 
be able to pick up the cues that required further discussion or illumination? 
And most importantly would I resurface past painful thoughts, feelings and 
emotions that had the potential to cause further significant distress for Fit? 
Fortunately my fears were unfounded. Once the interview began Fit became 
relaxed very quickly and his story flowed freely and I became less anxious 
and really excited'at his recall, insights and frank conversation. At times I 
needed to hold back with my questions in order to give him the necessary 
space and time to tell "his" story. At other times I felt that I had to reflect on 
his story to keep the threads of his story clear so I could compile questions 
which might add clarity to certain parts of his story. However, as I became 
more relaxed as the interview progressed I realised that many of the queries 
and questions I had, could be clarified at the next interview. 
During the first interview Fit had several periods where he became acutely 
distressed and tearful when he related how painful his experience had been. 
I believed that it was only natural that the telling of his story would cause him 
some distress. As a consequence of his tears and distress, I acknowledged 
his pain and gave him the necessary space and time to reveal these 
emotions in a safe and caring environment. At no time did I attempt to stop 
his tears or distress. However, I continually checked with him that he was 
happy to proceed. At no time did he express his wish to terminate the 
interview. At the end of the interview I enquired into his wellbeing and he 
said 
"It's, you know, it's been excellent and it's still there and 
a couple ofpoints still hurt and I didn't realise thaf they 
were still hurting that much and uh. It's not hurting but 
uh it affects me, still there". 
At the conclusion of the interview, I stayed for some time and debriefed with 
Fit over the pain and distress associated with resurfacing the disturbing 
thoughts, feelings and emotions. I discussed with him that he could feel 
some ongoing distress following the interview, that this was normal but that 
these effects would dissipate very quickly as I believed that Fit had made an 
excellent recovery from the effects of Critical Incident Stress. If these 
distressing effects had the potential to cause ongoing problems for Fit, I had 
employed a professional psychologist who was able to assist him. He 
reassured me that he was fine but had been somewhat surprised at the 
resurgence of the feelings and emotions. I sought Fit's permission to contact 
him every few days over the next week to enquire into his wellbeing, as there 
was the potential that by his participating in the interview it may cause 
significant ongoing distress which could require professional assistance. I 
also told him that if he became distressed or had any questions or concerns 
he could ring me at any time. My personal philosophy in working in the field 
of ClSM and research is to do no harm. 
At the beginning of the second and third interviews I began by enquiring into 
Fit's wellbeing. At the beginning of the second interview I enquired into how 
he had been since we last meet? 
"Excellent. Yes, no problems from doing the interview with 
you. It proved to bring out some extra points which was 
still deep within me. That proved to be beneficial. No I 
felt really good after thaf". 
I felt reassured that my professional judgement had been correct and that no 
harm had come to Fit from his participation in this research. I discussed with 
him that while he would always have the memory of the incident, the pain 
associated with it should become less or even absent with time. 
He replied 
"No, it is not painful, it is only a memory. It is definitely not painful, 
and I think that last time.. ... it came out but it was only a memory. 
It wasn't painful.. . . . .yes I had no problems with it and again when 
you rang back and we talked on the phone, you know I probably 
sounded quite happy. You know I felt quite good". 
After leaving the first interview with Fit, I drove to a quiet place and reflected 
on the interview process and the content of Fit's story. While I felt fatigued, I 
also felt elated. I had a sense that the interview had progressed really well 
and was beneficial to both parties. In fact I really enjoyed the interview and 
suspected that Fit had found it to be a very therapeutic process. I was really 
impressed with Fit's recall and the generous spirit in which he had told his 
story. I felt really excited about the positive effects that debriefing had had on 
both Fit and his crew. It was very affirming that what the ClSD Peer Support 
Team was providing in terms of a stress management strategy was truly 
effective and had ongoing benefits to both firefighting personnel, their 
families and the New Zealand Fire Service generally. 
With the interview still current in my mind, I wanted to transcribe each 
interview as soon as possible. Following the transcribing, I sent a copy of the 
transcribed narrative to Fit for him to read and make comments, deletions or 
additions. At no time did Fit or any of the participants request that any of the 
narrative discourse be deleted. There were additions and this often related 
to the need to clarify or verify some of their stories. 
Following the interviews my aim prior to analysing the stories was to become 
deeply immersed or engaged with the data. Streubert & Carpenter (1995) 
state that "becoming immersed in data is also called dwelling with them" 
(P.24). 
8.4 FIT - TELLING HIS STORY TO HIS CREW 
Prior to the debriefing, Fit had received a one-on-one supportive session with 
myself. As previously discussed he made the decision that a debriefing be 
held with his crew. He discussed very early on in the first interview, when I 
asked him to discuss his experience related to participating in a recent CISD, 
why he had involved the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing Team. He had a 
strong desire to tell his story to his crew. This appeared to be the most 
prominent of the themes in relation to the debriefing experience for Fit. 
"From the initial debrief (the one-on-one) I knew that I hadn't 
fotally satisfied myself maybe that I was back on the road 
to recovery and that I needed to involve other people. I 
was happy about the emotions that I needed to get out and to 
tell the story of what happened to myself. To let them know 
how I felt and my feelings towards them at the incident': 
Fit had a strong desire to tell his side of the story to his crew. Without the 
crew knowing his position, then they could not know what really happened 
from his perspective. While the one-on-one session had assisted him 
somewhat to recover from the immediate shock, he needed t o  share his 
experience, his story, to assist him in a full recovery from the impact of the 
incident. 
"Once I had relayed, used the ClSD Team to relay those 
feelings, my mind was mainly at ease. That everyone knew 
the situation, what I was in and from there the road to recovery 
was easier to take". 
"Using the Team got me back on the road very quickly. I believe 
that if I hadn't had the Team's support both on an individual 
basis and on a crew basis, it would have taken me a long 
time to face, especially my own crew". 
While it was necessary to provide Fit with a one-on-one session in order to 
help him work through the initial Critical Incident Stress symptoms, Fit 
acknowledged that it was important to debrief with his crew so his could tell 
his side of the story. 
" I  needed some more help. ....... .something more.. ..... .." 
While I thought I understood what he meant by this, I wanted to reassure 
myself that my interpretation was valid. I asked Fit to talk about this a little 
more. 
"The one-on-one, the reason I believed that it wasn't enough 
was there were other people involved in the incident who were 
in a situation themselves that was very dangerous and my mind 
didn't know why they hadgot into that situation. And I felt that 
I needed to explain to them, to satisfy myself that they did know 
that situation. On a one-on-one basis I can talk about if but 
no one else who was involved is finding out and I wasn't letting 
on my feelings on the rest of that crew knowing. The one-on- 
one certainly helped me overcome the stress of the situation 
from my own personal wellbeing and how close to death maybe 
I had come, but there were other people involved where I got 
close to maybe falling into this fire". 
Fit acknowledged the positive effects of the one-on-one session in terms of 
addressing his physical needs and some of his emotional needs, but he 
needed to further address his emotional and cognitive effects of the stress, 
particularly in relation to his position with his crew. Not only did he need to 
tell his own story but also needed to hear the individual crew members 
perspective both during and following the incident. He discussed his own 
situation and how, because of his own safety being compromised, that he 
looked after his own personal safety. He needed to tell his crew why he had 
forgotten them. 
"The getting myself out the last minute situation when I ran out of 
oxygen, got out of the fire. I was virtually out, I then took on  the 
role of looking after number one which meant that as a leader of a 
team I forgot about those people and I had to explain to them why 
I had forgoffen about them in those last few seconds of the incident. 
Without getting those feelings, and there was no other way of 
doing that than having the team debriefed and that part of i t  was 
extremely important to finish off my recovery". 
Traditionally firefighters often come back after a major incident and sit around 
their campfire, the "srnoko"' table, and discuss the incident which is akin to an 
informal defusing. This informal way of supporting each other following 
distressing incidents has been part of the culture of the Fire Service for many 
years. Fit talked about how he didn't believe this informal process would 
have assisted him. 
".....that shock to me was too great to sit around over a cup 
of coffee. It needed a different intervention. A set program 
that the Critical Incident Team are trained to bring out my 
fears, and over a cup of tea 1 think the wrong thing could 
have been said. 
"This was a personal situation to myself and to other members 
of the team, who 1 don? believe at the time knew how much of 
a serious situation they were in and I could not have personally 
relayed that to them straight away. I knew that to do fhat I 
needed help for myself to be able to stand up first before I could 
help the other people stand up and get on their feet again'! 
He acknowledged the importance of the one-on-one session in assisting him 
to move onto the next stage of his recovery, the debriefing. It was obvious 
that he was aware that he needed more than just the one-on-one 
intervention. I questioned him about the environment that was established to 
provide a safe and comfortable situation and whether he found it conducive 
and safe in which to tell his story. 
". . .. . 1 was so stressed out, I was still in a situation where I was 
upset with coming so close to death, upset with putting other 
people in a situation. I think if someone had said to me the 
wrong thing in an uncontrolled environment sitting around over 
a cup of tea, when someone just wasn'f keeping an eye on what's 
going on, the wrong thing would have, and I say would have 
because I believe it would of, caused great stress to myself 
to the point where maybe I don't know what I would have done 
at the time". 
"I was extremely fragile, that's the point I don't know where 
or what direction I could have taken. Whether to walk off 
the job, maybe someone might have said somefhing fhat 
really hit a nerve and I could have gone out in violent anger 
or somefhing like that and I don't know what direction. I was 
so, as you say fragile. That anything could have happened, 
Once again Fit discussed how the one-on-one session had given him the 
opportunity to look at his own vulnerable situation of being so close to death. 
He acknowledged that there were parts of the incident that he was unaware 
of and this was revealed during the debriefing. 
"I needed the group situation to let everyone else know who was 
there. Some were directly involved and some indirectly involved. 
And sifting outside and aloof from the incident, but were part of that 
team and didn't know what was happening as well. That came 
out in the debrief that I hadn't fhoughf about but it was something 
they had in their mind. ...... we needed to get out and draw out 
for me, to be able to look at my team and for them to know what 
actually happened and why I had put them in such a situation". 
On reflection it was important for Fit to tell his story so that his crew could 
have a true understanding of what really happened from his perspective. He 
was their Senior Officer and he had this strong feeling that he had let them 
down with his operational decisionmaking. It was important that they 
understood why he had made the decisions that he had under circumstances 
that some were unaware of. They had a mental picture in their mind of what 
happened. However, often this is distorted and is able to be clarified as each 
participant tells their own story. 
8.5 PEER SUPPORT - "HE LIFTED ME UP" 
Some of the other major themes that Fit discussed in some detail related to 
the role of the Peer Supporter. He found him helpful in terms of his role as a 
firefighter as he was able to assist him when he had some doubts about 
some of his operational decisions. However, he did discuss how he had had 
some anxiety around who the Peer Support was going to be . 
"At the time we were doing the debrief I was concerned about 
who the Peer Support was going to be actually. And I did have 
concerns to start with who it was going to be but l just can't 
remember exactly unfortunately whether it was in that debriefing 
or something he said afterwards as well, but in the debriefing he did 
talk about a situation that we had been in that very few firefighters in 
New Zealand, including himself, he put into that category, had not 
been in such a close death situation. And he said it is very hard, to 
help someone who has been there when you really are not sure what 
had happened, but his support saying that you had done, not done 
something, but being somewhere and coming out of it, and this is 
the afterwards part that come out of it extremely we//". 
The Peer Supporter personalised the situation, acknowledged the severity of 
the incident and how close Fit had come to dying in the incident. By 
acknowledging the seriousness of the situation, the Peer Supporter assisted 
Fit and his crew to process the incident. 
"The support he gave me and the comments he was making 
during the debrief and personal comments he made to me 
afterwards were amazing help to me. I am just trying to find 
the words just to explain how, how I felf from it, was probably be 
put at ease. He set me at ease a lot more and made me 
feel good about myself. That I had come through a situation 
I handled it in an appropriate way. The results were showing 
in what was happening. It was all happening, the results 
were being seen on my crews reaction, talking and feeling 
free and I felt really good that he, because I was so open trying 
to explain how I felf, that the other members of the crew had done 
the same thing. He was building me back up as a peer, as a equal 
as everybody else which was what I needed at the time. 
That's probably the point, he was lifting me back out of a hole. 
He got close to me saying, he did say he had been in serious 
situations buf nothing quite like that and he really lifted me up, 
and I was quite amazed at how much better I felt in having my 
own fellow officer helping me. He just touched on the right 
things, just to pick me up and that was probably what I needed 
at that stage, was a pick me up". 
Fit went onto discuss how the Peer Supporter continued to assist him both 
during and following the debriefing. 
"He was doing reinforcement work and it was just building me 
back up to get on with my life, and on with my job. It was, I don't 
know how to explain it. Different pads of the debrief picked me 
up really well and I can remember standing on the stairs on the way 
back down (following the debriefing) on the landing and him talking 
to me, talking to me about this. A couple of things he said just 
really picked me up'! 
Fit discussed that there were three major parts to his recovery. It is important 
to acknowledge that debriefing is one of seven components of Critical 
Incident Stress Management. Fit accessed two parts, a one-on-one support 
and a CISD. He acknowledged that the support of the Peer Support Team 
member was one of the major parts to his recovery. 
"It was just probably three major parts to my recovery and that was 
one of them (peer support). Letting out my feelings as in the team 
situation was the other one that I could explain what had happened 
to me and my crew. Why they were in the situation and why I had 
put them in that situation. It was one of them (debriefing). And 
the other one was the one-on-one. Without that I wouldn't even 
got to two or three. I feel I really believe that". 
He acknowledged the role of the Peer Support Team member having a big 
impact on his recovery. 
"Extremely big impact As I say it was probably the third most 
important part of it, of my recovery. You know it was just great and 
that firefighter has an experienced role and it was marvellous". 
Fit discussed how he was empowered by the one-on-one session which 
assisted him to move into the next phase of his recovery. He focussed on his 
need to have an individual debrief before he felt able emotionally to move 
into the next stress management strategy, the group debrief. 
"My initial one-on-one gave me the power, I suppose to move 
on to the next part of my recovery if you like. If this is the word. 
Without doing that initial one-on-one I felt as fhough I wouldn't 
have been stable enough to be able to just sit with the group 
because l had too many emotions initially of death to start with. 
I had to look at that in my mind. I had to look at that before I could 
help other people and to finish off where I was. I felt that death was 
imminent. And without and because we got through that stage one, it 
had shocked me so much I had to look at it. Without looking at that 
I couldn't look at where the situation that anyone else was in because 
l just wasnP ready to go on. I needed to analyse.. . . . . . . . Maybe I had 
to put my arms back on, my legs back on before I could use my toes 
to stand up straight': 
While Fit discussed how important the one-on-one session assisted him 
partially in recovering from the many stresses attached to attending the 
incident, he reflected on how he still needed a further strategy to assist him to 
a full recovery. 
"I still needed extra to talk to them on this, the next stage 
of recovery for me.. . . . . . . ... l asked them if they would be parf 
of it (debriefing) for me because I had things I wanted to 
talk about, and it would give them the opportunity as well 
to talk about it". 
Once again Fit discusses how he wanted to tell his story, so that his side of 
the story be heard, and also how others needed to tell their story of the 
incident. By all gaining an overview of the incident and what happened for 
each person at the incident, this assisted the crew to have a greater 
understanding of what really happened and why crew members were placed 
in certain situations. 
8.6 CREW PEER SUPPORT - DEBRIEFING POST- 
DEBRIEFING 
A further theme that Fit discussed, which I have not seen referred to in the 
literature was that of crew peer support following the debriefing. As is 
usual following a debriefing, the facilitator and Peer Support Team members 
remain for light refreshments. This allows participants the chance to talk 
informally to the Team and those who require more individual assistance to 
feel more able to approach the team in a less formal and more relaxed 
setting. I questioned Fit regarding what positive benefits, if any, the 
debriefing had had on his ongoing relationship with his crew. 
"After having that cup of tea afterwards, that also gave my 
crew and myself the opporfunify as well during the next hour to 
have cross communication between each other on an individual 
basis. We could all, I could see that everyone had spoken to 
everyone else individually and talked about what had happened.. . 
I talked to everyone individually and they had talked to each 
other so there was really cross communication going on and 
I would like to think that they got the benefit out of that, that I got 
as well: It was our own crew peer support". 
I discussed with Fit, after he had spoken about how maturely the participants 
had behaved throughout the debrief, and how they had responded to the 
seriousness of the incident and its effects. I shared that I didn't think It was a 
situation where it was appropriate to make insensitive comments, which is 
what often happens following an incident and often causes significant pain in 
terms of personal distress and crew disharmony. He acknowledged the 
benefit of the debriefing and long term effects. 
"For them they could see, I think they could see that it was worthwhile 
for me as well and I was probably at ease really quickly after that. 
Able to get back onto maybe a level playing field much easier". 
In terms of all the participants having a clearer understanding of each and 
everyone's position like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, each participant had parts 
of the puzzle but not the full puzzle. 
"The picture was made up. We had the picture and we could 
talk about the picture and that what communication my group, 
I think we talked about the whole picture, that's everyone's story 
and that was very important that everyone saw fhe picture now 
and not just their part of it". 
In the second interview, Fit further discussed the positive effects of the 
debriefing for himself and his crew where the debriefing carried on in an 
informal manner following the formal debriefing and departure of the ClSD 
Team members. 
"After the debrief there was certainly personnel talking to each 
other, about what had happened that day, that morning of the 
debrief. There was a different air, they were still talking about 
it and it proved to be very effective time is a way of putting it. 
An effective time to carry on that debriefing, so really the debrief 
went on all day. The rest of the day as we were passing each 
other working together doing our jobs, we were talking about 
it. So it was virtually a full days debrief so from that point of 
view I would say having the formal debrief earlier in the day 
left the rest of the day to continue it in an informal basis and 
I believe that proved to be very effective". 
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In the second interview Fit further discussed the peer crew support in terms 
of its positive benefits both to the crew as a whole and to himself personally. 
"We supported each other, it was good. If brought the morale 
of each of us back and bonded us back fogether again. I, for 
one had grave fears that I had lost support of some of my crew. 
I think that continued, however I felt it came back to me that 
I hadn't lost the support and what I had done as a Manager 
and geffing them together in that team environment had been 
good. If proved to be very effective". 
Fit discussed how if he had failed to get the team together for the debriefing, 
he may have lost his credibility and they may have had difficulty working 
together as a bonded team. He suffered much distress due to his concern 
that he had lost his crew's support. This concern was lessened by getting his 
crew together for the debriefing where each and every member of the team in 
a safe environment had been able to share his or her experience of the 
critical incident. As a consequence of the debriefing, the crew began to bond 
together as "peer crew support". 
"Who knows I may have totally lost it if I hadn't of done and 
didn't get them together. So in talking to each other was very 
important in building our bond back together as a team. It did, 
if felt really good and we got backfogether". 
The ongoing benefits to Fit and his crew from participating in the debriefing 
were highlighted by Fit. 
"Probably a bonding thing really. It kept us together and probably 
built a bigger bond amongst the crew.. . . . . . . ..definitely have bonded 
together and have respect for each other and look after each other". 
He further discussed other positive benefits, such as teamwork, doing the job 
well, working well together and job satisfaction. 
"Teamwork. We work as a team. I have got my respect back. 
I mean I felf I have, they respecf me for helping fhem. Giving 
them the opportunity to talk in a group situation. I think it has been 
a good learning curve for them and the respect that I have gained 
from them and they have gained from me. It has kept us going as 
a team. As an effective team". 
I was very conscious at the end of the first interview that I had resurfaced 
painful thoughts and feelings associated with the incident. Fit acknowledged 
that he was surprised that certain aspects of the incident still did affect him 
when he recalled them. 
"Ifs, you know, its been excellent and its still there and a couple of 
points still hurt, and I didn't realise that they were still hurfing that 
much. Ifs not hurting but it affects me. Still there". 
At the beginning of the second interview I wanted to check out how Fit had 
been since our last meeting. Had I caused him to suffer more significant pain 
by requesting his involvement in this research and asking him to tell his 
story? 
"Have no problems from doing the interview with you. If proved 
to bring out some extra points which was still deep within me. 
That proved to be beneficial". 
While Fit acknowledged that he had resurfaced the memory attached to the 
incident, it was not painful. 
"It is definitely not painful and I think that last time. It came 
ouf but it was only a memory. It wasn't painful. ...... ... Yes 
it is just a memory and I was talking about it with my partner, 
funny enough at lunchtime. ... with in relation to the incident 
and the interviews and the.. ... participating with you and those 
memories are different now.. . . . ... it doesn't hold any pain for 
me". 
At the third and final interview, Fit once again discussed the positive aspect 
of participating in the interview. 
"A marvellous learning curve doing these interviews have been 
for me. How much a learning curve the whole initial incident 
was. l just hope that I can take away all the experiences and 
continue to help people as I have been helped". 
At the end of each interview I thanked Fit for his contribution to my research 
and to the ongoing practice and training of the Peer Support Team. He 
stated how he had found the interview process helpful by recalling the 
incident and the debriefing process. He discussed how he was happy to be 
interviewed. 
"Definitely, ifs opened my mind up again, its / think, I feel a lot 
more relaxed from it. Its great. Oh excellent, I am really . 
rapted. I felt you know, I felt really good". 
Fit had obviously found it a therapeutic process recalling his story and the 
experience of debriefing. Engaging in the telling of his story clarified the 
meaning of his experience, which resulted in closure or a resolution. 
Recalling past experiences assists individuals to resolve unfinished business, 
which is an important element of affording closure which engenders meaning 
(Lichter, Mooney & Boyd, 1993). 
8.7 PERSONAL EFFECTS FROM THE ONE-ON-ONE 
SESSION AND THE ClSD 
I questioned Fit on the different effects of the one-on-one session versus the 
debriefing. I was interested to know why he felt he required both the one-on- 
one and the ClSD Critical Incident Stress Management strategy. 
"My personal and family immediate needs and that was, that had 
to be done for me to be able to, for my own satisfaction, to get up 
and to be able to go, to walk back to work and do my job? 
The debriefing had the effect of Fit gaining an understanding of not only his 
stress effects, but also his crews. 
"I was also tied up with my own, still tied up with my own personal 
grief that I would call it at the time or stress.. ... and if 1 hadn't of 
spoken to the team in a controlled situation, I don't think 1 would 
have heard all the feelings that they had. And each of them 
had a totally different perspective and feelings in their own unique 
little situation of where they were". 
Fit discussed how they had to work together to understand what happened 
for all the crew who attended the incident, to gain an understanding of all the 
crews perspective. It was important to regain trust in order to move on from 
the incident and work as a team again. 
"So we tended to work together and I can look at them and say 
that they knew that I did that for such and such a reason and 
not to have doubts still. They couldn't trust me maybe in another 
situation. I needed to get trust in them again". 
I asked Fit whether he was able to regain the crews trust by the participation 
of himself and his crew in the debriefing in order to begin working cohesively 
again. 
". . ...g etfing the trust back from them. For them to know that I 
was human was a big, big plus, getting their trust back, When I 
spoke to them one-on-one afterwards (the debriefing), just again, 
that was over like a cup of tea or just walking around, I spoke to 
each of them about how they felt with the situation that I was in 
and put them in. The results came back were tremendous, plus 
being able to do that in a controlled situation because we all listened 
to each other's story without interjection which I think we wouldn'f 
get overa cup of team, and that's, that's why it was excellent. 
We had, we were each able to tell our story, how emotional each 
got telling our story was varied. There was no interruption which 
could have put someone out. I am sure it could have put myself 
off as I was the most emotional (laugh), emotional". 
Fit shared with me how being involved in a ClSD had affected him and how 
he had doubts about his personal safety if he had not taken the opportunity to 
tell his story in a debriefing. 
"I really don't think I would still be in the Fire Service. I think 
I would have needed medical help in the end.. ... l would say I 
would have ended up physically sick as in the whole body packing 
if in and going into shock somewhere and I would have been at 
the Doctor's and I am only surmising this is what would have 
happened really.. ... l could have been sent away to specialists. 
Because I was having a psychological problem with it.. ...yo u 
know it could have got worse to the point of suicide in the end': 
I believe Fit shared how grave the situation was for him and his fears around 
his own personal safety. If he had not been given the opportunity to 
participate in a ClSD with his crew, he may not have been able to recover 
from the incident. He felt severely traumatised and overwhelmed by the 
seriousness of the incident and the potential for his own loss of life and the 
loss of some of his crew. The one-on-one support provided him with an 
opportunity to share his own story and subsequent personal distress in a safe 
and caring environment. This intervention enabled him to have the power to 
face his crew in order to tell his story and hear their stories. However, he 
needed more than what the one-on-one intervention was able to provide. He 
needed a forum in which to tell his own story in a safe and controlled 
environment and also to hear his crews' stories so that he could gain a better 
understanding of their situation and reactions to the incident. Without this 
opportunity I believe Fit may have had serious long term mental health 
problems. While I acknowledge there is a place for mental health services, I 
don't believe the services that exist in the present context were in a position 
to offer Fit the most appropriate assistance in the immediate phase following 
the incident, as what the debriefing was able to offer him in terms of the 
sharing his story with his crew. 
8.9 CONCLUSION. 
While there were several common themes that were highlighted by the four 
participants, which I will discuss in a later chapter titled "Patterns and 
Themes", I have focussed on several main themes that I interpreted as being 
of great significance to Fit's story. The main theme in Fit's story was, I 
believe, the need for him to tell his story. Fit needed the crew to hear what 
really happened from his position, from his and not from others' perspectives. 
He needed to tell his story in a safe and caring environment where he was 
given the space, time and respect to do so. In order to regain his self-respect 
and credibility, he needed to reveal not only what happened to him, but also 
share his feelings, emotions and stresses associated with attending and 
following the incident. He felt a great sense of relief when he was "heardn in 
the debriefing and was then able to hear the others' stories more clearly in a 
safe and caring environment which is imperative to the success of a 
debriefing. The formality of the debriefing permitted participants their "turn" 
to speak uninterrupted. He discussed how very often, when firefighters share 
over the "smoko" table upon returning after an incident, often insensitive 
comments are made, which for him may have had the potential to cause him 
serious harm. 
Fit's story, his journey and the making of meaning unfolded with the telling of 
his story. He reflected on his story and made further meaning of his 
experience in the second and third interviews where he clarified issues in 
terms of his own experience and the experience of others involved in the 
debriefing. He shared what was important to him, the choices he made and 
the reasons for some of these choices. His story illustrated his experience of 
the incident and subsequent debriefing by clarifying and interpreting the 
complexities of his experience into a vivid and rich narrative. 
While I have attempted to make some meaning of Fit's story, I have been 
cautious with my interpretation as I believe this is Fit's story. He shared his 
story with much emotion and in great detail, and it was evident to Fit and 
myself that it had been a very therapeutic process which he acknowledged 
on several occasions. However, it is Fit's story and my interpretation of his 
experience was written alongside his direct story, which I requested Fit to 
verify, in order to give credibility to his story and my interpretation of his 
experience. I have not over interpreted the text of his narrative as I chose to 
keep the researcher's voice quiet in the interview so as to remain close to the 
original telling of his story. I consider that this experience enabled me to 
discover deep insights into the experience of debriefing. 
Fit and I grew through the experience of the sharing of his story. He became 
empowered and validated in some of his decision making in relation to the 
incident and the subsequent organising of the debriefing and I became more 
grounded in my practice particularly in relation to CISD. Making visible, the 
invisibility of the experience of debriefing, helped both Fit and I understand 
the process of debriefing with greater clarity and vision. 
In the following chapter I will uncover the narratives of 'three other firefighters 
by discussing, in some depth, their unique experience of participating in a 
CISD. 
-1 65- 
9. OTHER STORIES - EACH IS A UNIQUE 
STORY 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to uncover the stories of three further firefighters who 
were all involved in the same critical incident and subsequent Critical lncident 
Stress Debriefing. I will begin with a discussion on the background to the 
particular critical incident that the participants attended. Following this I will 
divide the chapter into three sections. Each participant's unique story will be 
contained in an individual section and an interpretation of their experience 
will be addressed individually. 
As previously discussed, when interpreting the data I became aware that 
each individual participant had a particular theme that was unique to their 
experience. Because of this discovery, I have decided to present their 
unique themes individually and in a later chapter discuss the common 
themes that were elucidated during the interpretation of the data of all the 
four participants' interviews. When I immersed myself in interpreting the 
narratives for the essence of the experience of debriefing for the four 
participants, it became obvious to me that while there were several common 
themes, each participant had some aspect of the experience that was 
particularly unique to their experience. I will begin each section with some 
background on each of the four firefighters in terms of their length of service, 
rank and social circumstances. As in the previous chapter on Fit's 
experience, each story will be presented using some text as close to the 
original conversation and the narratives will be presented as a whole. 
9.2 THE CRITICAL INCIDENT 
Before discussing the participants' experiences of a Critical Incident Stress 
Debriefing, it is important to have some understanding of the background to 
the particular critical incident, which subsequently required the Critical 
Incident Stress Management strategy of a debriefing. All the participants 
attended an incident which on first impression they believed to be in their 
terms, "an ordinary old housefire". However, due to unforeseen 
circumstances the incident resulted in significant numbers of firefighters' lives 
being very nearly lost and their safety was severely threatened. Several 
firefighters were injured and required hospitalisation and for some of the 
injured firefighters, they required a lengthy period of rehabilitation. While in 
firefighting terms it was considered a routine housefire, it was subsequently 
upgraded to a major incident that required multiple resources, had the 
potential for loss of life and firefighters safety was severely threatened. 
Unfortunately, due to confidentiality reasons to protect the identifiability of the 
firefighters in a very highly publicised event, I am unable to discuss the 
incident in greater detail. However, it is important to understand that the way 
this incident progressed from a routine fire and was upgraded to a major 
incident took all those attending the incident by surprise. Because of the 
surprise element, and the belief that firefighters had died at the incident and 
there had been serious injury, the incident caused significant distress to all 
firefighters who attended the incident. This distress was felt by all 
firefighters, irrespective of rank, and had the potential to cause significant 
critical incident stress to all those who attended the incident. 
The debriefing which the following three participants attended followed a 
modified version of the Mitchell model (1983) of debriefing. The seven 
phases of the Mitchell model (1983) were followed but was not facilitated by 
a mental health professional, but by myself, a Registered Nurse with 10 
years experience in the field of ClSD and CISM. As the facilitator, I was 
assisted and supported in the debriefing process by two Peer Support Team 
* 
members. One of the Team members had extensive experience in the 
debriefing process with over 20 years firefighting experience; the other team 
member had much less experience in the field of CISM. The debriefing team 
jointly shared the leadership role, though the newer member tended to be 
less active in their involvement. 
Following the debriefing I discussed with the participants whether they would 
be willing to participate in my research study. I also provided them with an 
information sheet outlining in detail the research project and issues around 
their participation. I stated that I would follow-up all participants, with their 
permission, by telephone within the next 24 - 48 hours. However, one 
participant, who was to become known as Instantaneous, rang me within 24 
hours of the debriefing and stated that he would be willing to participate in the 
research study. I felt really affirmed by his positive and generous offer and 
his statements in regard to his amazement at how effective the debriefing 
process had been for him and his crew. The next two participants, Flick and 
Red, were the first two firefighters who responded positively to my telephone 
call enquiring into their willingness to participate in the study. 
The initial (first) interviews were all conducted within 3 - 6 weeks following the 
debriefing. Initially I planned to interview the participants 7 - 10 days 
following a debriefing. However, after further reading I discovered that the 
literature supported an extension of this time in order for the negative stress 
effects experienced following their exposure to the critical incident to 
dissipate. All three interviews for the three research participants were 
carried out in the private homes of the participants or the researcher, and one 
participant's interviews were carried out on Fire Service property. 
At the beginning of the first interview of the three participants, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, I explained the process of the research, gained 
informed consent and discussed with them in depth the sensitive nature of 
the questioning and that there was the potential to cause some further 
distress. They all stated that they understood the implications but were 
happy to proceed. It was my belief that if they had had any serious concerns 
or reservations about their safety, they would very likely have refused to 
participate. 
I was ever mindful of the importance of establishing a comfortable and 
trusting presence with the participants in order to gain the rich data that was 
necessary to truly uncover in detail the experience of debriefing. From the 
beginning of my initial contact with the participants, I worked diligently to 
establish an open and honest relationship in order to foster trust and rapport. 
I had previously worked extremely hard at establishing this level of 
relationship in the late 1980s when I had worked as an Occupational Health 
Nurse in the New Zealand Fire Service. When l joined the Service, women 
did not work closely with the men or work at the Fire Stations so I felt like I 
was blazing a new trail. In retrospect, at times I felt like I was trying to 
assimilate myself into a totally foreign culture. Now ten years later, I had 
gained a breadth of understanding of the Fire Service operational aspects, 
and more importantly the culture that had been established. While my return 
to the Fire Service was relatively recent, I believed that I was well respected 
and it made the process of gaining participants consent to participate in the 
study that much easier. 
9.3 THE STORY OF INSTANTANEOUS. 
WANTED TO TALK ABOUT MY GUILITY 
FEEL /NGSn 
lnstantaneous holds a rank of Senior Firefighter and had over 20 years 
experience of firefighting. He is well respected within the Service both for his 
Fire Service experience and expertise and belongs to several voluntary 
groups both within the Service and within his community. He is married with 
adult children. 
The interviews with lnstantaneous were held on Fire Service property in a 
quiet isolated area of the building in order to ensure privacy. However it was 
interesting to note that I believed both the participant and myself were less 
relaxed than those interviews that were conducted in the private homes of 
the firefighters or the researcher. Background noise was a problem that 
subsequently caused great difficulties transcribing the tapes and I was ever 
conscious that privacy and confidentiality could be breached by intrusion of 
the Fire Service support staff, even though I had attempted to find a private 
and quiet space in which to conduct the interview. However, in spite of these 
concerns lnstantaneous did share openly and honestly. On several 
occasions he did become tearful, particularly when discussing how he 
believed during the incident that members of his crew had lost their lives. I 
felt privileged and humbled by his sharing of both his story and his thoughts, 
feelings and emotions around the incident. At no time, when questioned, did 
lnstantaneous want to stop the interview, though quiet spaces were provided 
for him to regain his composure in order for him to carry on with his story. 
In my first leading open-ended question I asked lnstantaneous to discuss his 
own personal experience related to participating in the recent debriefing. He 
immediately began discussing what I believe was the most important issue 
for him in relation to attending the incident and subsequent debriefing. He 
discussed what I have referred to as "survivor guilt" which I believed was 
Instantaneous's unique theme. It was the first time in my experience with 
debriefing that a firefighter had highlighted this issue as being paramount to 
their experience. In past debriefings, firefighters have discussed their guilt 
attached to not being able to save an injured or cardiac compromised 
individual. I found it fascinating listening to Instantaneous's narrative around 
his guilt. He began his story with the following statement: 
"I had an overall feeling that 1 wanted to talk about my guilty 
feelings attached to the situation fhat I found myself in. I was 
separated from the rest of my crew. I genuinely believed 
that they had died. And it was some time believing that. I 
had a really strong feeling that I should have been with them. 
I wanted to say fhat to them". 
It became more and more evident on further questioning that it was 
imperative that he inform his crew in the debriefing that he felt guilty and that 
the debriefing had assisted him in doing so. 
"To express my guilt Fairly illogical but that is the way I felt". 
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I discussed with him the environment that was provided and whether that felt 
right for him? 
"Probably the only environment where I could express that. 
I did say to the crew concerned shortly afterwards, but I think 
/ needed to say that again in the larger group. l just thought 
it was an appropriate place to say it and that maybe other 
guys would have similar feelings and I wanted to hear what 
they had to say. No one else expressed a similar feeling 
but no one quite knew the situation I was in". 
lnstantaneous discussed in depth the stress effects on the firefighters and 
how they had never experienced such shock and disbelief. 
"In all my experience with the Fire Service 1 have never really 
been stressed out by fire or other incidents. / mean what 
stress there is, is short-lived for us. I mean if you see a motor 
accident and a child dies, I feel really sad about that. But I 
have never been plagued by stress, the operational side of if. 
I have been stressed and sad, but it is short-lived. 
"I have had similar incidents but I have never been so shocked, 
so emotional as this one because it was a terrific surprise 
to everyone. The actual incident. It was a terrific surprise. 
We were all experienced firefighters. We had seen houses 
burnt down before, but never expected what actually happened. 
The actual incident caused great shock. So this is the most 
unusual and it brought up a great deal of shock". 
lnstantaneous made a significant statement in relation to how effective the 
debriefing had been for him personally. He discussed the potential 
consequences for him if he had not participated in the debriefing. 
"I think if I hadn't been debriefed I might have forever in my 
Fire Service career continued to apologise to that crew for 
not being with them when they d i e d  
I questioned him about his need to do this again and if not why? 
"No, No. Because I have got it out of my system. 
Yes, I told them". (In the formal process of debriefing) 
He obviously found the formal process of debriefing beneficial in terms of 
sharing his emotions with regard to his guilt. 
"For me it was like a release of emotions, I suppose. 
Once it was out, it was over. But it had to come out". 
When I questioned lnstantaneous about the positive benefits for him 
personally, for both the present and for the future he answered: 
"When I let out the emotions I felt I had a sense of relief, a 
release if you like. I am sure I might have gone on like 
the Ancient Mariner.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Forever saying to 
the firemen I should have been with them when they d i e d  
"I thought if was a good experience and for me. it brought a 
final lid on the incident. Although 1 will probably talk about if 
for the next 20 years. Emotionally it is finished with". 
While lnstantaneous highlighted the positive benefits to him emotionally in 
terms of sharing his guilt attached to his own survival, he has since shared 
with me informally how powerful he believes the debriefing was. In his above 
comment regarding firefighters talking about the incident for the next 20 
years, he now says that his crew rarely mentions the incident. He believes 
this is related to the participants in the debriefing talking about it in the depth 
that the debriefing encourages and permits and since it has been "laid on the 
table", it is no longer an issue. 
In the second interview lnstantaneous began by stating that he was happy 
with the transcript and did not want any of the details deleted. However, he 
was disappointed that much of the humour and emotion was absent in the 
printed form. He felt that some of his comments appeared rather bland and 
pompous. I reassured him that while he and I were aware of both humour 
and emotion that it was pertinent that he raise this concern. I acknowledged 
that it was necessary for me as the researcher to skilfully highlight the 
humour and emotion when appropriate. We discussed how humour was 
used by some of the participants in the debriefing as a kind of mask to 
disguise their discomfort, particularly in the introductory phase, until they felt 
more comfortable to share some of their feelings, thoughts and emotions. 
During the second interview Instantaneous appeared to feel more relaxed 
and I believed a strong trusting relationship had been established during the 
previous interview. He appeared more able to share some of his discomfort 
in relation to his emotions and survivor guilt. 
"I mean it's ridiculous to think I should have died with them, you 
know". (Embarrassed laughter) 
I acknowledged that this was how he felt and questioned him around what 
this feeling was related to. 
"I think it's a natural parf of sorf of grieving.. .. That you're 
in a crew, during a group or a crew, that you should have 
been doing some task and they all got killed except you. 
You are bound to feel guilty. If's quite natural, but you 
have to get it out of your system sooner or later". 
He further acknowledged his guilt around his own survival when he thought 
others had died and how this had been the most important emotion that he 
had felt around the incident. 
"For some reason on that particular incident, that was really 
the only big emotion I felt and I felt guilty that I wasn't there 
with them and I was convinced, of course, that they'd all died. 
Not just my crew but 1 thought we'd have at least six fatalities. 
It turned out there were more firefighters actually injured or trapped 
or involved in the  collapse'^ 
It was important for me to acknowledge lnstantaneous's guilt. I discussed 
with him that while it was a natural emotion for him, particularly as he was 
convinced that he had lost all his crew who he had worked closely with for a 
number of years, that guilt was both a powerful and a destructive emotion if 
not dealt with effectively. 
The above parts of lnstantaneous's narrative highlight the intensity of what I 
believe was the unique theme for him in relation to his experience of 
debriefing. The debriefing provided him with a safe and caring environment 
in which to share his guilt attached to his survival. While he acknowledged 
he felt some discomfort with this emotion, it was imperative that he share this 
emotion in order for him to progress and lay that emotion aside. By sharing 
his guilt he was able to resolve his inner conflict and move on. 
In the third and final interview, Instantaneous stated that he had experienced 
no negative effects from participating in the interviews. Like several of the 
other participants he .had found the interviews therapeutic. While the 
interviews had surfaced some strong emotions attached to the critical 
incident he had found it "Very much therapeutic". 
I am familiar with the culture of the Fire Service and have in the past heard 
firefighters discuss in great depth and detail particular major incidents where 
there has been major property loss or loss of life many years previously. The 
incident continues to be a great source of conversation which is resurfaced 
and talked about in great detail, which lnstantaneous discussed. 
lnstantaneous viewed this incident as probably the most significant for him in 
all of his firefighting career. However he believes that it is now discussed 
less than previous incidents. I had to ask the question, is this a positive 
effect of the debriefing? lnstantaneous stated: 
"I thought this was probably. .... this incident was fhe most 
dramatic in some respects of any incident I've ever attended 
in the Fire Service. Buf it's the one that we've discussed 
the least and I think that's probably because fhere is no need 
to discuss if. We did fhe debrief and got it out of our systems: 
From working in the area of debriefing for the last 10 years I believe it most 
certainly is a positive effect. In concluding, the unique theme that was 
elucidated during the three interviews with lnstantaneous, was survivor guilt 
and the need to express this within the process of debriefing was the most 
paramount issue for him. Survivor guilt is an emotion experienced by 
individuals who have remained alive when others have lost their lives in an 
incident. There were also other common themes that he discussed, such as 
regaining respect for a fellow-firefighter, the value of the Peer shpporter, 
hearing other firefighter's perspective of the incident and a feeling that he 
was not alone with some of the feelings, thoughts and emotions. However 
survivor guilt was by far the most important issue for him. 
9.4 THE STORY OF FLICK "THEY HEARD MY 
STORY" 
Flick is a firefighter with over 20 years experience in the New Zealand Fire 
Service. He is married with children. He was situated in the heart of the 
incident where he played an active role in fighting the fire and the subsequent 
rescue of several of his crew. At times, during the interview, Flick seemed to 
me to contradict himself in terms of how effective he had found the 
debriefing. I believed he was confused over the difference between the 
operational debriefing which would address his professional role in the 
incident, and the Critical lncident Stress Debriefing which would address his 
personal needs in terms of stress management. I clarified the two different 
types of debriefing with Flick. On several occasions he said that he would 
have preferred the debriefing earlier which I will discuss later in this section. 
Unfortunately he had not received any other Critical lncident Stress 
Management strategies before the debriefing, such as a demobilisation, a 
defusing or a one-on-one offer of assistance or support. The Peer Support 
Team had made themselves available to assist crews either on a crew basis 
or for individual one-on-one support, but few firefighters had availed 
themselves of this service. 
"I like to get it all over and done with while the incident 
really is sfill going on. To come back, I felt sort of nof 
resentmenf, buf it was sort of.. ... I fhought I knew my stress 
levels had built up having fo come into a debrief and so 
late. To me personally I would have liked to, probably.. .. 
that morning. I feel that morning would have suited me 
a lot better than sort of flowed away from there". 
I acknowledged Flick's lack of support in the initial stages following the 
incident and explained what other ClSM support services could have been 
offered to him, but that a ClSD is usually held 24 - 72 hours following the 
incident and the reasons why it is not held earlier. The debriefing that Flick 
attended was held on the fourth day following the incident. The reason for 
the delay in holding the debriefing was due to those firefighters who had 
attended the incident having their four days off which began immediately 
after the incident. I acknowledged that he was making a very useful point to 
be mindful of in future planning following critical incidents. 
The Peer Support Team contacted some firefighters at their homes over this 
time period, as they were considered severely traumatised either due to 
injury or because of the role they played at the incident. Flick was not 
contacted but it is my belief he should have been as he was considered to be 
at the "heart" of the fire in terms of firefighting and in terms of rescuing 
others. In fact it is very likely that he had saved other firefighters' lives 
because of his actions. 
However, Flick stated that he found the debriefing did assist him particularly 
in terms of hearing the other firefighters discuss the incident from their 
perspective. 
"Yes definitely, it was good to hear others. It affirms to you 
the guy sifting next to you in the downhill job was no different 
to me. Basically your feelings are still the same". 
It was quite difficult to get Flick to discuss the experience of the debriefing 
from his own perspective. I believed he needed time and supportive 
prompting in order to tell his story of the experience, which I provided. I 
continually acknowledged his contribution to the rescuing of some of his crew 
members. However, on more gentle but direct questioning he answered: 
'*If was a very, very neutral feeling to go into it because I didn't 
know, not having a debrief of that sort of critical stress way. I 
didn't know what, basically what to expect. It certainly got 
deeper into the subject while we were there. It was to me . . .. 
personally.. . . . . it brought it right back to the incident. Clearer, 
straight in front of me again. And hearing the other firefighfers 
versions of i f  put a better picture and I knew where I fitted in, 
in that particular incident It was quite good in that respect. " 
As the interview progressed Flick discussed how he had felt safe in the 
debriefing and he expressed how he believed the participants had heard his 
story. 
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'And I was quite pleased with the people who were there, who 
heard my story. Now in their mind, they have said to me 
afterwards, they said to me afterwards, that they didnP actually 
know what was happening in my little part of the woods. And 
they were just so pleased with that. It made me feel quite 
good. 
Flick obviously found it really affirming and important to him personally to 
have had his story heard by the other firefighters. 
"Yes, yes, I actually found the other firefighters, because they 
didn't know what had happened to me. When they heard my 
story, they came back to me and I felt a lot of satisfaction. 
More satisfacfion from that rather than being sort of in the 
dark, and no one knowing what they were doing or done. 
In the dark of what happened. Now they know". 
It was obviously important that Flick share his experience of the trauma 
attached to the critical incident and I believe the debriefing process was the 
most appropriate and effective method in which to do so. He stated that it 
wouldn't have mattered where the debriefing was held since all he wanted 
was to tell his story and be heard. 
"Because of what had happened, I personally, if it had been 
at the local Railway Station, it didn't matter to me where it 
was. I felt quite, I had cheated death so what else can come 
second. Nothing. So as it was, if was in the Fire Station 
environment, it didn't really worry me. Personally I felt, 
I thought I would tell my story to my fellow firefighters and 
there was nothing that I had to hide so being in a little safe 
haven wasn't a problem. I had the complete freedom to 
say what, when and how I felt. People were listening 
without any outside influences whatsoever"'. 
Flick discussed how he had shared some of his personal feelings and 
reactions by telling his story. 
"I went through my story as if happened. Nothing was altered 
and even now I would hope I could put the same story through 
and not alter anything as this is the way I saw it': 
The power of the debriefing for Flick was that he was heard and he felt 
"lifted" by this. Another participant, Fit, used this term when he recalled the 
positive effect of the presence of the Peer Supporter in the debriefing. Once 
again Flick tended to contradict himself in terms of whether he felt he would 
have been heard as effectively telling his story over the "smoko" table. At 
times I became a little frustrated with his responses but kept reminding 
myself during the interview that this was the way Flick wanted to tell his story 
and to trust the process of his storytelling. When questioned about whether 
he felt the participants in the debriefing had heard him more effectively in the 
debriefing he answered: 
"Oh yes most definitely. As you said in the beginning (in the 
introduction phase of the debriefing where the ground rules 
are discussed) the four walls, nothing was to go outside. 
But still it wouldn't have mattered. They heard whaf I had 
to say and that's when I felt quite liffed by this". 
He confirmed my own feelings regarding the benefit for him personally by 
saying how the debriefing assisted him. 
"You feel a strong part of the team. And immensely it does 
lift you". 
Flick stated on several occasions that he was so intent on telling his story 
that it didn't matter where the debriefing was held. It is not uncommon for 
firefighters, because of their own personal stress attached to the critical 
incident, to deflect their own stresses onto other firefighters. They tend not to 
actively listen, often apportion blame, and make "wisecracks" about other 
firefighters' actions, and criticise their colleagues. Often this is in a "tongue in 
cheek" manner, but which has the power to cause severe distress to already 
traumatised or vulnerable firefighters. I believe that around the "smoko" table 
would have been a very unsafe environment for Flick to tell his story in any 
great depth. It was vital that he could be heard and acknowledged as to how 
well he had performed under difficult circumstances. I truly believe that the 
firefighters in the unstructured environment around the "smoko table" would 
not have given Flick the time to tell his story and the opportunity to be really 
heard. It affirmed to me an interesting observation I have made, that it is 
imperative to provide a safe and caring environment where participants are 
encouraged to share their experience from their own perspective without 
critique, ridicule or interruption from other participants. 
Flick did discuss how he had felt some discomfort at the presence of some of 
the firefighters in the debriefing, but due to the safe environment he was able 
to share his story. 
"There was definitely one there that I wouldn't have felt 
at ease. Certain things in front of him, but i f  I may say 
that person actually rang me a day afterwards and said 
that he respected what I had said and respected my 
actions, in what I had done at the incident. And though 
I wouldn't see him as my enemy, it is just a person I 
wouldn't have a lot of time for andnow maybe.......'! 
I don't believe Flick would have shared so freely and been heard in an 
informal setting and that this firefighter who subsequently rang him and 
acknowledged his actions may never have been given the opportunity to hear 
Flick's full story of his experience. This must surely be a positive effect of the 
debriefing for Flick. 
A further positive effect of the debriefing for Flick was that he felt stronger 
mentally and better prepared for an operational debriefing which occurred 
sometime after the CISD. However, once again he confused the CISD or 
stress debriefing, with the operational debriefing. While many clinicians refer 
to CISD as a psychological debriefing, I always refer to it as a stress 
debriefing as I feel it is more acceptable term and less threatening and 
intimidating to firefighters. This change of terminology I use in my practice 
resulted from a comment a peer supporter made to me following a debriefing 
when we were debriefing ourselves before leaving the debriefing venue. She 
made the comment that she felt some discomfort around the word 
psychological debriefing and wondered whether there was a more acceptable 
term to use for emergency service personnel. By using the word 
psychological they believe they are going to be psychoanalysed during the 
debriefing. The operational debriefing looks at the operational procedures 
that were followed at the incident and in the past many firefighters have been 
anxious and angry about attending an operational debriefing as they often 
view it as a "witch hunt" to apportion blame on individual firefighters. I had to 
highlight the clear differences between the two debriefings in order to clarify 
what Flick was referring to. He did acknowledge the positive effect for him 
from attending the CISD. 
"l feel probably a little bit stronger mentally for it because what 
has gone on in the past, in the past debriefings (referring 
to the operational debriefing), I am not prepared to put up 
with that. What we went through in that incident, it didn't 
warrant it. Certainly not warranted. 
In the second interview Flick discussed again how participating in the 
debriefing had made hi; a stronger person which could benefit him in future 
incidents. 
"Definitely it makes you a stronger person for it. Maybe the 
same incident again mighf not affect me as badly as this one has". 
He acknowledged that by attending the CISD he felt more able to handle an 
operational debriefing without being significantly traumatised. 
"You don't feel so vulnerable, the reserves knocked down. 
They weren't at the debrief. Things were resolved". 
In concluding a discussion on Flick's unique experience in relation to 
attending a CISD, I believe the most important issue for Flick was that the 
other participants heard his story. Because of this he felt affirmed by positive 
comments made by fellow firefighters both during and following the 
debriefing. I feel sure that his story would not have been heard as effectively 
in an informal process such as over the "smoko" table. He stated on several 
occasions during the three interviews that he was experiencing no negative 
affects from attending the incident, the subsequent CISD or participating in 
the interviews. 
"It's drifting away quite quick. It doesn'f take a talk like this 
to resurface it strongly again. I'm just quite neutral on it now". 
To me this was really affirming of the process of debriefing. Flick's story was 
able to be told and heard in a safe and caring environment where he was 
given the opportunity to not only tell his story and be heard, but also vent 
some of the strong feelings, reactions and emotions that he experienced both 
during and following the incident. 
On further reflection, I noted with interest that Flick's name was not one of 
those that was given to the Peer Support Team by Management who they 
considered at risk of being severely traumatised by the incident and who 
required follow-up by the Team following the incident. I wondered why his 
name was not included in the list? I would have considered him at significant 
risk of being severely traumatised by the incident as his own life was severely 
compromised and he played a significant role in the rescue of other 
firefighters. It is my opinion that he certainly was at risk of suffering from 
critical incident stress. However, Management and those who provided the 
names of personnel who they considered most at risk of significant stress 
were unaware of Flick's story. While Flick received little formal Critical 
Incident Stress Management in the time leading up to the CISD, at least his 
story was able to be heard in the debriefing without interruption. Those 
participating in the debriefing were able to get a true picture of his role in the 
incident. They were able to acknowledge and affirm his role in the saving of 
lives. I believe this played a significant role in his speedy recovery from a 
major critical incident. As a result of this information I asked myself the 
following question - how many other firefighters stories have been left 
unheard in the past? I resolved to consider this further and made moves to 
modify the way that I considered the list of affected personnel in the future. 
9.5 THE STORY OF RED 
#I DIDN'T HAVE ANYONE AT HOME TO TALK 
WITHn 
Red is a firefighter with less experience in comparison with the other 
participants. He is separated from his partner and has several dependent 
children. He was injured during the critical incident and required hospital 
treatment. What was unique to Red's experience of debriefing was that it 
allowed him the time, space and a caring environment in which to share his 
story. At the time he was separated from his partner and shared that he was 
not in a relationship in which he could have sought comfort and a listening 
ear. 
It was shared at the beginning of the interviews that Red had found the 
process of debriefing therapeutic because he was not able to share his 
experience on a deeper level with a close loved one. He began the first 
interview by discussing why he thought the debriefing was important for him. 
"I think really to me if was important for me fo go to the 
debriefing on the incident mainly because of the physical 
nature of what happened to me. I got injured. Also I think 
if was important to me to get into an environment where 
there was a lot of people there that were actually at the 
job. Sort of like everything, they lived it. For me the 
big thing about going and talking about it was because 
I didn't have anyone at home to talk with. That was 
what really sort of hit home, that it was a good thing and 
it was important. I did feel a bit uneasy though to sit 
in a larger group and actually talk about my emotions 
and that, Normally if I am going to do that I will probably 
do a one-on-one, ifs probably not with a guy, it is normally 
with a lady. But because at the moment I don? have a 
lady it was a good environment to be in. So that is why 
I sort of came and why I thought it was good. 
This was Red's first experience of debriefing though he did discuss that he 
had attended debriefings, but these were operational debriefings which, as 
discussed previously, are very different to a CISD. Red had been through a 
period of severe stress in relation to his domestic situation and was already 
traumatised by his family circumstances. As a Nurse Clinician I believe that 
Red was at risk of being severely traumatised by this particular incident 
because of several critical factors. Firstly, because of the existing stresses 
that Red had been exposed to in relation to his distressing domestic 
circumstances prior to the critical incident; secondly he had been injured, 
required hospitalisation and had faced the threat of death; and thirdly this 
incident was considered a major critical incident in which there had been the 
potential for significant loss of firefighters' lives. It was vital that Red receive 
some form of crisis intervention in order to assist him to recover from this 
major critical incident. He had pre-existing stressors that had the potential to 
lead to cumulative stress which could have caused Red to suffer from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, if assistance had not been made available to 
support him. 
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7 think in a way I have handled things quite well recently 
in the past. But because the added emotions of what 
has gone down in my life it was good to have another, 
another place to talk. 
He did discuss how, in the past he found it difficult sharing in a large group 
situation. However, once he felt safe, due to the format or structure that was 
provided in the debriefing, which is referred to as the seven stages of 
debriefing, he felt more able to share. 
"I am not actually a good sort of like speaker in front of a lot 
of people. I can speak to a few people, but not too many. 
I am not a good public speaker and also to speak of such 
quite emotional type things in an environment like that, it 
is quite hard. 
He found the process where the participants were asked to state who they 
were, what was their role in the incident and what happened from their 
perspective, where it was structured and the participants were aware of what 
was required of them in the debriefing, as helpful to him personally. 
"I suppose it gave me a format on which to say who I am and 
then sort of what actually happened. And a bit more about 
your feelings to the whole subject. Actually it was good and 
you need, and to me you needed to have sort of like a 
simple guideline in which to follow and that's exactly what it 
did and it was great. Really great. If you had said okay anyone 
in the room stand up and just talk, hell it would have been terrible7'. 
He further affirmed the benefit of the debriefing for him personally by 
discussing the need to ventilate his feelings as he had no one at home to 
share these feelings with. 
"As I said before I have not got anyone at home to go through, 
it was good fo get a few things off my chest. It was definitely 
a way of getting things off my chest and to realise that there 
were other people in the room that would probably, have the 
same sort of feelings as me.. ...". 
If Red had not been given the opportunity to discuss his experience with 
those who had been exposed to the same incident, there was the potential 
for him to suffer significant unresolved stress. By speaking out in front of his 
fellow firefighters who attended the incident and debriefing, he was able to 
share his feelings, thoughts and emotions. Remember this was the first time 
Red had shared so personally within in a group situation. Usually he felt 
more comfortable with a female partner. 
"To me its really just the, having the ability to speak out in 
front of people. Okay. Which I probably wouldn't normally. 
It would be just like a one-on-one. Now 1 think I probably, 
just by doing that, I would bottle it up more. Whereas by 
speaking out in front of a pile of people, it did really get if 
off my chest and otherwise what I think I would do, I would 
just live with it and it wouldn't really affect me too well. 
By getting it off my chest it sort of made me deal with it, 
even though I probably don't want to deal with if". 
He acknowledged how he had experienced unpleasant feelings following the 
incident and that if he had not been given the opportunity to discuss the 
incident his current stresses could have been exacerbated. 
"And I think it has given me, it has forced me to actually, to 
have a few of the bad feelings I have had in the past week 
or two. So unless you get it off your chest, you are going 
to carry that baggage around and I don't want to and I have 
enough on my plate at the moment. With relationship 
problems. To start piling more on it, and I want to be.. .. 
and when I am at a fire, at work, I want to be a good fireman. 
I don't want to carry stuff around that I don't need to". 
As Red's family had been recently divided, he found the debriefing made him 
feel like part of another family and he valued the team concept. 
"I suppose one of the other things that it does, is that it 
makes you realise that you are part of a big network 
and a big team. It does give you, it reassures you 
that what you do, is a goodjob.. And you think I do 
this by myself, a total individual, but you're not, you are 
a link in the chain. And it makes you feel good. 
Especially at the moment. Being part of the family': 
Red acknowledged how the debriefing had been positive for him personally. 
"To me the debriefing was positive. I can't think of 
anything that shouldn't have been said or was downright 
bad. It was cool, it really was': 
I believe that in the past firefighters have taken home some of the stresses 
associated with their attendance at critical incidents and their families have 
suffered the consequences of these unresolved stresses attached to the 
incident. Red stated how his participation in the debriefing had not only 
assisted him but also his family. 
"To me it's to get it off your chest. You can't bottle it up 
and as I have said before not having anyone at home with 
me now to discuss it with, it was great. I could talk to someone 
and feel being listened. And when it comes to like my family, 
it meant that I didn't have, because I have personal problems, 
familywise anyway, it was better to be able to concentrate when 
I see my children and laugh, carry on, have fun with my kids, 
than bring it up. It was better familywise for me to concentrate 
on things that were important to my children than for them fo 
see their Dad hungup on a bit of emotional stufi: trying to 
deal with it. They can't understand it. So it was better that 
the debriefing helped me out there". 
Red discussed how he would encourage others to attend a debriefing and 
because of the high divorce rate in the Fire Service, there were other 
firefighters who were in a similar situation to himself, without anyone to share 
the stress of the incident. 
"I would definitely encourage people and I don't want to get 
back to this, but especially people in my circumstances, where 
they have got like some emotional load at the moment and 
don't have anyone to come home to and cuddle up to and 
talk about.. . . . . Sure I was lucky. When I was lying there 
underneath all the rubble burning, I visualised my funeral, 
okay.. ... and as we know firefighters have one of the worst 
divorce rates in New Zealand so a lot of the time guys are 
between relationships or have just been coming out of one 
or into anther one. Yeah it is important". 
Towards the end of the interview, I asked Red whether there'was anything 
else he would like to add in regard to his experience of debriefing. He 
answered: 
7t has actually helped me to deal with my relationship 
better because even talking about that and not dwelling 
on, because of my partner running off and just talking to 
someone, it was great". 
As with all the other participants, I wanted to be reassured that they had not 
suffered any negative effects from their participation in the interviews. Red, 
like the other three participants, discussed how therapeutic it had been for 
him. 
"I seem to sort of think.. . . . . in a way it's like a . . ... sort of like 
a counselling session again and you actually, if's a way to sort 
of like finalise it.. . . . . and you know, put it out of your mind and 
away you go sort of thing.. ... carry on. I am actually starting to 
feel so much more at peace with everyfhing okay.. .. There's 
a lot going on in my private life.. ..but I feel so much at peace 
and work-wise really good. 
While reflecting on the participants' comments when reporting the research 
interviews as being very therapeutic, I began to question myself about the 
debriefed firefighters requiring more assistance following the debriefing? 
Should they be followed-up individually several days after the debriefing 
irrespective of whether we believed they require it or not? Since conducting 
the interviews, I now ensure that all the debriefed participants are followed-up 
by telephone contact within 24 - 48 hours following the debriefing to ensure 
that they require no further assistance. This follow-up telephone call is 
always made with the consent of the debriefed firefighters, which is sought at 
the conclusion of the debriefing. I have found their response to the follow-up 
telephone call as being very positive. I believe this further enables the 
channels of communication, support and assistance to be kept open. This is 
particularly pertinent for those who are still suffering the negative stress 
effects but are reluctant to seek individual assistance or those firefighters like 
Red, who have no immediate close social support at home. 
As the interviews progressed it became clearer and clearer that the main 
theme for Red was that "I didn't have anyone at home to talk with" and 
that the debriefing was positive for him, particularly in relation to his present 
family circumstances. Once he felt safe and reassured with the process that 
was to be followed during the debriefing, he felt more able to share his 
significant story of his personal situation at the critical incident. He was 
amazed at how comfortable and confident he became with the telling of his 
story to the group. He stated on several occasions that he had always felt 
some discomfort in speaking to a larger group. I believed that the formal 
process of debriefing, particularly where time is spent on the introductory 
phase in relation to confidentiality, speaking for oneself, explaining that it is a 
stress debriefing and not an operational debriefing, all assisted Red to feel 
safe, confident and competent to share with the other participants. 
9.6 CONCLUSION. 
In this chapter I have discussed the unique themes that were highlighted in 
the interviews that were held with the three participants, instantenaous, Flick 
and Red. While they all attended the same incident and subsequent 
debriefing, each had a particularly unique theme that was paramount to their 
experience of debriefing. Instantaneous had this strong desire to "talk about 
my guilty feelings", Flick found that "they heard my story" and Red 
"didn't have anyone at home to talk with". 
On reflection I believe these themes were all very pertinent, particularly in 
relation to the need to share one's guilt when a firefighter believed his crew 
had all died in the incident. Firefighters work as a team and they have this 
strong sense of looking after their crew. If a crew member or members 
safety is threatened or lives are lost, there is a strong sense of guilt related to 
these circumstances even though the cause may have been beyond the 
surviving firefighter or firefighters control. The second theme relates to 
having one's story heard. I believe that for some firefighters their stories are 
not heard. Often the more dominant and coRtrolling firefighters tend to tell 
their stories and be heard, particularly in the informal environment, whereas 
the less dominate firefighter often is given little space and respect in which to 
do so. This is all part of the culture of the Fire Service in relation to the 
"macho" image where the bigger and better you tell your story with the 
loudest voice, the more you will be heard. I believe this image is slowly 
changing and firefighters are beginning to challenge these individuals who 
dominate the group. The third theme relates to a firefighter having no one at 
home to share his experience. As previously discussed, the relationship 
breakup in the New Zealand Fire Service is particularly high and many 
firefighters are in similar circumstances to Red. The debriefing is a ClSM 
strategy that has been highlighted by Red as being particularly valuable in 
which to assist those firefighters who are not able to share their experiences 
with a close partner. 
In the following chapter I will discuss the overriding pattern and dominant 
themes that emerged during the analysis of the data in relation to the series 
of three interviews with Fit, Instantaneous, Red and Flick. 
0 . 1  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will illuminate the overall pattern and the eight major themes 
that were uncovered during my journey with the four participants, Fit, Flick, 
Instantaneous and Red. I will begin with a discussion on the overall pattern, 
that of the formalised process and follow this up with a discussion on the 
eight major themes which I have named safe environment, ventilating the 
stress reaction, similar feelings, getting the whole picture, peer 
support, bonding, respect and resolution. By highlighting and 
understanding the main pattern that was illuminated in the texts, a more 
indepth discussion can be woven into the themes that were discovered and 
the true meaning of the participants experience of debriefing will be made 
visible. 
The process of uncovering or illuminating the complexities of the participants 
world in relation to the experience of ClSD was a very humbling experience. 
I felt honoured and privileged that the four participants were happy to share 
their experience of debriefing when there was always the potential to cause 
further pain and suffering attached to the recent critical incident and 
subsequent CISD. However, I was really encouraged when participants 
discussed how they had found the interview process therapeutic and even 
stated that they enjoyed their journey with me into the world of research. 
Analysis of the narratives showed several striking similarities that stood out in 
the data. A careful study of the individuals' narratives elicited the uncovering 
of the experience of ClSD and the meanings they attached to the experience. 
One main overriding pattern became obvious as I journeyed in gaining a 
greater depth of understanding of the interview texts. The formalised, 
structured process of the debriefing became the overriding pattern that I 
believe assisted the participants share their experience of the critical incident. 
From this pattern, which I have named formalised process, eight major 
themes were illuminated. Overall, the participants highlighted the positive 
benefits of ClSD on themselves, the organisation, and the positive benefits of 
the formalised process that was followed throughout the debriefing. I will 
also highlight some of the negative comments that were stated in relation to 
the CISD which requires consideration, particularly for my own and others 
future practice. 
10.2 FORMALISED PROCESS 
The process of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing provides a framework 
where there is a clear beginning and a clear ending and where participants 
are informed at the beginning in the introductory phase where the process 
will lead them during the debriefing. Clear guidelines are established at the 
beginning of the debriefing so that the participants feel a sense of confidence 
that their story will be heard without interruption or ridicule, that they will not 
be psychoanalysed, or participate in psychotherapy. By following and 
participating in the process they will be able to have a clearer picture of what 
happened at the incident from all the participants perspective and be able to 
find some meaning or "silver liningn in the critical incident. The formalised 
process is completed in the re-entry phase where the participants are asked 
if they have any questions or concerns. Any ambiguities are addressed and 
the incident and the effects are summarised. This last phase of debriefing 
puts closure on the discussions that have occurred during the CISD. 
I highlighted in Chapter 4 the common profile of the personality traits of 
firefighters. One of these common traits is that of being in control of the 
situation. On reflection from my readings and research findings, I now 
believe that the process of debriefing is particularly applicable to utilise with 
firefighters because of their need to maintain a sense of control. Following 
attendance at a critical incident, firefighters may suffer from Critical lncident 
Stress and may begin to feel a sense of loss of control. To place these 
individuals in an uncontrolled environment could further exacerbate these 
feelings which has the potential to cause serious long-term harm. Because 
of the formalised and structured process that debriefing follows, the 
firefighters are less likely to feel disempowered, out of control and more 
psychologically receptive to the process of debriefing. 
It is important that the providers of ClSD are not over-zealous with their 
intervention, which may further aggravate the firefighters feeling of being out 
of control. By acknowledging that each and every person has been affected 
differently, though there are similarities and that these effects are normal in 
normal individuals to an abnormal event, this empowers the participants to 
maintain a sense of control. 
The research participants discussed the process whereby they felt a sense of 
"knowing" what was to happen which engendered in them a feeling of safety 
to share their experience. Several participants used the word control. 1 
personally feel some discomfort with the word control as I view it as a very 
disempowering word. However, it is a word which is important to firefighters. 
I prefer to use the word caring, as by providing the controlled, formalised, 
structured process there is a sense of true caring where everyone is 
respected and valued for their contribution, not only in the debriefing but also 
in the critical incident. This enables the participants to share their experience 
in safety. 
Fit "The process, the more serious, it was talked about having 
it around the situation of debriefing. .... the more serious the 
incident gets, the more control I believe in now. The result being 
the debrief needs to be in that controlled situation with the Critical 
Incident Stress Team". 
Fit "The results that came back were tremendous, of being able 
to do that in a controlled situation because we all listened to 
each others story without interjection which 1 think we wouldn't 
get over a cup of tea and that's, that's why it was excellent, 
We were each able to tell our story, how emotional each got 
telling our story was varied, and there was no interruption 
which could have put someone out. I am sure it could have 
put myself off as I was the most emotional at the time I 
think fhat could have put me off if someone had interjected 
and put me off my stride where 1 was going. I have got 
great admiration for having that done in a controlled 
environment". 
Fit discussed how, without the process, his credibility could have been further 
undermined which may have resulted in him exiting from the Fire Service. 
The debriefing had a positive effect on him personally, his family and also the 
Fire Service, who may have lost an experienced and well respected 
firefighter. 
Fit "I believe without fhat control I may not even be in the 
Fire Service today. I could have lost the trust of all my 
crew, the other crew members on the Station, because I 
may not have been able to tell my story effectively. Under 
the controlled situation I thought 1 could do that.. . . . .to relay 
relay my fears and my stress problems at the time. So it 
was, it wasn't easy to do in a team because I was so 
emotional but I certainly couldn't have done it if someone 
had said the wrong thing or just around the cup of coffee 
and the interjections that generally do come out of an 
uncontrolled situation': 
A further participant discussed how everyone had the opportunity to ventilate 
and that the more powerful firefighters were not able to dominate in the 
formalised process that was followed. 
Red "It just means that everyone has their say. Everyone 
gets things off their chest, and they've got to do that same sort 
of like.. ..hi, I'm so and so from watch station, this is what I saw, 
this is what I felt.. ..okay it was good. Because I've done quite 
a lot of debriefings (operational) and while I know quite a few and 
I know some of the powerful people.. ..yeah.. ..sometimes can be 
quite destructive. I mean they don't mean maybe consciously, 
don't mean to be but.. just makes the rest of them sort of shut up 
a little bit': 
"I don't think they looked at me and said bloody idiot you shouldn't 
been where you were. Or anything like that which is really good. 
It gave me confidence to speak my mind. I didn't have to 
speak as a macho firefighter. I could say my true feelings and 
not be scared of it". 
Red, like several other participants, felt protected by the formalised process 
that was followed and with that protection he felt safe to share his own 
experience in relation to the incident. 
Red 7 think they feel quite protected, especially seeing there's 
sort of like the golden rules that no-one sort of, you know, let's 
out any information about anyone.. .. Then the confidence is 
there. It felt safe. And I think also people looked upon me 
without any criticism when you sat there talking. Everyone 
had something slightly different to say even though everyone 
had seen virtually the same sort of thing. But no one judges, 
no one sort of says you should, or you made a mess of that 
or you shouldn't been there". 
Red discussed how humour was present in the debriefing, which he found 
helpful in what he termed "it breaks the old ice". While critical incidents 
cause significant pain and suffering to the primary, secondary and tertiary 
victims from their differing involvement in the incident, it is important to 
always find something lighthearted in order to assist in making some sense 
of the incident. It is well recognised in the emergency services field that the 
use of "black humour" or the other commonly used term, "sick humour", by 
personnel following their exposure to critical incidents is common. It is 
understood as a natural way of personnel coping with the incident 
immediately following their exposure. However, when this sick humour 
persists I would question how well the individualls were coping with the 
incident. 
Red "I like the lightheatfed side of things too. Okay, and if there 
is a bit of humour, I think if is really good and it breaks the old ice, 
and you know a few things were said and they didn'f mean it like 
that. It was the more lightheatfed it is, I think the more people sort 
of relaxed and shared more. Good to have the humour, and as 
we know from debriefs after a bad motor accident or all that sort 
of stuff, there is some pretty sicko corny kind of jokes that come 
out and things like that. It is not a good thing. 1 think a little bit 
of humour in it just relaxes people. Yeah it just sort of relaxed 
people a bit more. And I think in a situation like that they need 
to be, they need whatever needs to relax. Have coffee, have 
a bit of a laugh at times, is quite good". 
Flick felt a sense of freedom to share his experience of the incident. The 
formalised process was important to him, as this was the first ClSD he had 
ever attended. He liked the quiet, calm environment that was established at 
the outset. 
Flick "This is in a low key sod of environment, and it's.. ... 
that is the way it is. It's no high-rise building, laying on 
a couch or anything like that.. ..it's low key'! 
"I had the complete freedom to say what, when and how I 
felt and people were listening without any outside influences 
whatsoever". 
"Well being the first Critical Stress Debriefing I've been to, you 
don? know really what to expect and it's basically knowing 
the procedure, why things are done and having things 
explained to you, the way you're feeling, that's the benefit. 
And the positive thing that I think that's really.. ... enlightening 
you on what's happening.. ..rather than once you're in the 
dark you get up to all sods of things and your mind plays 
funny things on you because you just don't know". 
Generally the participants preferred the formalised process where everyone 
was given the opportunity to share their experience. Not just the dominant 
and controlling firefighters were heard, but all those attending were given the 
space to share also. 
Instantaneous "Just the way the meeting was run, each person 
had their turn to tell their story. No one interrupted them. If was 
just a caring meeting really. I listened to everyone else for the 
other side which was good. 
"That's good actually to say your story without someone saying 
no that wasn't it. It was like this. Because that is usually 
what happens.. ... not so much ridicule but that when you're 
trying to tell a story around the "smoke" table you say I did this, 
no you didn't, no you didn't, that was me, or people will butt in 
and say something else was happening. But there, because you 
could tell your story, it was your story, from your perspective. Other 
people might have seen your story from a diverent perspective but 
they allowed you to tell it from your perspective which was good. 
The above examples of the participants' narratives in relation to their 
experience of CISD, highlight how following the formalised, structured and 
caring process enabled them to feel a sense of maintaining control. 
Firefighters also follow a formalised set of standard operating procedures that 
are required to be followed at all incidents. The facilitator in the introductory 
phase of a ClSD clearly outlines where, how and what direction the 
debriefing will proceed, which is akin to following a set of procedures. With 
these clearly stated guidelines, the participants are empowered and 
encouraged to share their experience without fear of interruption or ridicule. 
It is clear from my intensive readings of their stories and interpretation of the 
narratives, that the predominant and overriding pattern was that of the 
formalised process. From this predominant pattern emerged eight major 
themes which I will discuss as the dominant themes. 
10.3 DOMINANT THEMES 
The participants all discussed the ClSD process as being a very positive 
experience. However, several participants did discuss their anxiety and fear 
in relation to their attending the debriefing prior to the intervention. For those 
who expressed this concern, it became evident through the interviews that 
they had not attended a pre-incident education session which would have 
allowed them the opportunity to understand the process with more clarity and 
hopefully less fear. Nevertheless, overall they positively expressed the 
benefits they received from their attendance at the debriefing. In their 
discussion I uncovered eight major themes, safe environment, ventilating 
the stress reaction, similar feelings, getting the whole picture, peer 
support, bonding, respect and resolution. I will now discuss in some 
depth with examples from the narratives to illuminate each theme. 
10.3.1 SAFE ENVIRONMENT 
In my experience it is important to provide a safe and caring environment that 
should be established at the outset of the debriefing. By creating a safe and 
nurturing environment, it enhances the debriefed participants capacity to 
share openly and honestly. In most instances the debriefing is carried out at 
the Fire Station, which is familiar and safe for the participants. The 
debriefings that the participants in this research attended were all held at Fire 
Stations. The respective Communications Centres had been advised to take 
the particular fire appliances off the run so as not to interrupt the process of 
the debriefing, which could be detrimental to the effect of the debriefing. All 
pagers and cellphones were turned off and no incoming telephone calls were 
answered. The participants were made to feel that this was their time to 
share their experience of the incident in relation to what happened for them. 
Several firefighters discussed how they had found the environment safe and 
conducive to sharing. 
Fit "We had an environment which was set up nicely. 'we  had 
an expansive room, we weren't crowded. It was an operational 
day. I took the truck off the run so we wouldn't go anywhere. 
We weren't going to be interrupted and it was on Stafion. There 
is no negatives. I felt comfortable maybe because 1 was at work 
and debriefing with the team I work with, so we were in our own 
environment. I was in my own environment, made me feel at ease". 
Red "I think definitely it was good. Actually I relate quite well 
to the Fire Station. To me it was good. The whole environment 
and to sit somewhere comfortable, being quite secure without 
people listening in or leaning through windows somewhere and 
having a talk out in the open. Everyone was very courteous 
and didn't interrupt". 
Because of the safe environment that was provided, the research participants 
felt more able to share their story and I believe be heard which often does not 
happen in many other environments. Some firefighters referred to some of 
the participants dropping their guard, which is not done easily by some 
firefighters and that they were surprised at this effect in those they least 
expected. 
Instantaneous "Well I think we were all in the same boat. We 
were all dropping the guard to a cerfain extent. Well, we were 
in a safe environment and as I say, we trust you. It was a good 
environment. My boss, I have never seen him drop his guard 
before. He was very scared at the incident. He thought he 
had lost his crew and he actually opened up at that meeting. 
I was surprised. He talked about the fact that he felt like he 
was loosing it during the rescue. He was looking around and 
nobody else seemed to be loosing it. And he wondered if they 
could see him loosing it. I felt it was quite a big fhing for him to 
admit that sort of thing. He felt secure'! 
Firefighters, due to their training and the need to maintain a sense of control 
keep their ."guardsn or surround themselves in their macho "shields". 
However, during the debriefing the participants did drop their guards 
somewhat. This could be related to a sense of feeling safe to share in the 
particular environment that was provided. 
lnstantaneous "Being professionals I think the guards didn't 
come right down, but it came down as much as ever I've seen 
with a lot of those guys, and I think it was good because I think 
if guys can say how they feel you tend to respect them more. 
Particularly my boss. He's quite a good Fire Officer but he's 
got limitations but he'll never under normal circumstances 
admit he'd got any limitations. But he did there. He actually 
stood up and he said he felt that at one stage he was loosing 
,I it , . . . . . . . 
From Instantaneous's comments it would appear that the safe environment 
that was established allowed this particular Officer to feel safe to share 
indepth some of his own vulnerability in relation to his own reaction, which 
under normal circumstances he would never have revealed. With his sharing 
he gained respect from his crew member. 
10.3.2 VENTILATING THE STRESS REACTION 
It has long been recognised that venting, catharsis, or expressing the stress 
reaction is an effective way of coping with a stressful event (Pennebaker, 
1985). It is helpful to talk about an incident, to express feelings and to reveal 
what is on one's mind, akin to talking about something significant in one's life, 
which is causing or has the potential to cause significant stress. This is 
commonly referred to as "getting it off one's chest". The more stressful the 
incident, the more important it is to discuss the incident from one's own 
perspective. 
Throughout the interviews it became obvious that the participants found it 
particularly useful to ventilate their own personal thoughts, feelings and 
reactions, to assist in reducing the stress effects and a resolution of the 
trauma attached to the incident. 
Instantaneous "Yeah, it assisted me in talking out my perspective 
and also hearing other peoples . . .. . ... How they, what they did. 
Also it had helped to hear everyone of them had handled 
themselves well. Because it got it out of my system. For me, 
for me it was like a release of emotions, I suppose. Once if was 
out it was over. But it had to come out. When I let out the emotions 
I felt a sense of relief. A release if you like". 
"No, I thought it was a very good experience, and for me it brought 
a final lid on the incident. Although I will probably talk about it 
for the next 20 years, emotionally it is finished with". 
Red "It was definitely a way of getting things off my chest 
and to realise that there were other people in the room 
that were probably having the same sort of feelings as 
me.. . . . . . . . Now I think probably by doing that, I would bottle 
it up more.. .. whereas by speaking out in front of a pile of 
people did really get if off my chest and otherwise what I 
think I would do, I would just live with it and it wouldn't 
really affect me too well. By getting it off my chest it sort 
of made me deal with it, even though I probably don't want 
to deal with it. And I think it has given me, it has forced 
me to actually, to have a few of the bad feelings I have 
had in the past week or two. So unless you get it off 
your chest you are going to carry that baggage around 
and I don't want to and I have enough on my plate at the 
moment. It sort of got it off my chest. It needed to be 
said. I have never said it to so many people. It was the way 
I was feeling. I was feeling relieved. That was the biggest 
thing I felt, the relief. Yeah I think it just sort of like cleared a 
lot of things for me in my mind': 
The debriefing process enabled participants to have their say in terms of 
what happened for them, their thoughts, feelings and reactions and to hear 
other firefighters share their experience. They repeatedly used the term "get 
if off my chest" and that if they had not had the opportunity of catharsis they 
may have never resolved some of the stressful issues around the incident. 
One participant referred to several of his crew members and the effect of 
allowing them to ventilate in relation to their own experience. Several of 
these firefighters were not known for expressing their emotions openly so it 
came as a surprise when they did share, though the sharing was mostly 
factual, but it obviously had a positive effect for a particular firefighter. 
Instantaneous "I know one guy who was quite shocked. 
Quite frightened and he said this job isn't worth the money 
they're paying us or it's not worth any money to lose 
your life.. .. .and he was going to go out right away and 
look for anotherjob, but after the debrief he quietened 
down. He's the same old guy. He is cartying on as long 
as he can go. It's quietened him down a bit and got 
things into perspective. 
-203- 
"The one guy.. .. . he was really cut up afterwards. He was 
buried in rubble and extracted himself. And afterwards he 
was shaken, really shocked. Even when he came back to 
work the next shift, he was still talking about leaving the Fire 
Service. Probably the one who was the most reluctant to let 
his emotions go deeply, but I still think by actually talking with 
everybody else and saying what he did, it has helped. He 
is quite relaxed now". 
'Xnd then talking about it afterwards help that sharing of 
emotion. I know he was reluctant to share too much emotion 
and stayed fairly factual.. . . . . but even for him that was quite a 
long speech and quite a lot of detail and I think its helped him. 
I'm pretty close to the guy and I know him fairly well and I think 
it's helped him and after the debrief he has never mentioned 
giving the job up or giving it away, He is content with what 
he is doing". 
I have found that those who are particularly resistant to share in an open 
forum do begin to feel safe to share their own experience once they begin to 
feel confident with the process. In previous debriefings 1 have witnessed 
firefighters resistance to share by their tense body language and their 
suspicious facial expressions. However, during the introductory phase a 
caring and safe environment is established with the group where all the 
participants in the debriefing begin to feel a sense of trust, rapport and 
respect The introductory phase provides a structure for the CISD, clearly 
defines the boundaries, builds trust and decreases the anxiety which most of 
the participants have when entering the debriefing. 
Flick "I think the guys were a little bit more honest with 
themselves and everyone else there expressed their feelings. 
Depending on what they wanted to say because there is still 
reserve, a lot". 
-204- 
However, I believe in reality there will always be a certain amount of reserve 
in the firefighters sharing. This is in part related to society's expectations of 
them as emergency service personnel, the image that has to be portrayed, 
their personality type of being in control and of course the culture of the Fire 
Service. 
10.3.3 SIMILAR FEELINGS 
When the firefighters vented their own personal feelings, thoughts and 
reactions they realised that they were not alone in the stressful effects they 
were experiencing. 
Flick "Have a little bit of insight. It is good to know that the 
feelings the other guys were feeling are your feelings foo. 
No one will say anything about them. But now with the 
debriefing you have got others' stories.. .. After hearing 
everyone's version of what had happened, and the near 
death situation of some of their colleagues had been in, 
I think they were quite astounded on what had actually 
happened. They were probably going on their own, of what 
they were told. But when they actually hear from the persons 
it is a little bit different". 
"l think you can look at people a little bit different in the respect 
that you.. .. before they were just work colleagues you know, and 
as 1 say that shield was always there, but it doesn't matter what 
they're saying, their thoughts are basically what you're saying and 
I'm saying you know, they're not much diflerenf than anyone else". 
7 think it was quite sombre. Everyone was, you know, it was quite 
a horrific sort of incident and I think people had their reactions the 
way that you had them, so they weren't much different than you". 
As the participants shared their own experiences, firefighters began to 
acknowledge that they were experiencing similar feelings, thoughts and 
reactions, and therefore felt more comfortable to share in the same way as 
others had shared in the debriefing. 
Flick "The thing that's good to know is that the other people 
are feeling the same way. And that I think is a major thing. 
It's. ...yo u get someone here who mouths off about you 
know.. . . . . they're alright and that and then you think well maybe 
there's something wrong with me or not, buf no everyone's 
the same". 
Fit "Others had the same stress levels too. But firemen 
being firemen, they would try to hide those sorts of things 
right to the last minute, I think. And a lot of people won't 
talk about things, about being stressed otherwise.. . . . . . . .. 
I felt as though I was them when they were saying what I 
knew". 
This last comment highlights once again the reserve of firefighters in sharing 
some of their personal pain and suffering in relation to their exposure to 
critical incidents, but when they begin hearing the similar feelings of their 
peers they begin to feel more comfortable in sharing their own reactions. 
10.3.4 GETTING THE WHOLE PICTURE 
A further significant theme identified was that by each of the debriefed 
participants sharing their own perspective, all of the participants were able to 
get the whole picture or perspective of the incident. An analogy I use in my 
teaching of this process is that this is akin to all the participants putting their 
own pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together. By each person piecing together 
the parts, together they create the full jigsaw puzzle so that all are able to get 
an overview of the whole incident. 
Flick "To me personally, it brought it right back to the incident. 
Clearer, straight in front of me again. And hearing the other 
firefighters versions of it, put a better picture and I knew 
where I fitted in, in that particular incident. It was quite 
good in that respect': 
"I had crews, firefighters who didn't realise my situation. I 
didn't know their situation. I know what went on in my litfle 
sector of the world, where we were sort of understanding 
what happened, the overall picture, all I could see. Basically 
now I understand their perspective of what was going on". 
"To hear other persons' versions of it, was the main thing that 
helped me. It is all put into perspective. To hear the process, 
yes, that assisted me to understand others. I could slof it into, 
not where you wanted it to be, but where it was, where you were at". 
There was an appreciation by the debriefed participants that others had a 
different part of the puzzle which they were able to piece together and put the 
whole puzzle together. This was an important part of the debriefing in order 
to have a real sense of what happened at the incident. 
Red "Because even when talking about fhe critical incident 
stress type things it is hard to know, sort of relive it, work out 
your feelings of what's going down, until you knew the picture 
because I only had my small section of the jigsaw". 
"Well that's what I sort of mentioned last time as part of,. . 
you know, puts the jigsaw together. And it's good to hear the 
physical jigsaw and bringing up the emotional side of things 
as well. It's all good for the morale is what it's all about". 
Flick "The picture was made up. We had the picture and we 
could talk about the picture and that what communication 
my group, I think we talked about the whole picfure, that's 
everyone's story and that was very important that everyone 
saw the picture now and notjust their part of it': 
"I think that is quite important. Because every member that 
was there with you is debriefed, even though we were in 
different areas because he didn't know what I was doing and 
I didn't know what he was doing....". 
Often the firefighters, through their own informal debriefing around the 
"smoko" table, believe they have a good understanding or the full picture of 
what happened at the incident. However, I believe that in the main they are 
not able to gain a full picture of the incident as well as what can be elicited at 
a CISD. The following comment highlights my belief. 
Instantaneous "It is quite interesting as we went around the 
room talking l assumed they had parts of the jigsaw which I 
guessed they had an understanding. I found that a particular 
guy I mentioned to you turned out very well. I hadn't expected 
that". 
"After the . . ... I was remote from the action and l wanted to be 
there.. .trying to help rescue the guys. So I felt a little bit out of 
if and I didn't quite know what had gone on. And then I heard 
some of their stories. In the debrief I learnt who'd done what 
and who'd done well and I think everybody really did well". 
Fit "Yes, if everyone can end up seeing the whole picture it 
makes life so much easier and you don'f get idle chat about 
what has gone on and misinformation which can lead to 
problems. So if everyone who is involved can sit together 
and end up seeing the big overall picture i f  has got to be good 
for you". 
By putting the jigsaw puzzle together, the firefighters were able to gain a 
clearer understanding of what really happened at the incident, not just from 
their own individual perspective but from all those that attended the incident. 
As a CISD is not an operational debriefing, which is a critique of the incident 
from an operational perspective, it is my view that given the right environment 
and process, the firefighters feel more able to share their own pieces of the 
jigsaw puzzle. They are more open to seeing other parts of the puzzle from 
the other participants perspective. The benefits of seeing the whole picture 
was highlighted from some of the comments in relation to the correct 
information being made available, not the misinformation or rumour that is 
well recognised as being widespread in the Fire Service. This is particularly 
applicable following major incidents. With these rumours comes much finger 
pointing and blaming, without the opportunity for those involved presenting 
their side of the story. 
The operational debriefing, which is a critique of the operating procedures 
and an opportunity to inform personnel on the details relevant to the incident, 
usually occurs 1 - 7 days following the incident. In most instances the 
operational debriefing usually follows a CISD. It is my belief, that due to the 
positive effects of the debriefing, it assists the firefighters to cope with the 
anxiety and stresses that they often experience when participating in a 
operational debriefing. As previously stated, there is always the fear of the 
apportioning of blame or even ridicule associated with their performance at 
the incident. 
10.3.5 PEER SUPPORT 
It is well recognised in the literature that peer support personnel who are part 
of a ClSM Peer Support Team, provide a valuable service in mitigating the 
harmful effects of Critical Incident Stress. In the early 1980s when the ClSM 
concept was in its infancy there was a general mistrust, especially amongst 
mental health professionals, that peer support personnel had the potential to 
do more harm to those they were assisting and the organisation as a whole 
(Mitchell & Everly, 1995). This fear was based on the belief that there was 
the potential for the peer supporters to work outside clearly established 
guidelines and act as mini-counsellors. However, this fear is unfounded. 
With the appropriate and professional initial basic training and ongoing 
training, supported with clinical supervision and expertise, Peer Supporters 
provide an extremely valuable service in assisting their fellow-firefighters to 
cope with the negative impact of attending distressing and traumatic 
incidents. 
During my years of practice I have witnessed the obvious benefits a Peer 
Supporter offers his peers, especially in understanding the true impact of 
attending critical incidents. I refer to this as having walked a mile in the 
shoes of those they are assisting and are therefore more able to empathise 
than other non-firefighters. I have seen how participants in a debriefing have 
felt unsure about their firefighting ability and the Peer Supporters have 
validated their ability by what has been referred to by several participants in 
the study as being "lifted up by him". As an example, one of the research 
participants discussed how the Peer Supporter acknowledged the 
seriousness of the incident, the firefighting skills that were required and how 
well the debriefed participantls had managed under extreme conditions. It is 
a powerful process to witness as one watches the confidence flow back into 
the previously unconfident and disempowered firefighteris, who prior to the 
debriefing, has been doubting their firefighting ability and were even 
considering exiting the job. 
In Chapter 9 where I discussed the unique themes for each individual 
participant, I discussed how Fit felt particularly empowered by the Peer 
Supporter in the debriefing that he attended. He found that by having a 
fellow firefighter who had a good understanding of the operational side of 
firefighting and the culture of the Service, this assisted him in recovering and 
regaining his confidence which was severely compromised following the 
critical incident. 
Fit "Having a peer member there as well proved to be extremely 
beneficial. I was fairly worried about that to start with but I would 
recommend it to anybody if they had that same situation. Have 
a peer there as well". 
Several participants discussed the benefits of having a Peer Supporter 
present during the debriefing and their contribution to the process. 
Flick "His feelings, his understanding of the culture of the place, 
how it worked, what we were going through. They could 
appreciate exactly that. His presence. I like to talk about it 
once I have said it. It was good. 
Instantaneous "Because we respect him for his Fire Service 
role. A couple of times we got off track, he was able to suggest 
we get back onto what we actually did. No, I thought it was 
really good. It worked, it worked really well. He wasn't 
intrusive or forcing us back onto track". 
The research participants appreciated the value of having a person who 
understood what the debriefed participants were saying. They were able to 
easily relate to the Peer Supporter and established a trusting rapport with this 
person in the early stages of the debriefing, which I believe is vital to the 
success of the debriefing. While I personally have a good understanding of 
the culture of the Fire Service and have some understanding of the 
operational side, the Peer Supporter's understanding of the operational side 
of firefighting far exceeds that of myself or others outside the organisation. It 
is because of this aspect that I believe the Peer Supporter, with the 
necessary training and personal qualities (such as respect by fellow 
firefighters and good listening skills) and who understands and may have 
experienced Critical Incident Stress personally, plays such a pivotal role in 
the success of the debriefing. 
Red "Yes, so he can relate. And I think it is important to have 
someone like that.. ... but I think definitely you need to have some 
Fire Service personnel. Even though they weren't there 
(the critical incident), it was good". 
"Well to me really, you actually realise that these guys are the 
same as you and have been through the same things as you 
have.. ..experienced what you've experienced.. .and they are 
your friends.. .and there is a confident thing that you can.. .. 
feel comfortable and they can relate. They know what 
you're talking about. They know, they've been there. 
The people who have seen a bit of work have felt and 
experienced and so it's quite easy to be open to those 
people and not feel too judged by it". 
From my experience I believe that without belonging to the culture, having a 
comprehensive understanding of the culture and the operational aspect of 
firefighting, mental health professionals and others providing professional 
services for Critical lncident Stress Debriefing, are severely compromised. 
They are very often not able to easily gain the trust and respect of the 
debriefed participants. Several participants highlighted this. 
Flick "You talk to a firefighter they know exactly what you are 
feeling and they can imagine what was going on. A family 
member or friend doesn't have that same understanding. With 
firefighters there is no grey areas at the top". 
Instantaneous "With that guy that was there.. .. we all knew him.. 
We've all served with him and has respect for his abilities and 
that is quite important I think in those situations". 
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As previously discussed, the value of the Peer Supporter was initially viewed 
with some suspicion in the early days of the development of Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing programme. However, the more debriefings I facilitate the 
more aware I become of the value of the Peer Supporters. I really value their 
contributions and the empathetic listening ear they are able to provide to their 
fellow firefighters. It is my personal belief that the success of the programme 
is associated with the support of the Peer Support Team members who have 
been there, done that and genuinely understand what Critical Incident Stress 
is in relation to firefighting. 
10.3.6 BONDING 
The firefighters work a shift system where a bonding or team-building ethos 
develops over time. This is mainly due to the nature of their work and the 
close interdependent relationships that are established due to living and 
working together over lengthy periods of time. This is particularly relevant to 
permanent and Community Service Team firefighters. However a bonding or 
team ethos also exists with the volunteer firefighters. Not only do they have 
an affiliation to the New Zealand Fire Service but also to their small and close 
communities. Trust and bonding between firefighters are key ingredients in 
the success of their working lives together (Stuhlmiller, 1996). A sense of 
belonging to a team engenders confidence in knowing that whatever dangers 
they may confront, their team will be there to support them. With this comes 
a feeling of being safe when working alongside their team members. 
The participants discussed that as a consequence of their participation in the 
debriefing there had been a feeling of increased bonding or camaraderie. It 
is well recognised worldwide that there is a real sense of bonding, which is 
related to the culture of the Fire Service. Their close working relationship 
and the need to feel a sense of bonding is important in terms of their 
personal safety in potentially unsafe working environments. 
Fit 7t was just a big teambuilding exercise which has stayed 
together.. .. The team has been really excellent. All the members 
that were there definitely have bonded together and have a bit of 
respect for each other and look affer each other". 
One participant discussed how following the debriefing he felt a real sense of 
bonding which assisted him and his crew in rebuilding their previous bond 
which was somewhat fragile following the incident. 
Fit "Again, as the day went on we supported each other. It was 
very good. It brought the morale of each of us back and bonded 
us back together again. I, for one had grave fears that I had lost 
support of some of my crew.. . . . .. I felt it came back to me fhat 
I hadn't lost the support and what l had done as a Manager and 
getting them together in that team environment (debriefing) had 
been good. It proved to be very effective. Who knows I may 
have totally lost it if l hadn't of done and didn't get them together. 
So in talking to each other was very important in building our bond 
back together as a team. It felt really good and we got back together. 
It kept us together and probably built a bigger bond amongst the 
crew". 
Instantaneous "l think there was a feeling of camaraderie. We 
had all been through a difficult situation so it was good in that 
respect. It brought us closer together. The incident and being 
part of the debriefing together". 
The personal safety of the firefighters is always paramount when placed in 
uncertain and unsafe environments. Firefighters work in pairs for safety 
reasons. When some of the participants discussed an increase in bonding, 
they also said that they had a greater sense of being safer with these 
participants. 
Fit "Maybe been a bigger bond than existed prior to the incident. 
A more cohesive.. .. And that even though you are always very 
aware of each others safety, maybe you are even more so now': 
lnstantaneous "You'd work beffer as a team at a fire, you'd be 
safer together, you'd know that you could trust guys and that 
probably if you're in trouble, you know they're going to come 
and get you". 
10.3.7 RESPECT 
Several participants discussed how they had gained more respect for some 
of the participants and one particular firefighter talked about how prior to the 
incident and the debriefing he had very little respect for one of the 
participants in the debriefing. By hearing this participant's story he was able 
to gain respect for this person. 
lnstantaneous "Yeah, he's gone up in my estimation. And I also 
sort of questioned how I thought about him before. Maybe I hadn't 
given him the benefit of the doubt.. . . . .. . That's the first time I'd 
heard him put his side of the story and you know in the Fire Brigade 
all you've got to do is say so and so didn.'t puN his weight and so and 
so couldn't get his gear to work and there's a feeling that somehow 
those guys are inadequate. Then someone else will say if and if 
reinforces things. And lots of incidents you don? have debriefings so 
nobody knows their side of the story. I was really impressed with what 
he did and what he had to say at the debrief: 
lnstantaneous acknowledged that in the Fire Service rumour is rife and often 
personnel are criticised for their performance at a incident. As a result of 
widespread rumour, their story is not heard but in this debriefing he heard a 
particular firefighter's story and gained a new respect for him where 
previously he had not believed this firefighter to be truly competent in his 
duties. He was able to reflect on this by stating how he had never heard his 
side of the story and his opinion of this firefighter could have been influenced 
by the preponderance of hearsay in the Fire Service. lnstantaneous 
discussed how he acknowledged with this firefighter sometime later, how well 
he had performed both at the incident and at the debriefing. 
Another participant discussed how he had gained new respect for another 
participant in the debriefing. 
Red ".....I have different thoughts about him now. Okay and the 
other one I actually think, well personally I think so much more 
highly for both of them for what they did on the job, for whaf came 
through in the debriefing was quite good. I was really impressed 
with their ability. I was shocked. And it was good to see them 
again, to see them in an environment like that. Incredibly. 
Not only their firefighting side of things and they kept their cool, 
but for actually coming back and bloody chucking it on the table 
In front of the guys. It was good". 
"I did gain increased respect for them and also feel that they 
gained respect for me. And in a situation like that it was 
a good feeling to know that those guys had respect for 
what went down on the night': 
lnstantaneous "We have all stood up and spoken honestly about 
our role. Nobody tried to hide or pretend they were super heroes. 
We all spoke honestly what we did, admitted our inadequacies, 
so I think I respect the guys for being honest about if. And we 
have all gone through a difficult situation. Spoken about it and 
I think emotionally have put it behind us': 
The positive effect of gaining or increasing respect for their fellow firefighters 
had a positive benefit for individual firefighters and the overall crew. Red 
summed this up. 
Red "Just as I've said, it gives me a lot more respect for them 
We can actually joke and laugh and carry on and yeah.. .. 
just closer to them. You look at them and think, yeah 
you are worthwhile. I don't mind being part of your crew. 
You know, whereas before I think, oh my God, got to watch 
my backside now". 
10.3.8 RESOLUTION 
Debriefing has become an accepted method of crisis intervention because it 
provides an opportunity to process the critical incident both cognitively and 
emotionally. It also plays in important role in that following any critical 
incident there is a need for closure or resolution and debriefing provides a 
social ritual for closure (Havassy, 1991). 
Venting of the distressing effects from their exposure to a critical incident in a 
safe, formalised environment, the participants are able to understand what , 
happened at the incident and to make some sense of the incident. By 
piecing all the parts of the jigsaw together they are able to put the incident 
into its rightful context and move on in their lives. The ultimate result is that 
there is a resolution to the incident and it can now be laid to rest. This was 
highlighted by Instantaneous's comments. 
Instantaneous 7 have hardly given the incident a thought, and 
the guys at work have, are clear of the incident, and they don't 
have any concerns about it or referring back to it. We have talked 
about if occasionally but only in a joking, humorous way.. ... certainly 
for me there has, when I think of the others and me involved, there's 
been a resolution". 
Flick "They don't dictate the way l think anymore. That's l think 
one of the main things that what we are six weeks down the 
course from the incident and probably as I said in the first 
interview, that time will heal it and I can actually feel that 
happening.. ... it's not in my thoughts as much now as it was. 
It's happened and it's just drifting away.. ... ... And now as I say 
things with the debrief and hearing the other peoples point of 
view, everything was in perspective and it's just drifting away". 
Flick "It's drifting away quite quick. It doesn't take a talk 
like this to resurface it strongly again. I'm just quite neutral 
on it now': 
The critical incidents that the participants attended were very dramatic in 
terms of the trauma attached and would be classified as a major incidents. In 
my experience of working with firefighters they tend to ruminate over past 
major incidents in terms of what happened, who was involved, how the fire 
was handled operationally and very often criticise those who were 
responsible for the decisionmaking at the incident. However, lnstantaneous 
discussed how he was surprised at how little his crew members now 
discussed this particular incident. 
Instantaneous "I thought this was probably.. .. this incident was 
the most dramatic in some respects of any incident I've ever 
attended in the Fire Service. But it is the one that we've 
discussed the least and I think that's probably because there 
is no need to discuss it. We did the debrief and got if out 
of our systems. This time nobody's bothered, it's almost 
like it finished at the debrief: 
Flick "With my story being told people had come up to 
me since and said they didn't know exactly my role in 
it and now that they did, they said you know.. . that they 
could have a better understanding of the whole incident". 
By bringing the incident out into its full context, everyone discussing their own 
personal experience attached to the incident, and the group cohesion that 
results by participants listening to and hearing others' experiences, it facilities 
an understanding of what happened. The participants are able to make 
some sense of the incident and are able to resolve the issues in terms of its 
impact on their lives. 
10.4 NEGATIVE ASPECTS 
The participants were questioned in regard to any negative aspects they had 
in relation to participating in the debriefing. While there was an 
overwhelming response to discuss the positive aspects, it is important to 
acknowledge and discuss the negatives aspects for two of the participants. 
10.4.1 L(/ LIKE TO GET IT ALL OVER AND DONE 
WITH" 
Flick repeatedly focussed on his need to address his stress immediately 
following the incident. While many of the firefighters wtlo attended this 
incident were followed up with one-on-one support, Flick did not receive this 
form of support even though I would have considered him to be at risk of 
significant stress considering his close involvement in the incident. 
Flick "I like to get it all over and done with while the incident 
really is still going on. To come back, I felt sort of not resentment, 
but it was sort of, I thought I knew my stress levels had built 
having to come into a debrief, and so late. To me personally 
I would have liked to, probably that morning (of the incident). 
I feel that morning would have suited me a lot better than 
sort of flowed away from there". 
While I acknowledged Flick's comments, I explained to him that the ClSM 
Team would not have held a debriefing immediately following the incident. 
This is due to existing evidence that suggests emergency sewice personnel 
are cognitively defended immediately after a critical incident, and a debriefing 
has the potential to do more harm in this early stage. I discussed with Flick 
that what was required was other ClSM interventions such as on-scene 
support, one-on-one support, a demobilisation or a defusing which is a 
shortened version of debriefing. 
1 further explained that the debriefing he attended was held on the fifth day 
following the critical incident, and while he felt this was too long, that 
debriefings are ideally held approximately 1 - 7 days following a critical 
incident. I agreed with Flick that it may have been preferable for him to have 
had a debriefing earlier because of the intensity and the significant distress 
that it had caused. However, the timing of the debriefing was related to 
bringing all the affected personnel together on their first day back on shift 
after their four days off-duty which commenced immediately following the 
incident. I discussed, how in the future, I would make a recommendation to 
Management following a distressing critical incident, that approval be granted 
to bring the affected firefighters back for a debriefing on their day off if this 
was appropriate. 
While Flick understood the rationale behind the timing of the debriefing, he 
remained clear on his need for earlier support. This is illustrated by Flick's 
following comments. 
Flick "I personally would have liked it earlier. I went home 
that morning and you had to do your own sort of recovery. 
That is the thing I found the longer it does, my personal thing 
is to have the debrief. I like to have if over and done with so 
that it is, while the mind can say.. ... I like to get it out of the way 
as quick as possible". 
Even though Flick would have preferred some form of crisis intervention 
sooner than what he was offered, he did admit that he had found the 
debriefing a positive experience. 
Flick "It's basically knowing the procedure of why things are 
done and having things explained to you. The way you are 
feeling, that's the benefit and the positive thing I think that's 
really enlightening you on what's happening rather than once 
you were in the dark, you get up to all sorts of things and your 
mind plays funny things on you because you don't know". 
10.4.2 ANXIETY AROUND PARTICIPATION 
While some participants expressed the reservations they had prior to 
beginning the process of debriefing, it is my belief that this was related to a 
natural fear of the unknown. When questioned about this fear or anxiety their 
responses were more in relation to how they might cope with their emotions 
during the debriefing. 
Instantaneous "I was a bit anxious that I might make a fool 
of myself emotionally'! 
As discussed Previously Red had reservations about sharing in front of a 
large group, but was surprised at how well he was able to tell the participants 
his story in relation to his own situation. 
Red "Because of so many people there, I am not actually a 
good sort of speaker in front of a lot of people. I can 
speak to some few people, but not too many. I am not a 
good public speaker so, and also to speak of such quite 
emotional type things in an environment like that, it is 
quite hard. Once I got into it, it was alright and suppose 
once you got through the embarrassment and all that. 
I suppose everyone in the room knew who everyone was". 
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Their concerns around how they might cope with the debriefing could be 
related to some of the participants not having received a pre-incident 
education session which discusses the different types of ClSM strategies, 
particularly in relation to CISD. This issue highlighted the need to regularly 
update firefighting personnel on the activities of the ClSM Peer Support 
Team by carrying out pre-incident education sessions. 
10.5 BENEFITS OUTWEIGH THE NEGATIVES 
While the negative comments require consideration for my own and others 
future practice, the overriding feeling was that the debriefing had been a very 
positive experience for all those in attendance. 
Red "There is nothing negative about the debriefing that I could 
think of and I think it is bloody great that you give up your time. 
The Fire Service in general needs to take heed that we do have 
emotions, that we are not bloody robots, that even though we 
see some horrific things at times and go through some horrific 
things, we need to have an area where we can go, feel comfortable, 
secure, safe, the whole bit, get it off your chest. And yeah let 
Management know that we are human. This is sort of our voice: 
Red acknowledged that he would be willing to participate in another 
debriefing if required. However, he discussed that debriefing needed to be 
reserved for the high impact incident that had the potential to cause serious 
emotional distress to firefighters. 
Red "The average scrubbie (scrub fire) when a couple of acres 
is burnt, the average housefire; you can handle it, have a laugh and 
look mate you did well. But when there is a life risk, there is a life 
risk. . . . . . . . '! 
Red discussed how he would encourage others to attend a debriefing in the 
future and believed that it was particularly useful for those who were already 
suffering from significant stress prior to the critical incident. Red's comment 
further affirms my belief that personnel who have pre-existing significant 
stresses prior to the incident, are potentially more vulnerable to suffer from 
the negative affects of attending a critical incident. Often the other members 
of the crew may not consider the critical incident to be all that significant, but 
for this particular firefighter it may have been a catalyst for exacerbating his 
pre-existing significant stresses. 
Red 7 have said to a few people, you should have come along. And I 
would, I definitely would encourage people, and I don't want to get 
back to this, but especially people in my circumstances, where they 
have got like some emotional load at the moment. And I don't have 
anyone to come home to and cuddle up to. ....". 
Several other participants concluded their interviews with their belief that the 
debriefing had been a very positive experience for them. 
Fit "l haven't got enough praise for it. I am a real pusher now as I 
was before, always being very careful with my team thaf they were 
okay after. Especially with a new crew. After the suicides that we 
have been through in our Station". 
It was obvious from closer examination of the narratives that the participants 
reported ongoing benefits for themselves, their crew, family and the Fire 
Service overall. Several participants referred to an increase in their 
confidence that may have been undermined following their exposure to the 
incident. 
Red "l had to sort of like be brought into a sense of confidence and 
once I was into that confidence part then I was alright but I needed the 
debriefing sort of situation to do that for me". 
Flick "And you feel an air of confidence about yourself talking like 
that. . It makes you a stronger person for it. Maybe the same incident 
again might not affect me as badly as this one has. The knowledge 
gained from things like this is strength for me for later on". 
Fit "I hope I am not just being too relaxed about it now. Yes I 
certainly feel that I handle these situations with greater ease. For 
myself it was amazing what I have learnt knowing my own capabilities 
in relation to the stress situation. It's probably a big learning curve. I 
can probably handle things better than I did before. I think I would 
know how to handle it. I would still need suppotf. The Critical Incident 
Stress Team would still need to be there but I think I could certainly 
handle it much better". 
One firefighter acknowledged how he felt the debriefing process also had 
ongoing benefits for his family. 
Instantaneous "I think it did have a benefit for my family in that I 
came right quickly if you like ... with the stress of the Fire 
Service.. .that's been going on for some time.. ..I'd at times.. ... things 
have come up which have made me really irrifable and I've gone 
home and inadvertently taken it out on the family, you know? Been 
short-tempered, but this time I suppose I had that potential but after 
the debriefing I felt really relaxed and I never took it home". 
In relation to the positive benefits to firefighters as a group and the 
organisation, this was highlighted by Flick. He discussed at length how the 
process of ClSM and the subsequent use of ClSD had allowed firefighters to 
be more open and honest in expressing their stresses attached to critical 
incidents. 
Flick "In the past there you know with thing S.... we kept to the 
individual to and you had to suffer the.. ...p ain and the traumas with it 
and everything, you know? Because if you say anything in a group 
that you were looked on as suspect or whatever but that has definitely 
changed. Definitely changed. You can actually.. ..because even now 
they still don? like to talk about it.. ..there's some sort of reserve. Yes, 
yes, but when they do talk about it, it's in a positive way. You do still 
get the ones who are quite negative about if but they haven't had to 
use the service". 
lnstantaneous discussed how Management has acknowledged the stresses 
attached to the job which he really valued. 
lnstantaneous ''It's nice to think I feel that the Fire Service now is 
recognising that guys are under stress when they perhaps have a 
fatality or a car accident which is really messy or something happened 
like the housefire and they do suffer emotionally. And they are doing 
something about it. So it's been a long time coming. It's been needed 
for as long as I've been in the Service". 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
In summarising I have highlighted the major pattern of the formalised process 
with eight major themes that were elicited afler intensive reading and re- 
readings of the narrative, along with my personal journal detailing reflections, 
particularly in relation to the individual interviews. The eight major themes 
were dependent on the creation of a caring, formalised and structured 
environment which was established by the facilitator and the debriefing team. 
Insight has been gained into how the formalised process created a safe place 
to ventilate, share similar feelings, have a sense of bonding, increased or 
renewed respect for their peers and that there was a resolution of the critical 
incident, which is akin to laying it to rest. These positive effects were 
assisted by the presence of the Peer Support Team members who had a 
natural affinity to the participants by their common understanding of what 
firefighting under traumatic conditions really means. 
l have also highlighted what I have called the ongoing benefits to not only the 
individual, but to other crew members, their families and also to the New 
Zealand Fire Service. 
In the following chapter I will discuss the findings in relation to my model of 
practice and the model modifications that will be developed as a 
consequence of these findings. 
1 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PRACTICE 
l l I INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will discuss the research findings which were elicited from 
the four participants when they shared their experience of a Critical lncident 
Stress Debriefing. Over the last 15 years the group process called ClSD has 
often been referred to as the "Mitchell Model". Professor Jeffrey Mitchell, 
WO developed the model, has always advocated that ClSD is only one part 
of a comprehensive, systematic and multi-component approach to managing 
traumatic stress (Mitchell, 1998). For the purpose of this research, I have 
studied in detail the experience of ClSD on four firefighters who have 
participated in the sevenphase group process ClSD based on Mitchell's 
model (1983). It is the findings from this model of practice which I will 
discuss in this chapter. 
As a consequence of the research findings, I will discuss the implications for 
my own practice and others working in the area of Critical lncident Stress 
Debriefing, which is one of several interventions currently available to assist 
firefighting personnel following their exposure to critical incidents. Since 
beginning this research I was appointed as the Clinical Director of a Critical 
lncident Stress Management Peer Support Team in a Region of the New 
Zealand Fire Service. The research process which I have been immersed in 
over the last two years, together with the research findings, have enabled me 
to become more grounded in my practice in the area of CISD, and ClSM in 
its totality. To bring the project full circle, I have reflected in detail on how the 
research has shaped my practice and the practice of the Peer Support Team 
members with whom I work in partnership in our continuing journey of 
providing a professional and credible Critical lncident Stress Management 
programme within the New Zealand Fire Service context. 
l 1.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR STORIES 
The stories that Fit, Flick, lnstantaneous and Red shared or entrusted to me, 
reinforced the value of the model of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing, 
namely that of Mitchell's model (1983). This was the model that was utiliskd 
in the debriefings that ail the participants attended. The narrative discourse 
produced stories in relation to human action. Fit, Flick, Instantaneous and 
Red's stories were concerned with their attempts to advance to a resolution, 
an explanation whereby the experience of debriefing was unravelled. 
"Narrative transforms a mere succession of actions and 
events into a coherent whole in which these happenings 
gain meanings as contributors to a common purpose" 
(Polkinghorne, 1997, p13). 
The narrative discourse was found to be an effective methodology to 
describe the experience of debriefing. It was a process that drew together 
the threads of the stories of the four participants different actions, events and 
issues that contributed to the research findings. While it took many months 
to choose a methodology that would reveal the true essence of the 
experience of debriefing, I now feel justified in the choice of the narrative 
methodology as being the most appropriate to use for this research study. I 
feel secure with the decision in terms of it "fitting" my own practice 
philosophy, but also that it will be able to be easily accessed by organisations 
with a special interest in Critical Incident Stress Management services. Also 
that it be acceptable and accessible to the consumers of CISM services. Of 
even greater importance is that it will be able to be read by others working in 
the area of CISM, particularly the Peer Support Team members, whose 
ongoing education in the field of ClSM is of utmost importance. 
The stories of Fit, Flick, Instantaneous and Red are the stories of four 
firefighters who have experienced the group process of a CISD. Unique and 
common themes have been illuminated and they also represent the 
experience of many others who have participated in a CISD. The eight 
themes that were uncovered through narrative discourse represent a 
common thread to a greater or lesser extent for all the participants. What do 
practitioners working in the field of Critical Incident Stress Management have 
to learn from these firefighters and their respective stories? 
The free flow of the narrative epitomised the experience of CISD and their 
personal views in answer to the open-ended questions which was posed for 
them. Of the many hazards that challenge the emotional wellbeing of 
firefighters, their most overpowering enemy may be their response and 
subsequent reactions to critical incidents. It was obvious from the narrative 
discourse that the critical incidents the research participants attended, carried 
two significant stresses which had the potential to cause significant long-term 
stress effects. The first significant stress was that of the threat of physical 
loss, that is serious injury or death either to themselves or their fellow 
firefighters. The second was the threat to emotional loss, irrespective of the 
physical danger whereby they could become emotionally aloof, moody, 
irritable and absorbed with the critical incident. These distressing effects had 
the potential to intrude on their lives and the lives of significant others, such 
as their spouses, families, work colleagues and friends. Therefore the effects 
of attending a critical incident without any post-incident crisis intervention 
strategies such as CISD has the potential to cause serious stress symptoms 
with devastating consequences both personally and professionally. 
The findings illuminated the strength of the process of CISD as perceived by 
the four participants. The formalised process was the overriding pattern 
that was analysed from the data with eight major themes being illuminated. 
While the participants' narratives attested to the positive benefits to both 
themselves and the organisation, it was not an overriding pattern or 
prominent theme as highlighted in Hanneman's (1994) study. I have 
discussed in the previous chapter in some detail what some of these positive 
benefits were to both themselves, their families and to the New Zealand Fire 
Service generally. The participants did discuss the positive benefits in some 
depth but I do not believe they gave it as much prominence as the formalised 
process and eight themes. 
The eight major themes that were uncovered from their narratives were safe 
environment, ventilating the stress reaction, similar feelings, getting the 
whole picture, peer support, bonding, respect and resolution. These 
are visually presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 The pattern of the formalised process which encircles 
the eight interlocking themes. 
Since discussing the themes in the previous chapter, I now believe I have 
named the eight major themes in order of priority as upon analysing the data 
it was obvious from the participants' narratives what were the most important 
themes they highlighted in their storying. The first theme, safe environment, 
related to providing a safe haven in which to share their personal experience 
in relation to the critical incident. With the provision of a safe environment, 
particularly in relation to ensuring strict confidentiality; that the debriefing 
was not an operational critique of the incident; that no onlookers be present 
in the debriefing; only those who were directly involved with the incident; 
that the participants speak on behalf of themselves; and that no ridiculing or 
apportioning blame on any participants was permitted. With these rules or 
guidelines the participants felt a sense of safety and comfort which enabled 
them to begin to ventilate some of the stress reactions that they had or were 
experiencing. An important component of establishing a safe environment 
involves establishing a climate of trust and rapport with the facilitator and the 
Peer Support Team members involved in the debriefing. 
The participants shared their experience of debriefing by discussing that 
once an environment of rapport and trust was established they could tell their 
story and in doing so were able to ventilate some of their strong feelings 
associated with the incident and its aftermath. These feelings they identified 
as being grief, depression, guilt, anger, vulnerability, feeling of failure, 
inadequacy and anxiety. By providing a formalised process of debriefing, it 
also provided the catalyst for uncovering previously repressed thoughts and 
feelings which could be related back to previous critical incidents where no 
formal crisis intervention strategies had been made available. It is not 
uncommon for earlier painful and distressing incidents to be resurfaced by 
attending further critical incidents and the sharing of the sights, sounds and 
smells of a current critical incident. This effect was highlighted by Red who 
discussed an incident where a young child died sometime later following an 
extremely unpleasant home accident. He discussed how when he was 
carrying out cardio-pulmonary resuscitation that he kept personalising the 
young child to his own child. He completed his discussion of this event by 
saying:- 
"That is the sod of thing I needed (Critical Incident Stress Debriefing). 
All I could see was my liffle child on the table. So thaf is the sod 
of thing the Crifical lncident Stress Team is needed for''. 
It is well recognised that by expressing emotions or ventilating the stress 
reaction openly improves psychological and physical wellbeing (Raphael, 
Singh & Bradbury, 1980; Pennebaker,l985, 1990; Roemer & Borkovec, 
1994). A key ingredient of Mitchell's model (1983) of debriefing is cathartic 
discussion which has been found to be useful in reducing the stress 
response (Everly, 1990). It is seen as being a critical criterion of the healing 
process. In my practice experience I believe this process of establishing a 
sense of trust and safety does not occur simultaneously for all participants. 
When it is first felt or experienced, which hopefully should be within the 
introductory phase, then one or two participants usually begin to ventilate 
their stress reactions. When these individuals ventilate their personal stress 
reactions, this enables others to share their stress reactions. It is akin to a 
snow-balling effect. Once one person begins to vent, this usually assists 
others to share their stress reactions. With this venting it enables others to 
acknowledge that they are not alone with their reactions and that all those 
who are participating generally have similar feelings. Those who have been 
resistant to share their experience then begin to feel more comfortable to 
share their own experience. 
Debriefing is culturally condoned, that is the model utilised has been 
specifically prepared for emergency service personnel. Individuals of similar 
experience and background who have been exposed to the same incident, 
share it. They are encouraged to participate in the process of piecing the 
incident together and assist each other in recovering as quickly as possible in 
order to return to their normal everyday activities without any lasting negative 
consequences. With the venting of their feelings, thoughts, emotions and 
reactions are validated as being normal, common and to be expected. This 
assists in mitigating feelings of guilt and shame, and prevents those 
individuals or groups from isolating themselves because they feared these 
feelings were theirs alone. The research participants shared how once they 
heard others venting, they acknowledged that they had similar feelings and 
therefore felt more comfortable sharing these with the group. 
The participants discussed how the facilitator of the debriefing encouraged 
them in the telling of their own story. They all had a particular story to tell 
and how the critical incident had been experienced by them. They 
acknowledged that very often there were misconceptions or the truth was 
distorted in regard to what really happened at the incident. It is 
acknowledged in the literature that under stress, incoming information related 
to a critical incident is often subjected to a partial or frenzied focus and is 
therefore prone to misinformation or a twisting of the truth (Blak, 1991). 
When the participants heard other participants perspective of the incident 
during the debriefing, they were able to get the whole picture of the 
incident. With the piecing together they were able to gain the full picture and 
also the truth of what really happened at the incident from all the participants' 
perspectives. The participants discussed how they were surprised at some 
of the pieces of information that were shared by individual participants and 
how some participants operational performance was admirable at the 
incident, which surprised them. With the piecing together of the incident the 
participants then gained a greater understanding of how particular 
participants performed and gained a new respect for these individuals. With 
that renewed respect came a sense of bonding. 
The importance of the Peer Support lending credence to the debriefing was 
discussed by the participants. The participants trusted the Peer Supporters 
as they recognised that they had also, in many instances had walked in their 
shoes. Because of this they believed the Peer Supporters had a greater 
understanding of what they were experiencing. The participants believed 
that a Peer Supporter could understand their turmoil and pain if they had 
experienced similar incidents. They postulated that the Peer Supporters 
were able to understand both the operational language and many of the 
feelings, thoughts and reactions they had experienced in relation to the 
critical incident and its aftermath. 
As the Peer Supporters understand the Fire Service culture, the operational 
procedures and what the debriefed firefighters were saying, they were able to 
establish a trusting rapport with the participants at an early stage of the 
debriefing. The debriefed participants felt safer and trusted the Peer 
Supporters and felt less stigmatised when they shared their feelings, 
thoughts and reactions to the critical incident. 
Professional firefighting is recognised as being a stressful and dangerous 
occupation. To cope with the inherently stressful and dangerous 
occupational demands, firefighters are reliant upon their fellow firefighters for 
support (Beaton, Murphy, Pike & Corneil, 1997). They work long shifts 
together, eat, sleep and play sport together, and belong to a unique 
occupational culture. Due to these factors the social relations of firefighters 
are rather unique. They therefore build a strong bond, particularly with those 
on their particular shift. 
Participants discussed how the other firefighters in the debriefing shared their 
own perspective of the incident in a deeper and more indepth meaningful 
manner than is usual. The participants discussed that with the sharing of the 
experiences in relation to the critical incident, and the feelings, thoughts and 
reactions that was shared, it brought about a greater sense of cohesion and 
understanding of other firefighters that were involved in the debriefing. With 
this sharing a sense of bonding, brotherhood or camaraderie was realised or 
appreciated more by the participants following the debriefing. With this 
sense of an increased awareness of bonding, some of the participants saw 
the positive benefits of the debriefing being a teambuilding exercise which 
continued following the debriefing. As a consequence of the critical incident 
in one instance, the bond between the crew had been somewhat eroded. 
This effect was due to what some of the participants believed had happened 
at the incident. When the participants heard the full story of what really 
happened for all the participants, there was a renewed sense of bonding 
which is imperative for the safe workings of all the members of the crew. 
Respect was a further theme that was highlighted from the narratives. 
Several participants discussed how they had regained respect for several of 
the participants. These were firefighters who they had little respect for prior 
to the incident and the debriefing. Because of their sharing of their 
perspective and hearing what really happened and how well they had 
performed during the incident, they now had greater respect for these 
firefighters than prior to the incident and debriefing. Also some participants 
discussed how they respected the participants for being open and honest in 
their sharing of their experience of the incident. They were surprised at how 
open the participants were in telling their story. 
Dealing with the trauma of death and destruction requires some social ritual 
to provide a closure or resolution. It was obvious that the participants 
experienced a sense of closure or resolution to the incident. This they 
found rather surprising as in the past major incidents were never totally laid 
to rest. They usually remained a frequent topic of conversation months or 
even years following the incident. However, with both these major incidents 
they believed that the incidents had been laid to rest and they now referred to 
and discussed the incident rarely, which they acknowledged as being very 
unusual. By encouraging the participants to discuss the incident, ventilate 
their feelings, thoughts and reactions, and validate their feelings and 
reactions as being normal, and acknowledging the contribution to the 
stressful and dangerous role they had performed, this provided a resolution 
to the incident. The experience of a ClSD where there was a shared social 
ritual within a homogenous group, and with the knowledge that there was 
ongoing support available from their colleagues and the ClSM Peer Support 
Team, greatly facilitated the resolution and the integration of the critical 
incident. 
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From the narratives it became evident that the ritual of debriefing is culturally 
appropriate for firefighters and that the formalised process of debriefing is 
effective. The effects of debriefing are maximised by the facilitator having a 
good understanding of the culture of the Fire Service and the Peer Support 
Team members belong to, and work within the Service. Therefore the 
debriefing is a shared experience which is both positive and validating to the 
participants. Other members of the Service also experience this positive 
effect, the organisation as a whole and of course the spouses, family and 
friends of the debriefed participants. 
In summary, the formalised process was identified as the overriding 
prominent pattern which related to Mitchell's model (1983). It was found by 
the participants to be a culturally appropriate and safe model of crisis 
intervention. The eight major themes highlighted the perceived positive 
benefit of the ClSD on the firefighters who participated. The research 
findings supported most of the basic assumptions and the rationale that is the 
basic foundation of Mitchell's model (1983). The ClSD was found to be 
useful in ventilating the stress reaction, which assisted participants in 
reducing the stressful effects, and was very reassuring in affirming that one's 
reaction was normal in response to exposure to an abnormal event. It had a 
very positive effect in that misinformation was reduced or eliminated and it 
assisted in enhancing the bonding process and respect of other participants. 
The Peer Supporters were identified by the participants as being a very 
valuable member of the ClSM Team. 
ClSD meets an urgent need in addressing the stress and reducing the 
ongoing harmful effects on firefighting personnel who have been exposed to 
critical incidents. The ClSD strategy provides a forum for an open and 
confidential discussion of the painful effects suffered by firefighters who often 
view themselves as being underpaid, poorly resourced and undervalued. 
l 1.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The research findings have assisted me considerably in validating my 
practice in the area of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing. It has given me 
insights into what the four participants perceived as being valuable to them 
personally, their peers, family, friends and the organisation as a whole. Afler 
being deeply immersed in the research process and analysing the data 
(which I surfaced), I found it has greatly assisted me in further developing my 
practice in partnership with the Peer Support Team members. The journey 
that I walk in the area of ClSM with the Peer Support Team members is a 
collaborative one using a collective approach with mutual support in order to 
provide a professional and credible service for the consumers of our service, 
the firefighters. 
113.1 ClSD FACILITATORS 
When using ClSD it must be remembered that participants in the debriefing 
are usually part of a homogeneous group and as a result they bring to the 
debriefing their own history of rules, regulations, values, beliefs, culture, 
interpersonal relationships and other unique characteristics of the 
occupational work environment (Wollman, 1993). The occupational group 
also bring to the debriefing their unique professional language or jargon with 
their own humour, particularly black humour, which is often found to be 
offensive by those who have not been immersed within the culture and all its 
nuances. This is particularly pertinent to firefighting personnel who 
traditionally use black humour as a coping strategy in the immediacy of the 
incident. This has the potential to cause serious communication difficulties 
for facilitators of debriefings who lack the inside knowledge and 
understanding of 'the specific workings of the organisation. Ideally a 
facilitator should have local knowledge of the organisation in order to 
establish a credible working relationship with personnel. 
Not only is it important to understand the culture of the organisation but it is 
imperative to direct a debriefing with a sense of confidence, cohesion and 
professionalism. This is required in order to gain the trust and rapport in the 
early stages of the debriefing to enable the participants to be open and tell 
their story. In my experience firefighters do have their own language and 
culture which I now understand and this understanding has helped me 
greatly in providing a culturally appropriate and effective practice. However, I 
acknowledge that I also have my own history, values, beliefs, culture and 
practice language. I have realised over time that it is particularly important 
that in order to gain a speedy rapport with the firefighters, I need to drop my 
own professional language or jargon, while acknowledging that it is still part 
of me. Failing to make this shift has the potential to seriously hinder the 
effectiveness of debriefing. 
I have found that an intervention such as ClSD is the most appropriate 
strategy for assisting firefighting personnel to handle the overwhelming 
effects of trauma in normal, well-functioning personnel. However, where the 
post-traumatic symptoms persist, or where psychological problems in relation 
to long-term maladaptive behaviour interferes with the firefighters personal 
and professional life, then more intensive individual psychological assistance 
is required. This is outside the boundaries of what the ClSM Peer Support 
Team is able to provide. To have the greatest effect, psychological services 
should be, and are part of our integrated programme of ClSM services. It is 
imperative that the programme has the full administrative support and 
commitment from top management through to all levels of management. 
Their support and confidence in the programme is paramount to the success 
of the programme. 
l l .3.2 TIMING 
Timing of a debriefing is viewed as being important. There is an overall 
consensus amongst clinicians that debriefing is most effective if carried out 
sooner rather than later following a critical incident (Miller, 1995). A problem 
which was highlighted in the research findings was that one participant, Flick, 
discussed in some depth how he would have preferred to have had the 
debriefing earlier. In Flick's words "I wanted to get it all over and done with. I 
like to deal with it straight awayi'. While I acknowledged his feelings in 
relation to having a debriefing earlier, I discussed with Flick the most suitable 
timing of a debriefing and the reasons why a debriefing was not the most 
appropriate ClSM strategy immediately following the critical incident. A 
typical debriefing usually takes place within 24 - 72 hours following a critical 
incident (Mitchell & Bray, 1990) when the immediate psychological defence 
of denial has lessened somewhat and intrusive reactions are being strongly 
experienced. However, there may be some variation for the most suitable 
time. Debriefings are ideally conducted when the participants are most 
psychologically receptive to the intervention. I believe it is imperative that a 
ClSD is not forced upon firefighters following a major critical incident, but 
they are asked if they would like to participate in a debriefing or offered some 
other ClSM strategies that they may find more suitable. 
There are other ClSM strategies that could have been made available to 
Flick, such as a demobilisation, a defusing or a one-on-one support session. 
Often the ClSM Team is not mobilised early enough in order to make these 
strategies available to personnel at the most appropriate time. An added 
complication is that the critical incident may have occurred on the last day of 
their set of shifts and they are not due back on shift again for up to four days. 
There is often difficulty bring the crew together within the recommended 
timeframe due to their off-duty time, their commitments to their secondary 
jobs and the geographical spread of firefighters who often live some distance 
from their stations. In many instances it is difficult to carry out a debriefing 
before they return to duty for their next set of shifts. Also there can be 
difficulty mobilising Peer Support Team members due to the geographical 
distance that has to be travelled when the request for ClSM support is 
received. However I do not believe it is ever too late to offer a ClSD if 
personnel request a debriefing or agree to the offer. 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing is not a substitute for psychotherapy but 
belongs in the field of crisis intervention. It is usually a one-off intervention 
strategy with the bulk of the work carried out in a single session. 
Occasionally there is the need for a follow-up debriefing. A recognised major 
constraint in brief group crisis intervention is the limited time available 
(Aveline, 1993). Because of the brevity of working with individuals requiring 
debriefing, a clear structure, which I refer to as the formalised process, is 
required in order to achieve a positive effect in a single, time limited session. 
Once again an environment of trust, rapport, respect, authority and structure 
is required in order to direct a debriefing and achieve positive results. It is my 
belief and others (Mitchell & Everly, 1995; Dyregrov, 1997) that this 
environment must be established in the very early stages of debriefing. I 
refer to this as establishing a therapeutic relationship with the participants, to 
establish a favourable climate in order for the participants to feel safe to 
share factual information in relation to the incident, but most importantly their 
intimate thoughts, feelings and emotions which many of them find difficult to 
understand and cope with. It is recognised that some participants following a 
debriefing require more individual support and the ClSD brief intervention is 
not able to totally meet the needs of some individuals. While these 
individuals may not necessarily require more expert psychological 
assistance, they may require a more individualised therapeutic relationship 
with a Peer Supporter. Often some participants feel more comfortable 
sharing in the one-on-one setting. It must be remembered that ClSD is not a 
miracle cure, and that some participants may feel little or no benefit from their 
attendance. However, it is important that no serious consequences should 
result from their attendance by forcing them to share their experience in the 
debriefing. If they require more individual or professional assistance, it is 
imperative that these.services be offered to them. 
1 l .3.3 PRE-INCIDENT EDUCATION 
How can some of the above difficulties be addressed? It is important to carry 
out comprehensive pre-incident education training sessions to all levels of 
firefighting personnel. It is vital to provide stress management education 
and crisis mitigation training to all levels of firefighters, from the new recruit to 
senior management. If firefighting personnel have a good understanding of 
Critical Incident Stress and it's effects and the ClSM strategies available to 
assist them in mitigating some of the harmful effects, this knowledge 
empowers them in coping with the distressing effects of attending a critical 
incident. If Management are fully aware and supportive of the ClSM 
programme and are familiar with the different levels of CISM, then they are 
more likely to mobilise the ClSM Team following critical incidents. 
It is important to periodically update personnel with continuing education 
sessions on stress management and ClSM in order to keep them abreast 
with new knowledge in the field of ClSM and to provide additional knowledge 
in preventing and mitigating the effects of stress. Another important aspect 
of the continuing education sessions is to promote the team's activities which 
is a marketing strategy to make team visible. 
l l .3.4 MARKETING THE ClSM PROGRAMME 
It is important to continually market the concept of ClSM and the strategies 
available to assist firefighting personnel following their exposure to critical 
incidents. A method of raising the profile of the ClSM Team's activities which 
I have found successful is to publish articles in the local Regional newsletter, 
professional journals, provide a fact sheet for all personnel on the ClSM 
programme and at each Station display a colourful poster which further 
highlights the Team's activities. I encourage Peer Support Team members to 
write articles following their attendance at regular training sessions and often 
firefighters will write a letter of thanks to the Team after receiving ClSM 
services. These are often printed, with the permission of all the debriefed 
participants, in the local Regional newsletter. I have found these strategies 
are a useful marketing tool to continually raise the visibility of the ClSM 
Team. 
1 l .3.5 PEER SUPPORT 
While the literature heavily supports mental health professionals as being the 
most appropriate leaders or facilitators of debriefing, I have found through 
experience, that mental health professionals do not always make the most 
effective facilitators in this context. Many Peer Support Team members from 
within the emergency service organisations have shown remarkable skill at 
understanding and facilitating the group process of debriefing. With the 
necessary advanced training in group process and debriefing, and with 
particular personal qualities such as a genuine caring attitude, an ethos of 
assisting one's fellow peers in an empathetic, warm and caring manner, 
walking a journey together, without disempowering those they are assisting, 
then it is my belief that they are able to conduct a debriefing in a professional 
and caring manner. Peer debriefers are the key ingredients of a ClSM team 
as they are seen as being credible by their peers and are thus more readily 
able to establish a rapport with emergency service personnel (Clark & 
Friedman, 1992). 
From my own practice perspective as a Clinical Leader of a Critical Incident 
Stress Management Peer Support Team, I value those Peer Support Team 
personnel who have the advanced training and personal qualities necessary 
to facilitate a debriefing. In many aspects I believe they are better able to 
provide a very credible and professional debriefing as they understand the 
culture, the language and even the black humour better than those who live 
outside the organisation. This is akin to Taylor's (1 994b) "being in the world 
by their immersion in the culture, inextricably in their everyday realities and 
understanding of self and others within the organisation by having a sense of 
belonging. I acknowledge that not all Peer Support personnel have the 
necessary qualities or the indepth understanding of the group process of 
debriefing and that it would be unsafe to place them in a situation where they 
were required to conduct a debriefing. With the necessary clinical guidance 
and supervision that I see as being paramount to my role as Clinical Director, 
then those who have the necessary skills are able to provide a safe and 
professional debriefing. 
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I have found, through experience, that not all Peer Supporters are suitable for 
every debriefing. It is important to choose the right Peer Supporters for a 
debriefing in order to increase the potential for a successful debriefing. I 
refer to this as "matching up" the most suitable Peer Supporters with the 
particular crew to be debriefed. The overall aim of any debriefing is to 
mitigate the harmful effects of the stress reaction and return firefighting 
personnel to their normal function as expeditiously as possible. To expose 
participants to a Peer Supporter who they may not respect or trust has the 
potential to cause further harm. The potential for this to occur in the New 
Zealand Fire Service in the current climate of disharmony amongst the three 
tiered level of firefighting personnel, is great. The three tiers consist of D1 
firefighters who are professional fulltime firefighters who remain on the old 
contract; the Community Service Teams (CSTs) who were introduced in 
1996 and who work a completely different shift system to the Dls. This 
includes longer working hours and an increase in hours of productivity. 
Lastly, there are the volunteer firefighters who are essentially unpaid and are 
recruited from within the local communities. 
As I understand the culture and the inherent stresses that exist for personnel 
within the New Zealand Fire Service today, I am ever mindful of choosing the 
most appropriate Peer Supporters in which to support myself or other mental 
health professionals in facilitating a debriefing. It would be unsafe to place a 
Peer Supporter who I and others recognise would have difficulty in 
establishing hislher credentials with a different tier of firefighting personnel. 
However, there are some Peer Supporters who may not come from the same 
tier as those who they are assisting in the debriefing. Because of their 
personal qualities, the relationship they have established in their area, their 
personal skills and particular occupations such as a being a Chaplain, a 
counsellor etc, they may be seen as being credible to a different tier of 
firefighters. In my practice I always give the selection of the Peer Supporters 
much thought when preparing for a debriefing. As I view the Peer Supporters 
as being pivotal to the success of the debriefing, it is imperative to choose 
the most appropriate Peer Supporters. The importance of 
selecting the most appropriate Peer Supporter was highlighted in the 
narratives from the four participants. 
The critical incidents that the research participants were exposed to were 
considered extremely traumatic and required Peer Supporters who were not 
only highly skilled in the peer support role but had extensive firefighting 
knowledge and experience. It was obvious from the narratives that the 
participants valued and trusted the Peer Supporters both for their peer 
support qualities but also for their operational experience. 
It is imperative to provide the Peer Support Team members with clinical 
support, supervision and expertise. They are individuals who have been 
selected from within the Service who are deemed to have specific 
characteristics that engender in those they are assisting confidence in their 
abilities to assist them in times of stress. They have received intensive 
training in ClSM and the problems they are likely to experience and are 
competent in dealing with them in a professional manner. It is important that 
they are able to work under clinical supervision as part of a disciplined 
professional group. I see my own role of providing that clinical supervision 
and expertise having worked in the area of ClSM for the last ten years. An 
important role I value is empowering them in their role as Peer Supporters. 
Often, because of geographical isolation, I am unable to meet with Peer 
Supporters before they provide a defusing or other ClSM strategy. However, 
I always make myself available by telephone to talk them through the 
process of whatever strategy they are to provide. I engender in them a 
feeling of confidence and competence and that I and other Peer Supporters 
are there to assist them if required. My motto, when discussing the strategy 
to be provided by the Peer Supporters is "keep it simple". Fire Service 
personnel are often very sceptical of 'fakes' and they very quickly put up 
barriers if they distrust those trying to provide a service that is outside their 
expertise. I always follow-up with the Peer Supporters who have provided a 
defusing or a debriefing to discuss how the strategy went. It is like a post- 
defusing, post-debriefing meeting where we discuss what went well and what 
can be learnt for the future. I always affirm their contribution to their fellow- 
firefighters and to the CISM programme as a whole. 
It is always encouraging and humbling to work with Peer Supporters as they 
progress in the field of CISM. They share their personal experiences of 
working in the field with much openness and honesty. Recently I supported 
several newly appointed but incredibly valuable Peer Supporters who carried 
out a defusing within their small community. It was their first defusing and I 
walked them through the process via telephone and as always encouraged 
them to "keep it simple". I reiterated the importance of spending time on the 
introduction and setting the scene, to enable the participants to feel safe to 
ventilate, which has been highlighted as being important in this research. My 
follow-up telephone conversation with the Peer Supporters was one of 
confidence on how successful they felt the defusing had been. One Peer 
Supporter discussed how the participants had "Come into the debriefing with 
their arms folded, tight as drums. They looked like funeral directors". 
However, as the Peer Supporters introduced the defusing and set the scene 
for a feeling of safety to ventilate, the Peer Supporter said in his own words 
"They started to loosen up and begin to relax. If was amazing watching them 
sfart to feel relaxed. Once they started to feel comfortable they all started to 
open up. It felt really great". By supporting Peer Support Team members, it 
engenders in them a feeling of confidence and competence. My relationship 
with the Peer Support Team members is important to their own personal 
wellbeing, particularly in these times of acute unrest within the New Zealand 
Fire Service. They too, are experiencing the ongoing stresses of the long 
and protracted restructuring and need support. 
My personal philosophy of practice centres on being in partnership with the 
team members. I value and respect their values, beliefs, culture, gender, 
spiritual beliefs and the experiences they bring to the Team. I value the 
partnership concept as being caring and like Watson's theory (1 988) 1 value 
myself and the Team members as being cared for in our journey of working 
in the field of CISM. I value and acknowledge the team members unique 
past experiences as being part of the caring relationship which is so pivotal to 
the relationship of all members of the team. I acknowledge their contribution 
both to my practice and to the ClSM programme that they so generously 
contribute to. As partners together, we are an important link in the chain of 
providing the most effective ClSM services where the Team members and 
myself become responsible and accountable for our own practice together. 
I view my journey with the Peer Support Team members as a journey of care. 
As a nurse I have a professional obligation to care and feel I am in an unique 
and privileged position to assist them in their journey. By being present and 
connected with them, I can assist them in their journey of finding their house, 
travelling through their garden, cultivating and toiling their roots by supporting 
and encouraging them in their practice, and being there for them in times of 
wandering through the wilderness and in times of uncertainty. This relates 
back to Kelley's (1995) house-garden-wilderness metaphor. 
l l .3.6 ONGOING TEAM TRAINING 
This research has not only highlighted the importance of the initial basic 
training but the need for ongoing training to reinforce or expand the Peer 
Supporters' skills. This ongoing training also provides the opportunity to 
share and learn from other Peer Supporters' experiences (Finn & Esselman 
Tomz, 1998). It is a form of networking where we can learn in partnership 
together in a safe environment. Bonding, teambuilding and cohesion was 
identified as one of the eight themes by the participants in the research. This 
is also a key function of ongoing training where it is important to continually 
focus on team building and develop a cohesive Peer Support Team. The 
ongoing training also provides an opportunity to gain an overview of the 
team's activities where the Team bonds as a group to work cohesively. 
Training in the past has involved role-plays where Peers are given role-play 
exercises which are video taped and followed up by a critique in a safe and 
caring exchange. This has been found to be an effective method of training 
and increases the Peers confidence and competence in the area of CISD. A 
further method of training that the Team utilises is reviewing past ClSM 
strategies that Peers have been involved in. In order to respect 
confidentiality, no firefighters' names are used or specific details about the 
critical incident revealed. The Peers present the critical incident and follow- 
up strategies implemented and discuss how they arranged the intervention, 
the planning that was required and the intervention strategy that was used. 
They then review the ClSM strategy implemented and view this process as a 
shared learning experience. 
Another positive aspect of ongoing regular Team training is that by 
presenting relevant and interesting topics which are supported by 
professional presentations, the enthusiasm and motivation of the Team 
members is maintained. A Team that fails to provide continuing education in 
upgrading the skills of its providers has the potential to stagnate. Instead of 
the ClSM Peer Support Programme growing from strength to strength, there 
is a potential for a general decline in the effectiveness in the services being 
provided. When team members loose interest they often fail to meet their 
ongoing commitment to attend Team training and meetings. This usually 
results in a feeling of isolation and a loss of interest and direction, which 
eventually results in members resigning from the team. 
The success or demise of any ClSM programme is dependent on the 
knowledge, training and expertise of the Peer Support Team members who 
provide the mainstay of the services. Ensuring that team members receive 
ongoing training in order to update and enhance their skills, ensures that the 
most appropriate ClSM strategy is provided at the right time. These are 
factors that can enhance or inhibit the success of any ClSM programme 
(Mitchell & Everly, 1997). 
l l .3.7 ClSD EVAULATIONS 
Following Critical Incident Debriefings I have found it important to request 
and encourage the participants to complete an evaluation of the ClSD 
intervention. The rationale for requesting this information is explained to the 
participants with regard to how we need to continually improve on the 
provision of ClSM services. Their evaluation of the process of ClSD is an 
important strategy on which to audit our programme. A stamped-addressed 
envelope marked 'confidential' is provided with the evaluation form in order to 
increase the likelihood of compliance. The evaluation results are also a 
useful tool for training purposes where we review the interventions that have 
been provided, what went well and how we could improve on future 
interventions. 
On reviewing some of the evaluations that I have recently collated, many of 
the themes that have been highlighted in the research are also recorded by 
the participants in the evaluations. Examples include:- 
"Gave me a chance to talk about the incident". (Ventilate). 
"Well confrolled and ordered. (Formalised process). 
"Understanding that others felt the same emotions etc". (Similar 
feelings). 
"To appreciafe what others did during the incident". (Getting the whole 
picture, respect) 
"Helped me hear what happened to the others': (Getting the whole 
picture). 
The timing of the intervention is addressed in the evaluation and the 
comments are variable, but oflen participants have commented that they 
would have liked the ClSD "sooneJ'. I believe this highlights the importance 
of pre-incident and ongoing education sessions in order to educate 
firefighting personnel on the different ClSM interventions available, and what 
is the most appropriate intervention to apply at a particular time following the 
critical incident. 
11.4 MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 
I believe it is imperative to the success of any ClSM programme to have the 
full support of management. Firstly it is vital that Management believe in the 
concept and benefits of a ClSM programme. Their financial and 
administrative support is required otherwise without their full commitment the 
programme flounders. This was evident during the mid 1990s when the 
Occupational Health Services were under review within the New Zealand Fire 
Service and some Regions no longer employed an Occupational Health 
Nurse. The Occupational Health Nurse provided clinical leadership, but also 
played a pivotal role in marketing the concept to Management and also 
fulfilled a liaison role between the Team and Management. The cost of any 
CISM programme should not be as prohibitive (Bergman & Queen, 1986) as 
the cost of medically boarding a firefighter as a result of trauma far exceeds 
the cost both in financial and personal terms. As the ClSM programme 
utilises Peer Support personnel who are unpaid volunteers, the programme is 
therefore less expensive to run in the long term. In my ten years of practice 
experience I have rarely had to refer distressed firefighters onto mental 
health professionals for more professional assistance. The ClSM 
programme takes a proactive stance as opposed to a reactive stance. 
To enlist Management support it is important to market the concept of ClSM 
services. Current research data and exemplars from within the New Zealand 
scene should be made visible to Management by bringing to their attention 
the psychological risks associated with firefighting. The consequences of the 
ICI fire and its ongoing aftermath that still plague the Fire Service today is no 
greater exemplar on which to base the need to provide ClSM services. Even 
up to the present time the Fire Service still bears the financial and personnel 
cost, in relation to a poorly co-ordinated health response following the ICI fire. 
The success of the Region's ClSM programme where I am employed is 
related to the support the team receives from the current Management, 
especially the Regional CommanderIManager. There is the commitment to 
resource the team for the initial training and ongoing training, attendance at 
meetings and the cost of employing myself as the Clinical Director on a part- 
time basis. Recently the Regional CommanderIManager agreed to finance 
the cost of two Peer Support Team members to attend the Australasian 
Critical lncident Stress Association in Adelaide, Australia. I believe in the 
current climate of fiscal restraints, that Management in this particular Region 
values the ClSM programme's contribution to the health and safety of its 
personnel. The need for psychological intervention such as Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing for firefighters following exposure to a critical incident has 
become widely accepted within the New Zealand Fire Service. Debriefing 
has been one of the most common method of intervention utilised as it 
provides an opportunity for firefighters to process the incident both cognitively 
and emotionally, especially following a particularly distressing critical incident. 
It is also culturally acceptable to the Fire Service. Although firefighters in the 
main respond effectively following a critical incident they are not immune to 
its stresses. They must attend to and witness the pain and suffering of 
others regardless of their own needs which taxes even the toughest 'John 
Wayne". Debriefing meets an overwhelming need among Fire Service 
personnel as evidenced by its gradual acceptance over the last 10 years. In 
times of repeated calls for fiscal restraint with funding cutbacks and budget 
shortfalls, CISD provides a forum for honest and confidential narration of the 
often painful experiences that firefighters are exposed to, during and 
following critical incidents. 
In today's tenuous industrial climate, firefighters within the New Zealand 
context feel grossly under-paid, undervalued and poorly resourced. I have 
personally witnessed their increased vulnerability to suffering from Critical 
lncident Stress due to the cumulative nature of the stresses that exist in their 
everyday life of working within the New Zealand Fire Service. The anger and 
resentment they exhibit particularly during a CISD, is very often directed not 
at the circumstances of the critical incident but at the organisational, 
industrial and operational circumstances. It is difficult, as a Clinician working 
in the field of ClSM within the New Zealand context, to offer any concrete 
suggestions on how to manage the stress attached to the ongoing industrial 
unrest. The strategy that I suggest, is that they draw from within their own 
resources of stress management, with the support of the Peer Support Team 
and myself, until the restructuring is finally settled. I see this as helping the 
distressed firefighter regain a sense of mastery and control of their 
environment, even when it remains in disorder. Unfortunately for some, their 
personal resources of stress management have reached breaking point. 
These are the firefighers for whom I have grave concerns for their personal 
well-being and safety. In some instances I have referred these firefighters on 
for professional psychological services which has assisted them in trying to 
regain some sense of control in their lives. 
11.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have discussed the findings of the research which supported 
some of the basic assumptions and rationales which are the structure of 
Mitchell's model (1983) of debriefing. ClSD was found to be effective in 
reducing the significant stresses associated with attending a critical incident. 
I have also discussed how the findings have influenced my ongoing practice 
and my partnership relationship with the ClSM Peer Support Team members. 
I have shared how some of these findings have significant implications for my 
ongoing practice. In the concluding chapter I will evaluate the aims of the 
study and briefly discuss the political implications for providing ongoing ClSM 
services in relation to the current industrial climate. I will also discuss the 
suggestions for further research. 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will evaluate the aims and present the conclusion of the 
study. I will also discuss the political implications for providing ongoing 
Critical lncident Stress Management (CISM) services, which includes Critical 
lncident Stress Debriefing (CISD), one component of CISM, in relation to the 
research findings and the current industrial climate that presently exists 
within the New Zealand Fire Service. I will conclude with a discussion on the 
limitations of this study and suggestions for further research. 
12.2 RESEARCH AIMS, PURPOSE AND OUTCOMES 
To address this process it is important to return to the introduction of the 
research to examine whether I have met the intended outcome for this 
research. My aim was to "explore within the New Zealand context, the 
experience of ClSD on firefighters following attendance at  a critical 
incident". The purpose was to "gain contextual meaning and an 
understanding of the experiences of firefighters who have participated 
in a ClSD based on Mitchell's model (1983) of debriefing". 
The research explored the experience of debriefing on four firefighters 
following their participation in a Critical lncident Stress Debriefing. The 
participants described their personal experience in relation to participating in 
a Critical lncident Stress Debriefing following attendance at significant critical 
incidents. Their personal insights into the experience of debriefing, portrayed 
through narratives, were both moving and inspiring. The pattern of the 
formalised process and the eight themes that were uncovered in an analysis 
of the narratives highlighted the positive benefits of the experience of 
participating in a ClSD to reduce and mitigate the harmful stress effects 
following exposure to a critical incident. 
The research not only uncovered the positive aspects of the experience of 
debriefing, but it also afforded the research participants the opportunity to 
speak about their personal experiences in some depth in relation to the 
particular critical incident and its associated stresses. I felt privileged that 
they were willing to share their narratives, in such depth and honesty with 
me, whereby they were required to once again recall a distressing critical 
incident and the debriefing that followed the incident. During the exchange of 
discussion there was a shared warmth, understanding and compassion 
between myself and the participants. With the telling of their stories there 
were mixed emotions of sadness and tears, but also humour, intimacy and 
respect. All participants found the interviews a very healing process which I 
found really affirming. Initially, I had grave concerns that the interview 
process had the potential to resurface painful thoughts, feelings and 
memories associated with their attendance at the critical incident and 
subsequent CISD, which could have had serious negative consequences. 
Fortunately my fears were unfounded as the telling of their stories was 
therapeutic. This therapeutic process is well supported in the nursing 
literature (Sedney, Baker & Gross, 1994; Heiney, 1995; McDaniel, 
Hepworth & Doherty, 1995; Koch, 1998). Not only was it healing to the 
participants, but also to myself. I felt affirmed in hearing them share the 
positive aspects of the debriefing which made me feel more grounded and 
empowered in my practice in terms of its value to the participants, their 
family, friends, fellow-firefighters and the organisation, the New Zealand Fire 
Service. 
The findings clearly indicated that the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing 
process was a very valuable CISM strategy to use, within the context of the 
New Zealand Fire Service, using a modified version of Mitchell's model 
(1983) following major incidents, or where there was evidence of cumulative 
stress that required debriefing. It affirmed that the services the Peer Support 
Team are providing are both appropriate and acceptable. I was grateful and 
humbled by their contribution to my research and their contribution to the 
ongoing development of knowledge in the field of CISM. The findings from 
this study regarding the positive benefits of participating in a CISD are 
consistent with the literature. 
The ultimate goal of this nursing research study was to provide information 
that would lead to improvement in the provision of services to the consumers 
of ClSM services and to encourage other organisations to look at providing 
such services to their staff who may be exposed to critical incidents. As a 
Nurse Clinician working in the area of CISM, it is my opinion that the results 
of this research clearly indicate that CISD is a major factor in assisting 
firefighting personnel in coping with the stresses associated with attending a 
major critical incident. The positive benefits to the participants has been 
discussed in more detail in Chapters nine and ten. However, the research 
has clearly demonstrated that there were very real benefits to the four 
participants who experienced the process of CISD. The process provided 
them with an opportunity to discuss the incident with others who had 
experienced similar stresses following attendance at an incident, in a safe, 
controlled environment supported by Peer Support Team members and 
facilitated by a facilitator who had a genuine understanding of the New 
Zealand Fire Service culture and had the necessary training and skills in the 
group process. The facilitator was able to assess those participants who 
required further ClSM interventions. As a consequence of attending a CISD, 
the participants found that a sense of bonding and respect was increased 
through the experience. A further finding was that the participants were able 
to resolve the stresses attached to attending the critical incident by their 
participation in the debriefing. 
While this research has focussed specifically on CISD, I have repeatedly 
stated that the CISD group process is only one component of ClSM services. 
It is part of the comprehensive, multi-component approach to ClSM and was 
never intended to be a stand alone approach to the management of Critical 
Incident Stress for emergency service workers. The importance of providing 
a systematic approach to crisis management relates to providing multiple 
interventions to afford the greatest impact in order to achieve the goal of 
crisis stabilisation and symptom mitigation (Everly & Mitchell, 1998). 
Unfortunately this concept is very often poorly understood as evidenced by 
Snelgrove (1998) who argues that the ClSD process should not be a stand 
alone intervention strategy. However, it must be recognised that in the 
earlier history of ClSM development, many programmes were referred to 
generically as Critical lncident Stress Debriefing programmes even though 
they provided other forms of ClSM services. This could be where the 
confusion has arisen. In fact, when I was involved in the pilot programme ih 
establishing a crisis intervention strategy for the New Zealand Fire Service in 
the late 1980's and early 1990s, we referred to our programme as a Critical 
lncident Stress Peer Support Programme. We provided a comprehensive 
and multi-component approach to ClSM services. Since redeveloping the 
present Team that I work with as the Clinical Director, we have renamed our 
team as a Critical lncident Stress Management Peer Support Team which 
more truly represents our programme. The generic term of ClSD has been 
replaced with the term ClSM to more precisely represent the multi- 
component approach to ClSM services (Everly & Mitchell, 1997). 
Recently, Professor Jeffrey Mitchell, the founder of the ClSD model suggests 
that the formal ClSD process receive a name change in order to more 
accurately reflect the reality of the world of crisis intervention. While he is 
honoured by the application of his name to the ClSD process, he believes 
that the ClSM field has developed beyond one individual. He believes the 
name should reflect those working in the field, not just himself and has 
suggested the term IClSF (International Critical lncident Stress Foundation) 
Model as a replacement to the Mitchell (1 983) model (Mitchell, 1998). 
12.3 RECOMMENDATIONS TO MANAGEMENT 
The data provided strong evidence in support of ClSD as a valuable 
technique for firefighters. The narrative can inform social policy (Van der 
Staay, 1994) and can facilitate change in organisations (Gabriel, 1995: 
Yanow, 1995). As discussed earlier, it is my belief that valuable personnel 
have left the service due to their inability to cope with the stresses attached 
to the job, particularly critical incident stress. The personal cost to the 
individual, to their families, to the organisation and to society can be reduced 
if appropriate ClSM services are provided to reduce chronic disease and the 
incidence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. I have personally witnessed 
the positive benefits of providing Critical Incident Stress Debriefings but I am 
ever mindful that it is just one component of the multi-component approach to 
CISM. I view ClSD as a strategy that compliments other ClSM strategies. 
Rarely is it utilised as a stand alone process. Often firefighting personnel 
have received one-on-one support either at the scene of the critical incident, 
or sometime later. A defusing may have been held and a decision made 
following the defusing that a more formalised intervention strategy such as a 
ClSD was required. I believe that the model that is followed within the New 
Zealand Fire Service does meet the needs of its personnel in a culturally 
appropriate and acceptable manner. The research suggests that the 
traditional methods of counselling and psychotherapy are not seen as being 
effective or acceptable to firefighters involved in critical incidents. This has 
been highlighted, not only in this research, but by the increased utilisation of 
the ClSM Peer Support Programmes that are currently operating within the 
New Zealand Fire Service. 
My recommendation to the New Zealand Fire Service Management is that 
their commitment and support of the ClSM programme needs to continue in 
its present form. This recommendation results not only from the research 
findings, but from my own personal knowledge of the long protracted and 
unresolved organisational change process which has had a negative impact 
on firefighters morale. In recent times I have facilitated debriefings where 
personnel have focussed more on the stresses attached to the current 
organisational unrest and uncertainty, than on the stresses attached to the 
actual critical incident. This indicates the seriousness of the present ongoing 
industrial relations issues. In many instances I have felt somewhat 
powerless to offer any concrete solutions. I have acknowledged and have 
attempted to understand their situation but have not been able to offer them 
any immediate hope of a resolution. However, the debriefing and other forms 
of ClSM services has provided them with an opportunity in which to express 
their anger, resentment and pain associated with the current organisational 
unrest and provided them with strategies in which to manage their stresses, 
until a resolution is reached. Also, increased bonding has been highlighted 
as being a positive aspect of the debriefing process which further assists the 
firefighters in maintaining some sense of control and cohesion. 
In the particular Region of the New Zealand Fire Service where I am currently 
employed on a part-time consultancy basis, Management are clearly 
committed to the concept of providing a ClSM Peer Support programme with 
clear leadership, employing a Clinical Director to provide the clinical support 
and expertise to the Peer Support Team members. Even though 
Management are ever mindful of the repeated calls from Government for 
fiscal restraints, in this particular Region they are committed to providing 
stress management strategies to provide a "duty of care" for their personnel 
in order to meet their obligations to the Health & Safety and Employment Act 
(1992). However, I do not believe that this commitment to the ClSM 
programme is clearly evident throughout the New Zealand Fire Service. 
Some programmes in other Regions, that previously were considered to have 
strong leadership and supportive Peer Support Team members, have 
faltered due to the lack of the commitment and support of Management. As a 
consequence they may have lost their Clinical Directors who were previously 
employed as the Occupational Health Nurse. The Peer Support Team 
members enthusiasm has lessened, understandably, due to the lack of clear 
leadership, support and ongoing meetings and training. Management, in 
these Regions, needs to look at the commitment to the health and safety of 
their personnel, particularly in the current organisational context of 
widespread unrest. 
The ClSD model described in this study was designed specifically for 
emergency service personnel, but can be easily adapted for other 
organisations such as hospitals, for their nursing and medical staff, in the 
mental health area, Hospice staff who care for the terminally ill, within the 
Education and Welfare sectors, and for organisations that provide community 
disaster workers. The key features of ClSD is to provide a debriefing within 
1 - 7 days after the incident, to have a skilled facilitator who has an 
understanding of the occupational group they are working with and who has 
credibility. I strongly support the training of Peer Support Team members 
from within these organisations who have "walked in the shoes of those they 
are assisting", are well respected, have excellent listening skills, respect 
confidentiality and have received the necessary training in ClSM services. 
Once again I acknowledge that debriefing is just one component of ClSM 
services, and the particular programme that I am associated with has moved 
towards more one-on-one interventions and less group interventions. 
However, debriefing is an important component, particularly after unpleasant 
and distressing critical incidents or following cumulative stresses associated 
with critical incidents. As previously discussed, traditional methods of 
counselling or psychotherapy are not always acceptable or as effective for 
nursing, medical staff, emergency service personnel or community disaster 
workers who have been exposed to critical incidents. It must be 
acknowledged that the reactions associated with their exposure to a critical 
incident are normal in normal individuals to an abnormal event. It is 
important not to medicalise Critical lncident Stress, but to acknowledge it as 
a normal reaction in personnel who are often exposed to critical incidents in 
their occupational areas. I strongly recommend to organisations who have a 
commitment to care for the health and safety of their personnel, to look 
seriously at providing Critical lncident Stress Management strategies for the 
good of their staff. Not only is it cost-effective in terms of fiscal savings to the 
organisation, but also in reducing the cost to the individual, their families, 
their colleagues and to society. 
12.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Limitations to the study relate to the descriptiveand exploratory nature of the 
study, and the limited sample size of the four participants who were recruited 
for the study from within one Region of the New Zealand Fire Service. 
In presenting the results of the research and the discussion in relation to 
implications for practice, and recommendations to Management and other 
relevant organisations, I have attempted at all times to remain faithful in 
retaining the narratives of the participants in their wholeness and 
completeness in order to demonstrate credibility. To ensure rigor and 
credibility, all the participants were sent a copy of the interpretations of their 
narratives to verify that they recognised the findings as true to their 
experiences. The purpose of returning the final results before presenting the 
research, is to ensure that those who have lived the experience of debriefing 
validate that the findings are a true representation of their experience. 
Many purists from the scientific model of research would argue that the 
findings of this research could not be generalised due to the limited sample 
size. However it must be remembered that while only four cases were 
studied, they were studied in depth. Certain issues, activities and problems 
did appear in the study which were common to all the participants, therefore 
certain generalisations can be drawn. The real contribution of case study 
design, utilised in this research, is not generalisation but particularisation to 
depict events or experiences in one particular setting as it exists in reality for 
the participants. I believe that the knowledge gained from the powerful tool 
of the narratives cited in this study has the potential to be transferred to 
others working in the field of emergency services. The insights and 
illuminations highlighted in the study have the power to be useful to ClSM 
service providers, that is mental health professionals and Peer Support Team 
members, and others working in the field of crisis intervention, to creatively 
develop their practices in order to provide the most appropriate and 
acceptable service. 
Despite the limitations discussed, I have created an audit trail discussing 
clearly, decisions made throughout the research study in relation to 
theoretical, methodological and analytical choices (Sandelowski, 1986; 
Koch, 1998). The objective of the audit trail was to clearly articulate and 
demonstrate the evidence and thought processes which led to the 
conclusions. I have sign-posted what has gone on while carrying out the 
research to enable the readers of this research to journey with ease and 
enthusiasm through the worlds of Fit, Flick, Instantaneous, Red and myself 
as researcher, in order for them to decide whether the narrative is a 
legitimate research process. 
12.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Since beginning this research journey into the experience of CISD on 
firefighters, I believe the potential for further research is considerable. While 
this research study has focussed specifically on the experience of CISD, I 
believe it would be of value to further extend the study by increasing the 
number of research participants to include the three tiers of firefighting 
personnel. Only permanent (DI) firefighting personnel were included in this 
study. This would increase the chances of being able to generalise the 
results and to increase this possibility. The study participants could be 
recruited from all the Regions of the New Zealand Fire Service. 
While I have studied debriefing only, a further area for research consideration 
would be to study the effects of the multi-component ClSM services and their 
integrated service provision. Is one method more valuable and acceptable to 
personnel than other methods? I believe this would be a valuable area for 
further research utilising both qualitative and quantitative research. 
Another area that I would like to research is the timeliness of Critical Incident 
Stress Debriefing. Is 1 - 7 days the most ideal time to conduct a debriefing? 
Should it be held sooner or later? 
The areas for research development in the field of ClSM are enormous. 
However, I believe given the current organisational unrest being experienced 
within the New Zealand Fire Service, an area for consideration that I would 
like to research would be to study the differing tiersllevels of firefighting 
personnel in order to evaluate whether one level is more liable to suffer 
Critical Incident Stress and require ClSM services than other levels, 
particularly in relation to the present ongoing organisational change process? 
Another recommendation for future research, is to interview members of the 
Peer Support Team members from the different Regions within the New 
Zealand Fire Service and evaluate the programme in terms of their initial and 
on-going training, the clinical support and supervision being provided, and 
how they are coping with the stress of being a member of a Peer Support 
Team while experiencing their own stresses in relation to the current 
organisational unrest. 
12.6. CONCLUSION 
While I began this journey looking to increase mine and others knowledge in 
the area of CISD, I had little understanding of what I and others would 
experience. It has been a journey of personal growth and practice 
development. My life has been enriched by the sharing and the intimate 
relationship that was established with all four participants who generously 
gave of their time and inner selves in order to provide the rich and powerful 
narratives that uncovered the value and importance of providing CSlD 
following particularly distressing major events. The knowledge gained from 
this study has the potential to hdd to the'increasing body of knowledge in the 
field of ClSM services in order to improve service provision to emergency 
service personnel who, because of their particular work, are more likely to be 
exposed to critical i~cidents in their everyday working lives. 
The journey with the participants has been one of true partnership. I have 
included them in decision making, particularly in relation to their participation 
in the study and, of course the final results of the study. The participants, by 
their sharing have found the process therapeutic and have been empowered 
with the knowledge that they have gained a sense of control over their lives, 
and with the sharing of their stories they have assisted not only myself but 
also others working in the field of CISM. Empowerment for me is the 
affirmation that the services provided by the Team are meeting the needs of 
our firefighting personnel. However, there are areas where we can improve 
that provision. With the knowledge gained from this study I hope I will be 
able to further empower the Peer Support Team members that I presently 
work with, in affirming that the service they so generously support and 
provide is valued by the consumers of their service. 
It is my belief that our journey in the field of CISM services is only just 
beginning. As a Nurse Clinician, I believe an important role I have is in 
acknowledging the resilience of emergency sewice workers when exposed to 
the life-threatening and devastating effects of disaster work. Those working 
in the field of CISM need to respect and acknowledge their contributions to 
the saving of the lives or the rescue of the injured or the deceased. By this 
acknowledgement, it validates their practice, empowers them and assists 
emergency service personnel in regaining a sense of control (which this 
research has highlighted), so as to assist them in the recovery from the 
effects of Critical lncident Stress. 
In conclusion, I feel more empowered in my personal philosophy and practice 
in the area of Critical lncident Stress Management. The personal narratives 
of Fit, Flick, Instantaneous and Red, will continue to provide me and others 
with a special interest in the area of CISM, with a greater depth of 
understanding of the experience of CISD. The four participants have all 
supported me in this journey, in my own house-garden-wilderness. The gifl 
of their sharing, in all its depth, honesty, integrity and willingness to open up 
past experiences and pain are gratefully acknowledged. 
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APPENDIX 11 
CHARTER 
PURPOSE STATEMENT 
Council and staff see the purpose of Whitireia Community Polytechnic is to provide 
high quality learning opportunities and a sense of belonging for all people in 
supportive and caring ways which are: 
Non-sexist 
Non-racist 
Sensitive and responsive to the uniqueness of each person's special needs 
Responsive to the changing multicultural community 
In accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi 
VALUES STATEMENT 
Council and staff are committed to the following values: 
EQUITY 
Providing significant learning, power-sharing and success for those who have lacked 
such opportunities. 
IDENTITY 
Creating an environment where people feel they belong because their uniqueness is 
valued and promoted. 
RESPONSIVENESS 
Being flexible, creative and open to change, to better meet individual and community 
needs. 
Encouraging the sharing of views, learning and resources, where individual self- 
esteem (mana) and group harmony result from caring about others. 
SUCCESS 
Being an effective organisation which leads in its field, demonstrating a clear sense 
of purpose and striving for excellence. 
GOALS 
OVER-RIDING STATEMENT 
All Goals and Policies developed will be consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi and 
ensure the opportunity for Maori people to achieve their social and economic 
potential as an equal party to the Treaty. 
GOAL l 
To provide a comprehensive range (introductory to degree level) of high quality, 
accessible, appropriately recognised, vocational and non-vocational learning 
opportunities which have been developed by consulting widely with relevant 
industry, occupational and other constituent groups. 
GOAL 2 
To provide a learning environment (including high quality teaching and a range of 
learning services) which enhances the possibility of success for every student - as of 
right. -282- 
GOAL 3 
To actively promote equity of educational opportunity particularly for traditionally 
disadvantaged groups. 
GOAL 4 
To be accountable for the efficient and effective use of resources allocated. 
GOAL 5 
To increase available funding resources 
THE CURRICULUM PHILOSOPHY 
INTRODUCTION 
The epistemological beliefs espoused in this curriculum arise from individual and 
collective critical reflection on past experience. Out of the discourse emerges a 
renewed commitment to two fundamental principles. Firstly, that health and well- 
being are an inherent right of all people in our community. Secondly, that through 
the development of specialised knowledge (research) nurses make a unique 
contribution to the health of their communities through their nursing practice. 
In seeking to embed these principles in our curriculum we have chosen to use the 
Treaty of Waitangi as a central organising conceptual framework. The justification 
for using this framework arises out of our belief that the Treaty provides us with a 
powerful metaphor of PARTNERSHIP by illuminating relational boundedness and 
the transformative possibilities which occur in the spaces created within this 
boundedness. The Treaty of Waitangi articulates the nature of the relationship 
between the founding peoples of New Zealand, by first naming them, and then 
describing the rights and obligations of each to the other. This is what we refer to as 
relational boundedness. It is the space between the "one" and the "other" that 
creates the dialectical tension through which relational possibilities are transformed 
into action. Even more fundamental than this, we would argue that when "one" and 
"other" engage in the dialectic each creates both "self" and "other". 
Critically reflecting on the historical relationship between the Crown and Maori gives 
us important insights into how the health and well-being of people within our society 
has been managed over time, and provides strategies by which barriers to health 
and well-being may be better addressed in the future. Deep understanding of the 
relational; that is, recognition of the dialectic between "one" and "other", is a 
fundamental basis for nursing practice. We believe that an understanding of the 
relational possibilities illuminates the transformative potential of the 
teachingllearning relationship, and the nurselclient relationship. 
Our beliefs about the significance of the concept of partnership to the 
teachingllearning, and nurselclient relationship are articulated through the 
understanding we have of the way the Articles of the Treaty create the possibility of 
partnership within the New Zealand context. 
THE TREATY OF WAlTANGl 
ARTICLE THE FIRST 
The first article of the Treaty of Waitangi is the basis for the claim that the Treaty is 
the cornerstone of New Zealand nationhood. Social existence is dependent on the 
organisation of mutual relations of human beings and classes of human beings in 
community. By signing the Treaty, Maori people mandated to the Crown the 
authority to secure an ordered social system within which Maori people and those 
represented by the Crown could live together in community. Over time, the authority 
of the Crown has been transferred to a western liberal parliamentary democratic 
system of government. 
In an uncritical climate this ordered system becomes a dominant ideology by 
representing itself as the 'natural order', thus "assuming a cultural ascendancy" 
which enables this world view to reproduce itself overtime. (Fay. 1987. p 138) 
This process is what Gramsci described as hegemonic oppression in which; 
"...those who govern and disproportionably possess its goods are thought to have a 
right to do so." 
(Gramsci. 1971. ps 1 81-182) 
The greatest source of a government's power and authority lies in the hegemonic 
belief held by those who are governed, that governments act in their best interest. It 
is this process which obscures the real nature of power relations within any social 
system. What makes the New Zealand context unique is that by using the Treaty of 
Waitangi as their reference, Maori have consistently challenged this hegemonic 
process. By their resolve to maintain their mana motuhake, Maori challenge the 
legitimacy of a social order based on a "single world view" reality. By creating the 
possibility that "knowledge" may derive 
from more than a single world view Maori become an archetypal model for the claim 
that there may be many ways of knowing. 
From the literature, and our own experience of teaching to culturally and socially 
diverse students we believe that a sinale world view approach to teaching and 
learning deriving solely from an empir~allbehaviouri~ paradigm is not only 
educationallv inadequate but also morally indefensible. In acknowledging the 
possibility o i a  bicult'ural world view, we can also extrapolate that there are many 
world views, many ways of knowing, that inform us. To provide a framework where 
these different forms of knowing a& explicit and open for conscious reflection we 
have used Habermas' three categories of knowledge-constitutive interests which he 
argues are integral to human existence. These three categories he identified as 
"technical", "practical" and "emancipatory". (Habermas, J., 1971). 
Each of these knowledge interests articulate essential ways of knowing which is 
integral to nursing practice. 
Technical knowledge interests derive from empirical analytic inquiry and 
is; ...".. typically instrumental knowledge taking the form of scientific explanations. 
"(Carr & Kemmis. 1986. p 135) These explanations provide nurses with essential 
knowledge of the psychobiophysical, as well as an understanding of instrumental 
methodologies and process which are integral aspects of nursing practice. 
Practical knowledge interests derive from the hermeneutic or interpretive paradigm 
Typically it takes the form of phenomenological inquiry which explores and 
articulates the meaning of the lived experience for self and others. 
"It is distinguished from technical cognitive interest in that it aims not at 
comprehension of an objective reality but at the maintenance of the intersubjectivity 
of mutual understanding." (Habermas, J., 1971. p 176). 
It is through the insights gained from the phenomenological paradigm that nurses 
are able to articulate the core value of caring in nursing practice. 
Emancipatory knowledge interest arises from a critical paradigm. Habermas 
argued that the interpretive paradigm was an insufficient explanation because it 
ignored the way people's understanding of their lived experience was itself shaped 
by the social structures and constraints. (Carr & Kemmis ibid.) Emancipatory 
knowledge is possible when people engage in a discourse which challenges dogma 
and received wisdoms. 
"Discourse helps test the truth claims of opinions (and norms) which the speakers 
no longer take for granted. In discourse the force of the argument is the only 
permissible compulsion, whereas cooperative search for truth is the only permissible 
motive." (Habermas, J., 1971. p 168). 
In the context of the relational, when "undistorted communication occurs people 
can realise their ootential to fully act as autonomous rational decision makers. It is 
the inclusion of emancipatory knowledge that moves us past the didactic limitations 
of power and powerlessness, and into a dialectic model of empowerment from which 
transformative partnership can emerge. 
It is this illuminated concept of partnership which links the emancipatory potential of 
the Treaty of Waitangi with the'eman~i~aiory potential of the teachingnearfling 
relationship, and the emancipatory potential of the nurselclient relationship. 
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE AND NURSING 
Critically reflecting on the limitations of positivist science as a 'single world view' 
enables us to articulate both the relationship of science within the curriculum, and 
the nature of power relations existing between "teachers" and "learners". 
Like most industrially developed countries, New Zealand has gained much from the 
application of knowledge gained from positivist science. However as Carr and 
Kemmis (1986) argue; 
"Science had become an ideology culturally produced and socially supported 
unexamined way of seeing the world which shapes and guides social action. " 
(P 1 327) 
In developing our curriculum we have recognised that a "single world view" based 
on an empirical behaviourist approach to teaching and learning is an inadequate 
basis to prepare students for nursing practice. There are two major limitations to 
curricula which rely solely on an empirical approach. 
The first serious limitation is that empirical explanations are themselves limited. 
Again to quote Carr and Kemmis; 
"... to claim that the label "Knowledge" can only be ascribed to that which is founded 
in 'reality' as apprehended by the senses,(is in effect to say) that value judgements, 
since they cannot be founded on empirical knowledge, cannot be given the status of 
valid knowledge. (ibid. pp 61-621). 
We would argue that one of the important outcomes of this curriculum is in fact to 
produce beginner nurse practitioners who are able to make sound value judgements 
in relation to client care. To rely solely on an empirical behaviourist paradigm would 
be to create a serious paradox between what we teach and what we intended to 
achieve. Bevis (1989) has lucidly argued that when nursing curricula depend on a 
behaviourist approach, illegitimate and hidden curricula are employed to circumvent 
the inadequacies of explanations deriving from this empirical paradigm. 
The second limitation to behaviourist curricula is that they become what Friere has 
described as a "banking" model of education. (Friere, P. 1972) That is to say a 
model of education in which the teacher has all the 'knowledge' which they 'deposit' 
in students who are deemed to have no knowledge. It is this model of education 
which has been challenged by many critics on the grounds that it has become one 
of the principle mechanisms by which dominant ideology is reproduced by obscuring 
the nature of the power relations in the teachingllearning context. 
(eg Friere, P. 1972, Gramsci, A. 1971, Bourdieu, P. 1973, Apple, M. 1979.) 
It is these insights, along with their lived experience which has in recent years 
caused Maori to question the adequacies of the education system to meet their 
needs and aspirations. Similarly, authors such as Belenky, M. et al (1986) have 
challenged this model of education from a feminist perspective. And this same 
challenge has been raised by nurses who have questioned the adequacies of this 
model of education to prepare students for nursing practice. (Bevis, E. & Watson, J. 
1989, Perry, J & Moss, C. 1989, Clare,J. 1991. Dixon, A. 1991 .) 
In addressing this limitation we acknowledge our obligations and responsibilities of 
Kawanatanga in this curriculum. The curriculum describes the "ordered system", 
and states under what authority actions are taken in order that accountability may be 
defined. 
The boundedness of the concept of Kawanatanga as it relates to the role of the 
"teacher" in this curriculum, arises from the interpretation of Governorship as 
authoritative responsibility and obligation to "students" rather than authoritarian 
privilege. From this stance, Tutors model the way "governance" translates into a 
social contract of competency for the professional responsibilities and obligations of \ 
safe nursing practice. 
In this curriculum technical interests are reflected in a strong Bioscience focus and 
technical nursing skills. 
ARTICLE THE SECOND AND FOURTH 
TIN0 RANGATIRATANGAIAUTONOMY 
At the very least the second article of the Treaty articulates the right of Maori to 
maintain their separate identity as Maori. The Crown guaranteed to protect those 
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institutions, customs and artefacts by which Maori express and know themselves as 
Maori. We have interpreted Tino Rangatiratanga to mean the right to be self 
governing and self determining, and use the term "Autonomy" to represent this 
meaning. 
Hoagland (1988) describes the Kantian view of autonomy as the need for people to 
rise above their nature and through the use of pure reasoning determine what to do 
and by exercising their will do their duty. Fay (1987) presents the existentialist view 
of autonomy as defined by Sartre as the freedom from the illusion that our actions 
are dependent on external forces or other people. According to this view of 
autonomy we are condemned to freedom. The autonomous person knows that 
they alone are responsible for the decisions they make from an infinite range of 
possibilities. (p 201) 
A third sense of how the term autonomy has been defined is that suggest by 
Rousseau. He argued that autonomy represented moral liberty. That is, the 
autonomous person is one who acts on the basis of ones best judgement as to what 
one should do. A person is self determining in the sense that who one is and what 
one does is as a result of ones own voluntary discretion. (Fay. 1987. p 76). 
Hoagland challenges the Kantian view of autonomy as freedom from ones emotions, 
and the radical autonomy of the existentialists, and appears to argue a view of 
autonomy similar to the Rousseau explanation. 
She proposes that autonomy may be defined as the self conscious sense of 
ourselves as moral agents. She extends the concept of autonomy (self governing) 
to include the idea of autonomous individuals in community by coining the term 
"auto koenony", that is self in community. Auto (self) and koenonia (community, or 
any group whose members have something in common). 
"The self in community involves making choices, it involves us having a self 
conscious sense of ourselves as moral agents in a community of other self 
conscious moral agents." 
(Hoagland. 1988. p 451 .) 
This idea of self in cornmunit); is expanded upon by Fay who argues that: 
"Collective autonomy involves a group of people determining on the basis of rational 
reflection the sorts of policies and practices it will follow and then acting in 
accordance with them." (Fay. 1987. p 77) 
In relating these different perspectives back to the Treaty, we argue that autonomy 
expressed as Tino Rangatiratanga, is the possibility Maori people have to critically 
reflect on what it is to be Maori within the context of the dialectic tension between 
Kawanatanga, and Tino Rangatiratanga. 
It is in the space between Kawanatanga and Tino Rangatiratanga that all of the 
relational possibilities can be realised. It is from the Treaty that we take this model 
of the way "partnership" can emerge from a transformative relationship in which 
"self and "other" are mutually constitutive. 
In his discussion of Buber's conceptualisation of the l-Thou relational, Geering 
captures the essence of this potential. 
" In the beginning there is neither I nor Thou but the primal relation we may call I- 
Thou. It is out of such a relation that the I grows to become a self conscious 
reality. Moreover, it is only through a Thou that a person develops a clear sense of 
self identity: and this happens to one as an act of grace." 
(Geering. 1983. p 27) 
We would argue that the Treaty provides an opportunity for this relational possibility 
to exist between Maori and non Maori, and to symbolically represent the 
transfonnative potential of all relationships. 
If it is an act of grace to recognise that the "I" needs the "other" in order to know 
"self" then it is the act of an autonomous, self conscious moral being to accept 
responsibility for what they bring to the relational. 
Understanding the shared meanings of people's lived experience, and the choices 
they make, forms the basis for Habermas' claim that this constitutes a practical 
knowledge interest. 
PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE INTERESTS AND NURSING 
If technical knowledge enables us to develop universal laws of probability, then 
practical knowledge enables us to understand through interpretive theory the 
meanings people make of their lived experience. 
"Lived experience is the way people encounter situations in terms of their own 
personal concerns, background meanings, temporality, habitual, cultural bodies, 
emotions and reflective thought. " 
(Benner & Wrubel. 1989. p 410) 
The significance of practical knowledge to nursing practice is that through the use of 
interpretive methodologies such as phenomenology, nurses are able to surface the 
central caring value of nursing practice. Patterson & Zderad (1976), Watson (1985), 
Benner & Wrubel (1989), and Bishop & Scudder (1991) have all provided examples 
of thick descriptions of the way caring is critically and fundamentally a process 
involving the relational between nurse and client. 
Nursing begins with a moral disposition "to care". Using an ontological interpretation 
of caring as a fundamental human way of being in the world, Bishop and Scudder 
(1991) draw a Heidegarrian distinction between caring that creates dependency and 
"authentic caring". 
"... authentic care occurs when the care giver will 'leap ahead' in his existential (sic) 
potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his "care" but rather to give it back to 
him authentically. Thus, in authentic care the other is helped to care for his or her 
own being." (Bishop & Scudder. 1991. p 57) 
The significance of the distinction between caring which is dependency creating and 
caring which is authentic, is that dependency creating care inevitably involves a 
"power-over" relationship. Authentic care is "an act of grace", in that the power in 
the relational is an enabling power, a "power-to". 
We would argue that a prerequisite for understanding the full potential of what it 
means "to care" is the development of an autonomous self as defined by Hoagland. 
That is that "authentic caring" can only be undertaken by people who have 
developed a self conscious sense of themselves as moral agents. It is our 
contention that authentic caring for self precedes the possibility of authentic caring 
for others. Within this curriculum students are guided through a reflective process of 
exploring their own lived experience, in relation to others. From this platform, 
students begin the exploration of the meaning of authentic caring for self and others, 
for the l-Thou within a nursing context, using the knowledge from the interpretive 
paradigm to inform them. 
While knowledge from the interpretive paradigm is a necessary aspect of nursing 
knowledge, it is no more sufficient an explanation of the complexities of nursing 
practice than knowledge from the technical paradigm. To argue that the one or the 
other is a better foundation for nursing practice is to deny ourselves the opportunity 
to use both kinds of knowledge. The transformative power of the relational is 
diminished when it is represented as a reductionist argument of eitherlor. That is to 
say that neither the knowledge from the technical , nor the interpretive is sufficient to 
explain the relational. 
In relation to the Treaty this point is most aptly put in a submission to the Waitangi 
Tribunal from the Manakau claim: 
".. As things are, the local tribes have no status. Continually they feel it to be 
pressed upon them that they have only two options- to capitulate to Western ways, 
which they refuse to do, or cling to past ways in the belief that they contain fixed and 
uncompromising truths freed from the challenge of change. We believe there is a 
better option." (Cited by William Renwick. 1990. p 42). 
In relation to an educational curriculum, Bawden argues that this reductionist logic 
has become a 
".. conflict around the relative importance of knowing versus doing. It has indeed 
become an issue of competitive exclusion- Knowing has become divorced from 
doing and vice versa, and indeed has been placed in opposition to it. (Bawden. 
1993. p 1) 
Within Nursing this same argument takes the form of the a debate between "theory" 
versus "practice", and between the "ethic of efficiency" and the "ethic of caring". 
What is required to move beyond this sterile binary trap is a way of conceptualising 
the relationship between Kawanatanga and Tino Rangatiratanga, between knowing 
and doing, and between theory and practice. 
We believe the third article of the Treaty moves us beyond the binary trap of 
eitherlor, and enables us to explore the "other options", the other potentialities. 
In this curriculum practical interests are reflected in the emphases on personal 
growth and communication skills, and an acknowledgment of the significance of the 
meaning that individuals have of their own lived experience. 
ARTICLE THE THIRD 
KIA RITE TAHllEMPOWERMENT 
The third article brings the concept of Kawanatanga into relationship with Tino 
Rangatiratanga. It articulates two obligations of the Crown to Maori, and by 
inference suggests the responsibility of Maori to the Crown. The first obligation was 
that the Crown would protect Maori people. We interpret this obligation from a 
deontological perspective of non maleficence, that is an obligation to do no harm. 
The second obligation was that the Crown would invest Maori people with the same 
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rights of citizenship as all other people within the Crowns jurisdiction. This second 
obligation we interpret as a right of inclusion. 
The significance of defining protection and inclusion is that it places some 
boundaries on the nature of the relationship formed by the two parties to the Treaty. 
The notions of protection and inclusion oblige the Crown to remain in the partnership 
with Maori. At the same time it may be argued that by accepting the rights of 
citizenship, Maori also accept the responsibility to participate,and thereby setting 
some limits to their autonomy. 
The three articles of the Treaty of Waitangi create the possibility of a partnership 
between the founding peoples of New Zealand. Our understanding of the 
partnership between Maori and non Maori acknowledges past power relations of 
dominance and subordination, and the effects that this history has had on the way 
we express ourselves as New Zealanders. In the past we would argue that the 
denial of the significance of the Treaty by Tau lwi has led to injustices and social 
inequities for the Tangata Whenua. A relationship built on hegemonic privilege is 
oppressive to all in the relationship because it limits human potential. 
When we begin to understand through critical reflection that the Treaty enables both 
'partners' to define themselves in relation to the other, then the whole concept of 
partnership becomes one of emancipatory potential. This potential occurs when 
people are able to engage in what Habermas defined as the undistorted 
communication of discourse. When discourse occurs all of the dialectical 
possibilities are attendant in a relational in which authentic self engages with 
authentic other to act. Empowerment is achieved when this emancipatory potential 
is realised. 
EMANCIPATORY KNOWLEDGE INTERESTS AND NURSING 
Bawden argues that the reductionist trap can be avoided through the realisation that 
the relationship is triangular not binary. In his formulation the triangle is defined at 
each apex by 'theory", "practice" and "praxis". 
"As a Trinity (these concepts) reflect a set of interrelated processes where no one 
element is prime, but each contributes to, and indeed participates in the others in 
affecting their very essences and creating a dynamic learning system." (Bawden. 
1993. p 2.) 
Similarly, Bishop and Scudder reconceptualise Buber's I-Thou, l-It from a binary 
dialogue to a "triadic dialogue", by including the "It" world into the relational between 
the "I and Thou". 
"Triadic dialogue is constituted by the relationship of two partners to the events in 
the world, as well as their relationship to each other." (Bishop & Scudder. 1991. p 
83) 
We would araue then that emancioatorv knowledge within the curriculum enables 
tutors and stidents to engage in dialogue which surfaces the contradictions 
between "theorv" and "~ractice", bv reflecting on their own understanding and 
experience in &h a way that nkiquestioni and therefore possibilities emerge. 
According to Perry and Moss (1989) this becomes a transformative process 
because "ideal-real" dichotomies are able to be made explicit and therefore open to 
critique. It is this transformative potential which Friere (1972) calls praxis and which 
we derive from the Treaty partnership as empowerment. 
It is this transformative potential of the relational which we take from the Treaty and 
embed in our curriculum to illuminate the teachingnearning partnership, and the 
nurselclient relationship in nursing practice. 
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In this curriculum emancipatory interests are reflected in the strong emphasis on 
critiquing Maori access to health, and sociological concepts relating to 
disadvantage, which create structural barriers to full and equitable access to health 
care. 
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APPENDIX 11 1 
JNFORMATION SHEET 
TO EXPLORE THE EXPERIENCE OF CRITICAL INCIDENT 
STRESSDEBRIEFING ON FIREFIGHTERS WITHIN A REGION 
OF THE NEW'ZEALND FIRE SERVICE. 
Researcher: Julie Maher, Progr'amme Manager, 
Level 3 Bachelor of Nursing Programme, 
Whitireia Community Polytechnic, Porirua. 
Telephone 237.31 03 ext.3738. 
I am asking you to consider being part of a research project I am doing for my 
thesis for a MA in Nursing at Victoria University. This information sheet 
gives you information about the project to help you decide whether you wish 
to be involved. 
I am interested in finding out more about the experience of participating in a 
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (C.I.S.D.) for firefighters. No studies have 
been carried out within the New Zealand culture and ever changing 
workplace of the New Zealand Fire Service. By talking with firefighters like 
yourself it will be an ideal opportunity of gaining further information and 
understanding of the concept. 
This study forms the basis of a MA Thesis to be conducted by myself, Julie 
Maher, through the Department of Nursing and Midwifery, Victoria University 
of Wellington. My supervisor is Margi Martin, Senior Lecturer from the 
Department. I am a Registered General and Obstetric Nurse and was 
employed in the No.4.Region of the New Zealand Fire Service from 1988 - 
1993. 1 am currently employed as a Nursing Lecturer in the Bachelor of 
Nursing Degree programme at Whitireia Community Polytechnic. I have 
been and remain an active member of the C.I.S.D.Peer Support Team for the 
last 8 years. 
, D E P A R T M E N T  O F  N U R S I N G  A N D  M I D W I F E R Y  
P.O. Box 600, Wellington. New Zmlutld. Trlrplltone c644471 5363 or Freedrone 0800 103 005 
21. (Information sheet continu'd). 
If you choose to be a participant in the research project your position within 
the New Zealand Fire Servie will not be adversely affected. 
It is important that you are willing to openly and honestly talk about your 
experience of debriefing. You have the right to refuse to answer any 
particular questions. If during the course of the study you no longer wish to 
participate, you have the right to withdraw at any time. 
Confidentiality will be maintained at all times throughout the process and 
anonymity will be adhered to in the final draft of the Thesis and any 
publications or conference presentations arising from this. You will be 
allocated a pseudonym to which.only you and I will have access to. The 
transcripts will be typed by a third person who will sign a confidentiality 
agreement. 
The aim of this study is to assist the researcher in understanding the 
experience of being a participant in a C.I.S.D. The researcher would like to 
interview 3 - 6 firefighters who have participated in a C.I.S.D. Knowledge 
gained from the study may benefit the health and welfare of firefighters and 
may also assist the C.I.S.D.Peer Support Teams provide a more effective 
programme. 
The study has been approved by the Central Regional Health Authority 
Wellington Ethics Committee, Victoria University of Wellington Ethics 
Committee, the National Office, the National Firefighter's Union, the United 
Fire Brigade's Association and the C.I.S.D.Peer Support Team in the Central 
Region. 
STUDY PROCEDURE 
If you choose to participate in this study I would meet with you on three 
separate occasions over a period of 6 - 8 weeks. Each meeting is expected 
to last up to an hour. 
Within the next 24-48 hours I will telephone you to ask if you are willing to 
participate in the study snd address any questions you may like to ask. If 
you are unwilling or unable to participate then I thank you sincerely for 
considering my request and for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
If you are willing and able to participate in the study I will arrange a time and 
place suitable to yourself for the first interview within 7-1 0 days. 
31. (Information sheet continu'd). 
At the first interview I will discuss the aims and objectives of the study, what 
your involvement entails and address any questions or concerns you may 
have. Following this you will be asked to sign a consent form. After this, the 
first interview will begin. Each interview will be audio-taped, with your 
permission, and the transcript, written conversation, will be given to you to 
verify that the statements are an accurate reflection of what you wanted to 
say. 
A second interview will be arranged approximately 3-4 weeks later at a time 
and place suitable to yourself. The audio-tapes and transcripts will be made 
available for you to view, verify or change. Further questions will be asked 
which will h5ve been generated from the analysis of the first interview. 
A third and final interviewwill follow approximately 2 weeks from the last 
interview. The audio-tapes and transcripts will be made available for you 
once again to view, verify or modify the information. This will be a time for 
you to ask any questions, concerns or queries you may have, not dissimilar to 
a debriefing. At the completion of the study your tapes and transcripts will 
be returned to you or destroyed, whatever you indicate. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for 
considering my request. Please do not hesitate to contact me by 
telephoning me on 4738.064(H) or 237.3103ext.3738(W). 
If you have any concerns about this study you may contact the Chairperson, 
Central Regional Health Authortiy, Wellington Ethics Committee, Wellington 
Hospital, Private Bag 7902, telephone 3855.999 ext.5185 or by Fax 
385.5840. 
If you wish to contact my supervisor regarding this research please telephone 
Margi Martin, Department of Nursing and Midwifery, Victoria University 
tele.4721.00. 
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APPENDIX fY 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY. 
TO EXPLORE THE EXPERIENCE OF CRITICAL INCIDENT 
PRINCIPAL RESEARCHERIINTERVIEWER: Julie Maher (M.A.student, 
Department of Nursing and Midwifery, Victoria University of Wellington). 
RESEARCH SUPERVISOR: Margi Martin, Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Nursing and Midwifery, Victoria University of Wellington. 
TIME AND PLACE OF INTERVIEWS: As convenient to the participant. 
AIMS AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH: , 
This study aims to gain meaning and understanding of the experiences of 
firefighters who have participated in a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing. 
Potential benefits of this research is to gain a better understanding of the 
process and its value or lack of value in order to sustain, reshape or remove 
the present model. Not only will it benefit firefighters but benefit other 
occupational groups especially in the emergency and health areas. 
PARTICIPANTS' COMMITMENTS IN PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY: 
You are asked to meet with the researcher on three occasions in which the 
interviews will be audio-taped and later transcribed by a transcriber. The 
audio-tapes and transcriptions will be locked away when not in use and will 
be destroyed at the end of the study. You may withdraw from the study at 
any time if you so wish. 
D E P A R T M E N T  OF N U R S I N G  A N D  MIDWIFERY 
P.O. Box 600, Wellington. NW Zenlrt~~d, Trleplfonr c644471 5363 or Freeplrotle 0800 108 005 
Fncsimile +644496 5.141 E-mail Nursing-Midwif~y@i~~~w~~~c.nz 
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21. (Consent form continu'd). 
ANONYMITY ASSURANCE: 
Anonymity will be adhered to so that a pseudonym will be used on any 
audio-tapes or transcripts, which only yourself and the researcher will be able 
to identify. Field notes and transcripts will be kept in a safe and secure 
place where access will be restricted to the researcher, transcriber, 
supervisor and examiners. All information will be kept confidential at all 
times and on no account will any information be given to any personnel within 
the New Zealand Fire Service. Your participation in the study will have no 
detrimental effect on your employment within the Service. If during the 
course of the study it becomes evident that you are suffering any ill effects by 
your participation, with your permission you be supported to seek assistance 
from a healfi professional and your participation in the study will be 
tem~inated. The experience of ill effects, will in the first instance be 
determined by yourself, and I will make time before each interview to allow for 
discussion as to your general health and wellbeing. 
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION: 
All interviews will be audio-taped, transcribed and presented to verify, modify 
or withdraw any information you do not wish to remain. The final draft will be 
reported in an anonymous manner. The final draft will be held in the library 
at Victoria University of Wellington. A copy of the Thesis will be given to 
your when it is written. 
STATEMENT BY PARTICIPANT: 
"I have read the information sheet and have all the details of 
the study explained to me by Julie Maher. My questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask 
further questions at any time." 
"If I agree to participate I have the right to withdraw from the study 
at any time and to decline to answer any particular questions." 
"I agree to provide information to the researcher on the understanding 
that my name will not be used without my permission. (The 
information will be used only for this research and 
publicationslpresentations arising from this study)." 
I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY 
Signature of participant ....................................... Date .............. 
Witness name: ...................................... Date .............. 
31. (Consent form continu'd). 
Researcher declaration 
I have discussed with ................................................. articipant's 
name) the aims and procedures involved in the study. 
........................................ ................ Signature of researcher Date 
Three copies required: 1 retained by participant; 1 retained by the 
researcher;ll for records. 
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APPENDIX -V 
TRANSCRIBER CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
TO EXPLORE THE EXPERIENCE OF CRITICAL INCIDENT 
STPFSS OFBRIEFING ON FIREFIGHTEf3S WITHIN A REGIQN 
- OF THE NEW ZEALAND FIRE SERVICE 
This is to certify that I, 
NAME ........................................................................................... 
........................................................................................... ADDRESS 
................................. ................................ TELEPHONE NUMBER .: 
"I am the transcriber for the above-mentioned research study. 
I understand that the information contained in the study audio-tapes I am to 
transcribe is to be kept confidential. 
1 agree to maintain confidentiality by not disclosing any aspects of the 
audio-tapes or typed transcripts with any other persons at all times other than 
with the researcher. 
Audio-tapes, transcripts and computer discs'will be returned to the researcher 
as soon as they are finished with". 
........................................ .................................................. DATE: of 1998. 
SIGNATURE: ............................................................................................. 
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